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Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange-Nassau.

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K I N G S . O F S P A I N  
OF THE  
H O U S E O F B O U R B O N ,  
F R O M T H E A C C E S S I O N O F P H I L I P V .  
T O T H E D E A T H O F C H A R L E S I I I .

1700...TO...1788.

DRAWN FROM ORIGINAL AND UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

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BY  
WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.  
ARCHDEACON OF WILTS, AND RECTOR OF BEMERTON.

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
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P R I N T E D F O R  
L O N G M A N , H U R S T , R E E S , O R M E , A N D B R O W N , P A T E R N O S T E R - R O W .

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VOLUME THE FOURTH.

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# MEMOIRS OF S P A I N.

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## CHAPTER THE FORTY-EIGHTH.

1746—1748.

*Accession of Ferdinand the sixth—His conduct towards the queen dowager and his brothers—His motives for not continuing the war in Italy—His new general, Las Minas, withdraws into Provence—Capture of Genoa by the austro-sardinians—Invasion of Provence—Revolution of Genoa—Pacific negotiations between Spain and England—The Spanish troops again enter Italy—Relief of Genoa—Successes of France in the Low Countries—Negotiations and peace of Aix la Chapelle—Establishment of Don Philip in Italy.*

**F**ERDINAND the Sixth, the only surviving son of Philip by Maria Louisa of Savoy, succeeded his father in the thirty-fourth year of his age. His accession was marked by circumstances which evinced a generous mind, and afforded the prospect of a just and benevolent reign.

CHAP. 48.

1746—1748.

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1746—1748.

The ambition of the queen dowager had plunged Spain into those frequent wars which had exhausted its strength; and she had invariably treated Ferdinand with coolness and aversion, and promoted the establishment of her own children, in opposition to his interests and those of the state. It was therefore confidently expected that the new sovereign would resent the injuries he had received: the nation exulted at the prospect of witnessing the humiliation, if not the punishment, of a woman whose unpopularity was become proverbial. But Ferdinand possessed too much justice and magnanimity to sully his dignity by personal resentment. He ratified the donations of his deceased father, and not only permitted her to retain the palace of St. Ildefonso, so long the scene of her grandeur, but even to take up her residence in the capital. He displayed likewise equal affection and liberality towards his step-brothers, and gave them the strongest assurances of his zeal to promote their interests.

From the usual embarrassments at the commencement of a new reign, and the cautious character of the sovereign, no immediate change was made in the ministry. Villarias was continued in the direction of foreign affairs; and the other departments were confided to the marquis of Ensenada, who, since the death of Campillo

in 1743, had succeeded to the helm of state, and the possession of royal favour. Ferdinand also wrote a letter in his own hand to the king of France, testifying his resolution to maintain the engagements contracted by his deceased father, and declaring that he would sacrifice the last man of his state, to promote the interests of his brother.\*

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We cannot judge to what degree Ferdinand might have imitated the policy of his father, had not the french monarch himself set the example, by pursuing separate negotiations with Holland, and other powers, notwithstanding the repeated promises pledged to the court of Madrid.

A knowledge of these circumstances rendered Ferdinand less scrupulous in departing from the principles of the bourbon alliance. One of the first acts of his government, was to transfer the command in Italy to the marquis of Las Minas, a true spaniard in his aversion to France, with orders to withdraw the army from the scene of action. The new general conveyed a letter in affectionate terms to Don Philip, but was instructed to exclude him from all share in the command, and all influence in the conduct of the war. He joined the army at Voghera, and superseded Gages and Castelar, who were remanded in disgrace to Spain.

August.

\* Mémoires de Richelieu, t. 6, p. 353.—Noailles, t. 6, p. 202.

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1746—1748.

The intelligence of the change of government reached the army at the moment when it was struggling to maintain the position at Placentia, and contributed to aggravate the dejection occasioned by defeat. The bourbon generals next endeavoured to transfer the scene of action to the other side of the Po, but reverses rapidly followed each other ; for the king of Sardinia, after establishing a chain of posts beyond the Po, to cover the Milanese, effected a junction with the austrians, on the upper course of the Trebbia, and thus inclosed their army. Their only hope was consequently placed in a safe retreat. Collecting boats on the Lambro, and throwing two bridges over the Po, they withdrew their troops and fell back through Castillo St. Giovanni, towards Voghera and Tortona. This movement awakening the attention of their vigilant and enterprising enemy, the rear guard was attacked at Rotto Freddo, on the Tidone, by several bodies from the neighbouring posts on the Po and the Trebbia ; new reinforcements, and fresh assailants poured in ; the combat became more general and obstinate ; and they were at length extricated by a column of 5,000 men, who had formed the garrison of Placentia. This action, which lasted several hours, is said to have cost the gallo-spaniards 4,000 killed and 2,000 prisoners ; and by the evacuation of Placentia, vast quanti-

## FERDINAND THE SIXTH.

5

ties of stores, and no less than 80 pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. Broken, dispirited, and reduced by desertion and the sword to 20,000 men, they reached Tortona. On their approach, the sardinian garrison abandoned Novi; and 8,000 men, under Mirepoix, descending to Gavi, once more opened the communication with Genoa.

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1746—1748.

During this struggle, the new general arrived, and from the moment he assumed the command, all concert ceased among the bourbon forces. Las Minas began his retreat to Genoa, and the french, unable to resist the austro-sardinians alone, were constrained to follow his example. Hopes were at first entertained, that an attempt would be made to defend the formidable pass of the Bocchetta. But the spanish general evinced his decided resolution to abandon Italy, by embarking his artillery and baggage, and taking the route to Provence, notwithstanding the united remonstrances of the infant, and the french general. Thus deserted, the situation of the french and genoese became desperate: the main body of the sardinians penetrating by the valley of the Bormida, hastened the retreat of the divided and discomfited army; and Maillebois, after exhorting the genoese to defend their territories to the last extremity, was obliged to follow the example of Las Minas in withdrawing

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1746—1748.

Sept. 15.

towards Provence. Abandoned to their fate, the genoese could not withstand the combined attacks of the austro-sardinians, assisted by the british fleet. The city surrendered almost at discretion ; the garrison were made prisoners of war ; the stores, arms, and artillery, were to be delivered ; the doge and six senators to repair to Vienna and implore forgiveness. The marquis of Botta, who had replaced Lichtenstein in the command, took possession of the place with 15,000 men, while the king of Sardinia occupied Finale and reduced Savona.

In consequence of this success the austrian court meditated the re-conquest of Naples and Sicily, which had been drained of troops to support the war in Lombardy. The british government, however, foreseeing that such an enterprise would irritate the court of Madrid, and render an accommodation with Spain more difficult, over-ruled the design of the empress queen. Her reluctant consent was extorted, to carry the war into the south-eastern provinces of France, which, if successful, would not affect the interests of Spain. It was not difficult to obtain the acquiescence of the king of Sardinia, and before the commencement of November, the allied army crossed the Var. Their progress was however instantly arrested by an insurrection at Genoa, occasioned by the exactions and oppres-

sions of the austrian commanders. The garrison was expelled by the tumultuary efforts of the populace ; and the army, to obviate the mischiefs of this unexpected reverse, hastily measured back its steps. Instead of completing the disasters of the bourbon troops, the austro-sardinians employed the whole winter in the investment of Genoa, their mutual altercations preventing any cordial co-operation ; while the unanimous efforts of the genoese were sustained by the sense of impending danger, and continual succours from France.

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1746—1748.

October to  
December,  
1746.

The spanish sovereigns being highly gratified by the interposition of England to prevent the expulsion of the infant Don Carlos from Naples, private overtures were made and accepted through the channel of the portuguese court, at the moment when the allies crossed the Var. Mr. Keene was sent to Lisbon ; the mediation of Portugal was admitted by both parties ; and a negotiation took place through the agency of the spanish ambassador, Soto Mayor, and by the private correspondence between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid.

These transactions did not escape the notice of France, or the vigilance of the queen dowager. The court of Versailles endeavoured to prevent the defection of Spain by offering to assist in the conquest of Tuscany, as an establishment for

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1746—1748.

Don Philip ; by holding forth various political and commercial advantages ; and by appealing to the affection, which Ferdinand was supposed to entertain towards his family. At the same moment the queen dowager instigated Villarias to reject the mediation of Portugal, without the authority of his sovereign ; and the arrangement was further obstructed by the clandestine opposition of the cardinal da Motta, prime minister of Portugal, who was secretly inclined to France.

December.

To obviate these machinations, Villarias was superseded, though without being removed, by the appointment of Don Joseph de Carvajal, of the family of Linares, a zealous adherent of the new court, to the post of dean of the council of state.\* As he was placed above Villarias by his situation, and empowered to receive communications from the different departments of state, he was thus raised to an important share in the general administration, and the supreme direction of foreign affairs.†

Notwithstanding so clear a proof of the pacific inclinations of Spain, this change did not at first contribute to accelerate an arrangement. The further progress of the negotiation was suspended

\* It is remarkable that on the death of Philip, Villarias was the only remaining member of this once illustrious body.

† Mr. Keene's dispatches from Lisbon, Dec. 15, 1746, and Feb. 26, 1747.

by the refusal of the empress queen to contribute to the establishment of Don Philip in Italy ; and by the unwillingness of England to extort new dismemberments of the austrian inheritance.

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Approaches which shewed a mutual good will, were however made in both countries. The british parliament repealed the act prohibiting commerce with Spain in consequence of the war, at the motion of Mr. Walpole, a zealous advocate for a reconciliation. On the other hand, less formal, but direct communications were made to the court of London through the channel of Macanaz, who was then an agent for Spain at Breda, and of Mr. Walpole himself, by means of correspondents whose names and situation cannot be traced. By these channels, the court of Madrid expressed their sentiments in a style, which shewed that the national honour and the personal feelings of the sovereign himself, were equally interested in the establishment of Don Philip. "I hope," observes one of these correspondents, "your people will see their error; and how their allies are draining them of their money. Their war against us is to no purpose, because Providence has put us in such a situation; and we are so habituated to misery and hardships; that we cannot fall lower, if the war should last twenty years. You will therefore find us indifferent and easy. Believe me, nothing but a

Jan. Mar.  
1747.

June 25.

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1746—1748. settlement for our young gentleman, will ever bring about a peace: drive the nail that will go."

"Nothing," is the remark of Mr. Walpole in giving the substance of this correspondence to the king, "but Don Philip's not going back to Spain will prevail on that court to come to any terms; not from the old policy of the queen, but for the quiet of the present sovereigns. They have enough to do with the cardinal;\* and the very character of Don Philip is a sufficient motive to prevent his return. He is weak in his understanding, and in every thing french; so much, that he affects not to understand the spanish language."†

June.

It was probably in consequence of these communications, that the queen dowager was removed from Madrid, and Mr. Wall, an irish gentleman, who had served in Spain, was secretly deputed to London to forward the arrangements for a peace.

Still, however, the british cabinet, persisting in their complaisance towards Austria, Ferdinand discovered that his eagerness for peace had only exposed him to more onerous demands, and his resolutions were strengthened by the representations of the king of Naples and Don Philip. He

\* Don Louis, the youngest son of Philip.

† Extract of letters to Mr. Walpole, 1747.—Walpole Papers.  
—Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 29 and 31.

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1746—1748.

accordingly opened a communication with the king of Sardinia, ordered Las Minas to co-operate in the relief of Genoa, reinforced his army, and began to refit the navy, which since the engagement with admiral Matthews had remained neglected at Cartagena. In consequence of his instances, also, Maillebois was removed from the command, and replaced by marshal Belleisle, who besides being distinguished for his enterprising spirit, had taken a principal share in the management of the war.

From this co-operation, the bourbon troops once more resumed the offensive. They recrossed the Var, and advancing through the western Riviera delivered Genoa from a blockade of unusual length and severity. At the same time, to renew the war in the vallies of Piemont, Belleisle detached his brother with 15,000 men, to force the pass of the Assietta. The attempt was made with the most desperate courage, but terminated in the loss of the commander himself, and nearly 6,000 men. This enterprise offended the spanish court, whose object was peace, not conquest. Divisions again arose between the generals, and they closed their operations by retiring into winter quarters at an early period.

During the preceding operations in Italy, the french had made their principal efforts to extort a peace from England, by carrying the war into

July 9.

October.

CHAP. 43.

1746—1748.

May, 1745.

October,  
1746.

July 1, 1747.

April, 1748.

Oct. 4, 1745.

the Netherlands, and threatening the united provinces. The victory of Fontenoy first gave a decided superiority to their arms, and was followed by the reduction of Tournay, Ghent, Ostend, Bruges and Ath. The victory of Roucourt in the ensuing year, occasioned the reduction of the whole Netherlands, except Luxembourg; and in the last campaign, the battle of Lauffeld led to the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, the subjugation of dutch Flanders, and the investment of Maestricht. The bickerings usually attendant on ill success arose between the House of Austria and the maritime powers: not only was the independence of Holland once more endangered, but England herself threatened with an invasion from every point of the coast washed by the channel.\*

Fortunately, however, peace was equally necessary to France. The secret intercourse between the courts of London and Madrid had led to an informal accommodation, by which the British ministry not only admitted the right of search, and other claims, in regard to Spanish America; but even acquiesced in the transfer of Guastalla to the infant Don Philip, in addition to Parma and Tuscany. While this accommodation had again widened the breach between the two Bourbon courts, the elevation of Francis

\* House of Austria, vol. 2, ch. 27.

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1746—1748.

duke of Lorraine to the imperial throne, restored the austrian influence in Germany; 30,000 russia auxiliaries in the pay of England were rapidly advancing towards the Netherlands, and strenuous efforts were made to retrieve the recent misfortunes.\*

The marine of France had severely suffered, and the finances were dilapidated. Even victory itself could not shield the successful commander, marshal Saxe, from the cabals of the native generals. The dissipated monarch, who had been stimulated to give a momentary countenance to the operations of the war by his presence, panting to return to his accustomed pleasures and voluptuous residence at Versailles. From the joint operation of all these motives, the french court made overtures for an accommodation soon after the battle of Lauffeld, and tendered terms little differing from those arranged with Spain; the establishment of Don Philip in Italy, and the mutual restoration of all conquests.

England, embarrassed with the expences of the contest, dissatisfied with the court of Vienna, and alarmed at the progress of the french in the Netherlands, did not reject so advantageous a proposal. After some conferences commenced at Breda, and transferred to Aix la Chapelle, the preliminaries of peace were signed between

April 13.

\* House of Austria, vol. 2, p. 2, ch. 29.

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France and the maritime powers, April 30, 1748, without the participation of the court of Vienna, whose pertinacity it was fruitless to combat by argument. Parma and Placentia were assigned to Don Philip, with the addition of Guastalla, recently vacated by the death of the duke Joseph Maria, the last male of the House of Gonzaga.

1746.

The reluctance of the empress queen to ratify the dismemberment of Silesia, and consent to the cessions in Italy, for a time obstructed the progress of the negotiation ; but she was over-ruled by the peremptory tone of England. The definitive treaty was signed on the 18th of October, by France and the maritime powers, within two days accepted by Spain, and on the 23rd, by the empress queen herself.

A trifling contention, however, delayed the accession of the king of Sardinia, and prevented that of the king of Naples. As Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, were ceded to Don Philip, with the reversion of Parma and Guastalla to Austria, and Placentia to the king of Sardinia, should he be called at any future period to the crown of Naples ; Don Carlos rejected this stipulation as a virtual contravention of the right which he himself possessed by the treaty of Vienna in 1739, to dispose of his crown in favour of one of his sons, should he succeed to Spain. The question was warmly contested for a considerable period,

and though the king of Sardinia at length yielded,  
no arguments could vanquish the determination  
of the king of Naples.

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The asiento treaty was renewed for the remaining period of four years; but the other contested points between Spain and England were too numerous and complicated to enter into a general treaty; and were therefore, by mutual consent, referred to a particular and separate negotiation. Accordingly Mr. Keene quitted Lisbon to resume his residence at Madrid, and Mr. Wall took upon himself the public character of Spanish minister in London.\*

\* Copies of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, in Chalmers' and other collections of public documents.—Tindal, vol. 21, p. 357.  
—Koch Histoire des Traités, t. 2, p. 74.

## CHAPTER THE FORTY-NINTH.

1746—1753.

*Characters of Ferdinand and queen Barbara—Of the ministers Ensenada and Cerejal—Influence and characters of the confessor and Farinelli—Fundamental principle of Ferdinand's policy.*

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FERDINAND was in the thirty-sixth year of his age, when the treaty of Aix la Chapelle pacified Europe, rendered the court of Madrid the centre of political intrigue, and revived that harmony between Spain and Great Britain which had been interrupted by the machinations of France, and the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese. He was low in stature, ordinary in person, of a delicate constitution, and docile temper, though occasionally subject to violent fits of passion. Scrupulously attentive to veracity in all his words and actions, he was characterised under the noble designation of ‘a prince who was guilty of no untruth.’ He was economical almost to a degree of parsimony in his own personal expences, yet liberal to his subjects in cases of distress. He was supremely anxious to maintain his country in peace and tranquillity, from a conviction that the spirit of heroism and con-

quest, which had so long domineered in the counsels of Spain, had injured the real interests of the nation, and obstructed the improvement of agriculture and commerce.

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Though he felt a personal affection for the chief of the House of Bourbon, yet he equally deprecated a dependence on France, or hostility with Great Britain ; and repeatedly declared that he would never be a viceroy to the king of France upon the throne of Spain. Like his father, he never doubted the invalidity of the renunciation which had been made of the eventual succession to the french throne ; but so far from casting a longing eye on that succession, he invariably expressed his resolution to remain in Spain, should it ever become vacant, and leave to his brother the option of realising his pretensions.

Subject to the same hypochondriac malady which had afflicted his father, with fewer resources, and as little activity, he sunk into despondency and apprehension of death, on the slightest indisposition or anxiety. Naturally more irresolute than his father, he fancied he had done his duty when he had charged his ministers with the burthen of affairs. Averse to the details of business, from habit and disposition incapable of serious application, the chace and music formed his only amusements, or rather occupations. He was so sensible of this incapacity, that

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to a person who complimented him on his skill in shooting, he replied, "It would be extraordinary if I could not do *one* thing well." This conviction, and these defects, rendered him a mere instrument in the hands of those to whom he confided the government.

Ferdinand placed the most implicit confidence in his queen, communicated to her the most private affairs, and seldom formed the slightest resolution without her advice; or rather approbation. She therefore became a no less important personage in the government, than Elizabeth Farnese during the preceding reign.

Maria Magdalena Theresa BARBARA, was the daughter of John the fifth, king of Portugal, by Mary Anne, daughter of the emperor Leopold the first. She was born in 1711, and in 1729 espoused Ferdinand, who was two years older than herself. By her meek and insinuating manners, she conciliated the good will of Philip and the queen her step-mother; while she gained the entire affection of her husband by her amiable deportment, and conformity to his inclinations and temper. She was homely in her features, and the original elegance of her shape was lost in corpulence.

Barbara was a woman of agreeable address, sprightly wit, and uncommon gentleness of manners. She was cheerful in public, and extra-

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gantly fond of dancing and music; but she partook of the constitutional melancholy of her husband. Her solitary hours were haunted by two contrary apprehensions; the dread of want, the customary fate of the Spanish queens, if she survived him; and the fear of a sudden death, which her asthmatic complaint, and plethoric habit, rendered not unlikely. From the first of these motives, she was greedy of amassing money, and debased her dignity by accepting presents from the ministers, and even from foreign ambassadors. Hence, notwithstanding her engaging qualities, she was never beloved nor respected in Spain.\*

But, although she swayed Ferdinand with as much power, and less difficulty, than even Elizabeth Farnese governed his father; yet many peculiarities in his temper and disposition, as well as in her own, set bounds to her absolute controul. Timid and irresolute on occasions of emergency and difficulty, she was unable to act with firmness, and melted into tears when it became necessary to decide with spirit and dignity. The fear of harrassing and agitating the king's mind, and of throwing him into doubts and despondency, prevented her from exerting all her influence in obtaining the dismission of persons in

\* Mr. Keene's dispatch to the earl of Holderness, Nov. 6, 1751.

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whom she did not place implicit confidence. For she well knew from experience the indolence and irresolution of the king ; and dreading the effects of anxiety on his constitutional weakness, she was apprehensive lest any difficulty should induce him to execute a resolution he had sometimes hinted, of resigning his crown. Another embarrassment, not less serious, arose from the fear that the king of Naples would profit by the increase of his hypochondriac malady, to assume the reins of government, and the consciousness that he was secretly encouraged by a strong party in Spain, and by the private instigations of France.

Without hopes of succession, without talents for rule, and of delicate health; she confined her ambition principally to the credit of nominating and supporting the chief ministers, taking little share in the exercise of that power to which she had raised them. She employed, therefore, all her address to maintain her ascendancy over the king, and fomented disputes among the ministers, that by holding the balance in her own hands, she might incline it to the weakest side. Convinced from long experience, and a perfect knowledge of her husband's disposition, that he founded his policy on the maintenance of peace, she supported that system with her whole in-

fluence. From similar motives, she alternately favoured the courts of Great Britain and France, as each appeared on the decline.\*

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At his accession, Ferdinand found the administration of affairs in the hands of two ministers. The first was La Quadra, marquis of Villarias, whom we have before described as a man of slow parts, and confined understanding, accustomed only to the routine of business, without talents or capacity equal to his high situation, who had been suffered to continue at his post, merely because he gave no umbrage to the queen, and was habituated to the drudgery of office.

The other was Don Zeno Somo de Villa, marquis de la Ensenada, who, from an humble origin, had risen to the post of prime minister. He was born in 1704, at the village of Arioca, received the rudiments of education at one of the royal seminaries, and obtained a competent knowledge of the different branches of literature and science, particularly the classics and mathematics. We find him afterwards a master of one of the royal seminaries, an occupation which afforded him the means to ground and extend his acquirements. From this office, he appears to

\* The characters of Ferdinand and Barbara are drawn from the interesting dispatches of Mr. Keene, in 1749 and subsequent years. The editor of the *Memoires de Richelieu*, has given some curious traits of their characters, as well as of their two ministers, but with the usual exaggeration of french writers; t. 6, ch. 29.

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have removed to a banking house at Cadiz, where, in the capacity of clerk, he studied the theory and practice of commerce and finance.

We next discover him in a subordinate situation in the department of the marine, where he rose in rotation, till his superior talents attracted the notice of Don Joseph Patiño, whom he always revered as his first patron, and "to whom," as he frequently said, "I owe all I know, and what I am." Probably by his means, assisted by the patronage of the infant Don Philip, he was nominated secretary to the admiralty.

Similarity of situation and pursuits appears to have brought him into the notice of Campillo, who succeeded to the favour and power of Patiño. It is certain at least that he acquired numerous friends by his insinuating manners, and during a severe, but temporary indisposition of Campillo in 1741, he was selected to carry on the business of his departments. This incident gave him an opportunity to display his abilities to Philip and his queen, and to form connections at court. Accordingly, on the departure of the infant Don Philip to Italy, he accompanied him with the title of secretary. In that capacity he maintained an intimate correspondence with Campillo, and was charged with the arrangements for the pay and subsistence of the army.

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The death of Campillo, in 1743, opened the way to his further elevation. From the high opinion entertained of his abilities, joined to the zealous support of the duchess of Torecusa, camerara mayor, his great patroness, he was chosen to fill the place of the deceased minister, as the only person acquainted with his plans and preparations. He was remanded from Italy, and nominated secretary for the marine, finances, and war, with the title of marquis of Ensenada. In the dispatches of Noailles, he is mentioned as, the first and favourite minister of Philip.\*

On the death of Philip, his credit appeared likely to suffer from the change of sovereigns; but having formed a friendship with Farinelli, at a time when they were both in an inferior situation, through his recommendation, aided by timely presents to the new queen, he acquired her patronage, and maintained his former offices and consideration.†

His brilliant parts, ready comprehension, and facility in transacting business, gave him a deep interest in the mind of a weak and indolent sovereign, who sunk under the fatigue of reflection; while he increased his favour with the queen, by

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 6, p. 166.

† Sueinta Relacion y ultima desgracia acaecida al marques de la Ensenada, MS.

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consulting her caprice, and by a dexterous subser-  
vience to her views.

Conscious of his abilities, to which he justly attributed his rise, Ensenada prided himself on his humble origin, and when honoured with the title of marquis, he, with affected humility, assumed that of *Ensenada*, a species of pun, signifying “Nothing in itself.” With this pretended modesty, he was vain and presumptuous, extravagant in his style of living, and so fond of dress and ornaments, that he wore in his various decorations, jewels to the value of £.100,000.\* He was disinterested and above the suspicion of venality ; yet the profusion of his establishment, his liberality and taste for splendour, and the numerous bribes which he lavished to support his interest, rendered him rapacious in amassing money. From a fear of offending the queen, he concealed his real principles of policy. To gratify her, he favoured the removal of Villarias, and promoted the transfer of the foreign affairs to Don Joseph de Carvajal, a nobleman whose sedate temper and reserved habits did not seem likely to supplant him in the royal favour, and

\* Clarke says of him, at a later period, “He wears, on a gala or court day, more crosses, diamonds, orders, fillets, &c. than any spanish grandee, so that, like Simon in the *Aeneid*, he seems a victim fled from sacrifice. *Vittasque deum quas hostia gesi.*” Clarke’s Travels in Spain, p. 332.—Mr. Keene’s dispatches.

who, content with appearing as his superior,  
would, he hoped, submit to act under his controul.

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Don Joseph de Carvajal, the first spaniard of high rank who, for a considerable period, had occupied a place in the ministry, was a younger son of the duke of Linares.\* He was born in 1703, brought up in the diplomatic line, and seems to have been secretary to Montijo, when ambassador at the german diet, in which capacity he drew up the documents proving the rights of Philip to the austrian succession. He was afterwards minister in some of the german courts, and on his return to Spain, was selected to counteract the machinations of the queen dowager, and charged with the direction of foreign affairs, under the name of minister of state, because he deemed the usual title of secretary derogatory to his birth. Though he had been long in habits of friendship with Ensenada, he acquired the esteem of the king, and the good will of the public, by the freedom with which he professed his antigallican principles.

Carvajal had not long exercised his office, before he began to regard his subordinate influence as unworthy of his rank and character. At first he meditated a resignation ; but the increasing confidence of the sovereigns, and the cheering influence of public opinion, encouraged him to

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Lisbon, Dec. 15, 1746.

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retain his post, to emancipate himself gradually from his dependence, and to give full scope to the zeal which he felt for the welfare of his country.

Carvajal possessed strong judgment, sound sense, and a cultivated understanding, though without brilliant talents. He was stiff and formal in his manners, devoted to etiquette, diffident of himself, and still more diffident of others. He was laborious in business, and slow in deciding, but tenacious of an opinion once formed. Though at first timid, from the nature of his situation, and want of support, he gained firmness and decision by experience, and acquired no ordinary share of address in negotiation. Even his most implacable enemies respected his integrity ; and he was so remarkable for an uncourtier-like adherence to rigid veracity, that he never allowed himself to make an innocent compliment to the sovereigns, lest it should be imputed to adulation. Conscious of his integrity, and the uprightness of his views, he formed no petty intrigues, and scorned to court Farinelli, or bend to the confessor. He invariably recommended measures calculated to promote the independence and honour of the crown, as well as the interest and happiness of the people, yet he proffered his advice in a dry and indifferent manner, as if careless whether it was adopted or rejected ; and thus embarrassed his sovereign, who was desirous

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to spare himself the toil of deliberation, and expected his minister to direct his resolutions. Conscious of his own reserved and uninviting deportment, Carvajal often expressed his surprise, "*how so dry a chip,*" as he called himself, could preserve his credit with the king and queen, in opposition to the intrigues of the french. In every thing a contrast to Ensenada, he was plain and simple in his apparel and mode of life, and displayed the austerity and disinterestedness of an antient roman. With a becoming sense of his high birth, he despised honours and titles, and was more flattered with the reputation of an honest man, than of a great minister. He retained his office not from love of power, but from a consciousness that his continuance was necessary to liberate his country from her long dependence on the french, whom he both disliked and feared.

Attached to Great Britain from habit and principle, he dwelt with pleasure on his own descent from the family of Lancaster, and was anxious to cement a stable union between the two crowns. Yet in the promotion of this favourite object, he never lost sight of the honour and independence of his country, and carefully avoided such measures as might affect the neutrality of Spain, which he considered as merely exchanging the bondage of France for subser-

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1746—1758.

vience to Great Britain. On his first entrance into the ministry, he told the king that, to be great and independent, he must have no joint views or engagements with France, otherwise he would be considered and treated as a subordinate prince.\* “ His fixed principle,” says Mr. Keene, “ is, that a close union between France and any other country, but especially with England or Spain, must by the nature of things be ruinous to either of them. He rails at their bad faith, has but a poor opinion of their ministers ; and he has told me more than once, that ever since he has been in the ministry, and as long as he shall remain in it, the french shall be kept at a distance from any interference, in matters purely regarding England and Spain. In a word, if I cannot bring him to be as much an englishman as I desire, I will be more sanguine than I am apt to be, in promising that he will never be a frenchman.”†

The integrity, sincerity, and independent spirit of Carvajal, endeared him to a sovereign who possessed similar qualities. His maxims became the ruling principle of Ferdinand’s government ; and the esteem of the king gave him so much interest in the mind of the queen, that

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Aug. 30, 1752.

† Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, June 28, 1749. The characters of Carvajal and Ensenada are likewise chiefly drawn from his interesting dispatches.

he gradually succeeded in balancing the power of Ensenada.

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The confessor, father Ravago, a jesuit, owed his appointment to Carvajal. He possessed a great share in the king's confidence, less from personal qualities than from the respect paid by a devout prince to his character and office. He was ambitious of obtaining the same influence with Ferdinand as d'Aubenton with Philip ; and of interfering in the government. Being ignorant of foreign affairs, he was tutored by a junta of his more able brethren, and from conviction or interest adopted the principle of his sovereign, that Spain should maintain an even balance between France and England. The eagerness with which his agency was courted by all parties, and the advantage of a long and daily conference with the monarch for the purpose of easing his scruples of conscience, encouraged him to aspire to a kind of independence, and to form a party distinct from those of Carvajal and Ensenada. One of the first proofs of his influence was the change of the governor of Castile.

"The removal of the bishop of Oviedo," says Mr. Keene, "from being governor of the council of Castile, was executed in a manner equally disobliging to that prelate and to M. Carvajal, at whose recommendation he was promoted to that high office. This alteration may possibly produce

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some others, as it has set the two ministers at greater variance than ever; and has given another person an opportunity to make use of this employment, neither to *their* advantage, nor to that of her catholic majesty. I mean the king's confessor, who has artfully employed Ensenada's credit to remove the bishop, and of M. Carvajal's interposition to prevent Ensenada from placing the person he intended in his room. But in this conflict between them, he has introduced his own friend the bishop of Barcelona, and of late has altered his language, and speaks in a more authoritative tone to those who apply to him than he has hitherto done.

"This jesuit's employment gives him an opportunity of speaking to the king alone, an hour every day; and his friend, the president of the council of Castile, has the same privilege once a week. They may thus play the game into each others hands; and both the ministers and the queen may have no other knowledge of what is passing between them than what they may think fit to discover. They have a secretary of state for the interior affairs of the kingdom, who is intirely at the disposal of the confessor, and will be ready to dispatch the king's decrees before either Carvajal or Ensenada can have any scent of them."\*

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, Madrid, Sept. 8, 1749.

Among the persons who figured in the court of Ferdinand, we must not omit Farinelli, whose influence over the queen was so great that he is ludicrously stiled by some foreign writers the prime minister.

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Carlo Broschi, surnamed Farinelli, was born at Naples in 1705, and having attracted the admiration of Italy by the excellence of his voice and style of singing, came to England in 1734, was engaged at the Italian opera, and rapidly amassed a considerable fortune. In 1737 he went to Versailles, and was drawn to Madrid by Elizabeth Farnese, who was desirous to try the power of music in soothing the melancholy of her husband. Soon after his arrival, she arranged a concert in an apartment adjoining to that where the king was in bed, where he had lain for a considerable time; and from which no persuasion could induce him to rise. Philip was struck with the first air sung by Farinelli, and at the conclusion of the second, sent for him, loaded him with praises, and promised to grant whatever he should demand. The musician, who had been tutored by the queen, intreated him to rise from his bed, suffer himself to be shaven, and dressed, and attend the council. Philip complied, and from that moment his disorder took a favourable turn. This incident was the origin of the high favour to which Farinelli arrived. He regularly sung

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every evening to the king the same airs, was rewarded with a pension of £2,000 per annum, besides continual presents from their catholic majesties ; and was no less noticed by Ferdinand and Barbara, prince and princess of Asturias, who were both extravagantly fond of music.

On the accession of Ferdinand, he rose in favour and consideration, was honoured with the cross of Calatrava, and as director of the opera became the minister of the royal pleasures. An elegant theatre was erected at the gardens of the Buen Retiro ; singers, dancers, and skilful mechanists were drawn from every quarter ; and under his superintendence the capital and royal residence were enlivened with a series of exhibitions, which vied with the most splendid spectacles in Europe. His taste and abilities were equally displayed in the magnificent musical parties on the Tagus, during the royal residence at Aranjuez.

His situation in these diversions enabled him to hold long and familiar conversations with the queen, and to ingratiate himself still more in her confidence. He was therefore soon beset by all the pretenders to court favour, flattered by the public ministers, and cajoled even by crowned heads. He was not, however, dazzled by such temptations. He did not seek for honours, and accepted the cross of Calatrava merely from a

fear of offending his royal patroness. Always modest and unassuming, he behaved with affability to those below him, and with respect to his superiors; often bantering those who forgot their rank to pay him court, and displaying a disinterestedness and independence worthy of a more exalted station.

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1746—1765;

Knowing the uncertain tenure of court favour, he exerted the same ingenuity to avoid, as others employ to gain, a share of political influence. But with all his caution, he could not always resist the flattery of sovereigns,\* and the importunities of ministers, particularly when he found that his agency was not unacceptable to his royal patroness herself. He therefore became the frequent channel of political communication, and occasionally ventured to suggest such notions as were likely to please the queen, or were furnished by those with whom he was in habits of friendship. He has been falsely accused of receiving bribes from the English and Austrian ambassadors; but with a character so peculiarly disinterested, his own fortune and the favour of his patrons placed him above this species of temptation. Indeed in his whole conduct, we trace the operation of more honourable motives. The first was a

\* Kaunitz apologising to the Empress Queen when he requested her to write to Madame de Pompadour, she replied, "have I not flattered Farinelli?" House of Austria, vol. 2, p. 675.

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zealous devotion to his royal patroness, which rendered him incessantly watchful to avoid clashing with her favourite principles or rules of government. Other considerations were respect for the empress Maria Theresa, whom, as a native of Naples, he always considered as his sovereign; and a strong sense of gratitude for the favour and patronage he had experienced in England. But the most powerful, and perhaps only motive which overcame his studied caution, was the esteem which he particularly entertained towards Ensenada. Him he never courted in prosperity or deserted when he was declining in favour, and though he was often treated by him with insulting coolness, he was never unfaithful to the sentiments of their former friendship.

From this review of the court and ministry of Madrid, we find a weak and hypochondriac, but honest and pacific king, almost entirely governed by his queen, yet occasionally influenced by Carvajal, Ensenada, and the confessor; bound by ties of blood and affection to France, yet from personal as well as political motives attached to Great Britain; alternately beset by the two powers, who respectively endeavoured to engage him on their side by perpetual proposals of treaties of alliance. The queen partly influenced by the court of Lisbon, partly by her cousin the empress queen, partly

by Farinelli; supporting Ensenada even while she knew and disapproved his artifices: esteeming Carvajal and approving his measures, yet thwarting him from jealousy. The two ministers opposite in temper and abilities, and at continual variance with each other. Power placed in such a manner that it was difficult to exert it; the queen, Carvajal, Ensenada and the confessor seldom agreeing so as to unite on a single point, each having credit to hinder affairs, but yet not sufficient to bring them to a conclusion, while the necessity of keeping the king easy in his mind, and the dread of throwing him into despondency, linked together, or rather prevented the separation of these discordant parts.\* Yet with all these symptoms of weakness and the want of a solid and well-grounded system, no period occurs, since the elevation of the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, in which the interests and independence of the kingdom were so well and consistently supported as during the reign of Ferdinand the sixth. This advantage was principally owing to the pacific inclinations of the monarch, and to the firmness and integrity of Carvajal, whose principles outlived his administration.

\* Mr. Keene's dispatches.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTIETH.

1749—1754.

*Difficulties in settling an arrangement with England, relative to the commerce of Spain and the colonies—Conclusion of a definitive treaty—Disputes relative to its execution—Plans of Ensenada to restrain the contraband traffic of the dutch settlement at Curaçoa—Negotiations between Spain and Portugal, relative to the colony of Sacramento—Abrogation of the commercial treaty with Denmark.*

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AFTER the termination of the treaty at Aix la Chapelle, the principal attention of the British and Spanish courts was occupied in the adjustment of their particular disputes.

It was the great object of England to obtain the renewal of the commercial privileges, and particularly the confirmation of the treaty signed in 1715, which was intended to replace British subjects in the same situation, as during the reign of Charles the second. This design was, however, totally at variance with the maxims which had reigned in the Spanish counsels since the accession of the House of Bourbon; and with the leading principle of every Spanish minister, however disposed towards England, to exclude foreigners in general from any direct intercourse with the colonies, and to check the progress of

foreign trade in Spain by heavy duties and incessant obstructions.

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It was the just observation of Mr. Keene, in adverting to the jarring interests of the two courts which had excited the late war; “The principal cause of this evil, on the part of Spain, consists in the very nature and spirit of the laws and original institutions, for the government of the Spanish West Indies. They were framed at a time when Spain had extended a whimsical universal right to land, sea, and the air itself of that vast country, and was resolved to do her utmost to prevent the approach of any stranger. The very act of appearing there was criminal, as long as she had force to support it. From this source, all orders to governors, instructions to guarda costas, and every public dispatch and determination in tribunals, were, and still are infected. How contrary and inapplicable such principles are to the present state and condition of America, when several princes, and particularly the crown of Great Britain, have such an empire there, must appear at first view. And it will seem likewise, that other nations may be exposed to very unjust usage on the part of the Spaniards, without any explicit or positive orders, or design from this court for their proceedings. On the contrary, so righteous a prince as the present king of Spain may think he is doing

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justice, while the laws of that country are taking their course, and doing wrong. Such inconveniences must follow more or less, as long as the laws and government of that world are not adapted to the present state and division of its territories.

" This language I have held to both the spanish ministers, in order to bring them to some method to stop this evil, so difficult to be cured, that it demands no less than a tolerable change, or some modification at least of their primitive instructions. The effect of these insinuations is, that M. Carvajal assures me, he is so much of my opinion, that when he assisted and voted in the council of Indies, of which he is governor, he contradicted the judgment of his fellow counsellors ; and M. Ensenada, in his more warm way, told me that he has often made the same reflections ; that he thought the most beneficial thing which could happen to this country, would be to burn all the laws of the Indies."\*

Notwithstanding the liberal principle which was gradually acquiring the ascendancy in the spanish councils, the national jealousy was continually inflamed by various causes, and by none more than the commercial and party publications in England, which were filled with exaggerated

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, Dec. 8, 1750.

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accounts of the american treasures, and projects of commercial enterprises. Among this mass of publications, each of which doubtless contributed to strengthen the general impression, the spaniards appear to have paid particular attention to "The Interests of Great Britain ill understood," a pamphlet which was written before the war of the succession ; and to the later narrative of lord Anson's voyage, which at this period was given to the public.

A single example which occurred in the course of the commercial negotiation, will shew the extreme sensibility of the spanish court in matters the most remotely regarding America. The subject was an expedition for a voyage of discovery to the south seas, and particularly to ascertain the properties and situation of Falkland's Islands, the importance of which was highly vaunted by the editor of Anson's voyage.\*

"Carvajal," observes Mr. Keene, " said he was sorry that, so soon after the signature of a treaty for re-establishing the antient friendship between the two crowns, new matter should be projected, which would probably throw us into the same, or worse disputes than those which had been the cause of the last rupture. We knew, by experiance, that our having possessions in the neighbourhood and way of each other, where

\* Anson's Voyage, b. 1, ch. 9.

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communication and commerce were absolutely prohibited on both sides, had exposed us to many disagreeable accidents. It must hurt those who cordially desired a solid union, to see any new attempts which might keep alive our ancient jealousies, and occasion what he on his part deprecated as sincerely as any one. It was in this light he must look upon the preparations we were making at present, to send two frigates into the american seas ; that neither he, nor any one else could be a stranger to the rise and extent of such an expedition, since it was so fully explained in the printed relation of lord Anson's voyage."

After detailing the arguments and explanations which he employed on this occasion, Mr. Keene continues :

" Whatever I could say did not seem to render this scheme more palatable. When he appeared to give credit to our not having any design to settle on the two islands in question, he adverted to the inability of pretending to a further examination of them, and affirmed they had been long since first discovered by the spaniards, who called them the *Islas de Leones*, from the number of sea lions on their coasts, and that in the office books there were ample descriptions of their dimensions, properties, &c. If we did not intend to make any establishment there, what service could this knowledge be to us ? We had

his possessions in that part of the world, and consequently could want no passages or places to refresh in. He hoped we would consider what air it would have to see us planted directly against the mouth of the straits of Magellan, ready on all occasions to enter into the South Seas, where the first step would be to endeavour to discover and settle in some other islands, in order to remedy the inconvenience of so long a voyage as that to China, and to refit our naval force on any disappointment we might experience in our future attacks upon the Spanish coasts, as had happened to lord Anson. \* \* \*

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"I afterwards visited Ensenada, who cut short my account by saying that the present time and circumstances appeared not the most proper for such an undertaking, from the rumours to which it would give rise. That the French, who are very jealous and uneasy, would think, in consequence of our disputes relative to the island of Tchago, that we were forming schemes together to strip them of their possessions in America. He repeated his hopes that it would be laid aside for the present. I answered this minister as the other, and nearly with the same effect."\*

In such a disposition, the difficulty of effecting a satisfactory arrangement may easily be conceived. After much discussion, the question of

\* Mr. Keene to the Duke of Bedford, Antigola, May 21, 1749.

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search was passed over in silence by mutual consent, and other inferior matters prudently reserved by the ambassador himself. But on the grand point, the restoration of the English to the same commercial advantages as before the war of the succession, he had at once to struggle with pride, prejudice, and interest. Though empowered to purchase the concession, by sacrificing the remaining term of the asiento, and compromising the South Sea Company's claims for a sum far inferior to their amount, he encountered innumerable difficulties in completing the arrangement. The king was averse to a compensation which might appear as if granted to purchase the accession of Great Britain; Carvajal was full of scruples with regard to the American trade, and the Treaty of 1715 in general; and every difficulty was aggravated by the machinations of Ensenada, and the cabals of the French party. Although the Queen supported the British interest, and the agency of the Visconde de Ponte de Lima, Portuguese ambassador, was employed, it was finally found necessary to recall Wall, the Spanish minister, from London, to facilitate the conclusion by his personal credit, and skilful explanations.\*

At length the address of Mr. Keene, thus

\* Mr. Keene to the Earl of Holderness, Madrid, March 12, 1752.

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powerfully assisted, was victorious. But the eagerness of the British cabinet to push their advantages raised a new difficulty. This was the demand for the revival of a private agreement between the magistrates of St. Andero, and the British merchants, concluded in 1700, before the death of Charles the second, and though passed over in the treaty of Utrecht, confirmed in that of 1715. An agreement which opened such an avenue for contraband, and infringed the rights of sovereignty, was rejected by the Spanish court with the utmost indignation. “The repugnance of Carvajal to the treaty of 1715,” says Mr. Keene, “is so great, that he informed me it was an article in Masones’s\* instructions at the congress, not to consent to the revalidation if it had been enumerated among the rest. He has at last been prevailed upon to consent to some material articles, to which he at first very strongly objected, and I was in hopes he would have admitted this, having inserted it in the project which I gave him at Aranjuez, and heard no objection to it till we had agreed on the other articles of the treaty. He then declared very positively that he would never pass it, nor durst he so much as propose it to the king his master.. It was a dishonour to the regal

\* Masones had appeared on the behalf of Spain at the congress of Aix la Chapelle, and was now minister at Paris.

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dignity, and the worst of examples to permit subjects to assume the character of sovereigns, by entering into public engagements with other nations. I urged, it was the regal power which gave existence to this treaty, and consequently could not be hurt by it. I expressed also the surprise it would cause, that his catholic majesty, who so much venerated the memory of his royal father, and thought himself secure in following his footsteps, should deviate from them in this instance, and, I might say, put a slur on his conduct in giving the royal sanction to a treaty entered into in a manner derogatory to the authority of the crown. Nothing could move him from his resolution. But I at last prevailed upon him to lay these new representations before his master that evening, and to let him know that I could not conclude without this article, as indeed I refused to do it. The next morning, he told me, that the moment he began to prepare the king to hear my instances, his majesty perceived his intent, and abruptly left the table, where he was at the *despacho*.

"I am under no apprehension that these are little ministerial arts; for, besides my knowledge and experience of the minister's character, I have had checks and intelligence which convince me to the contrary. The truth is, he had fixed in the king a resolution not to grant money on this

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occasion, nor suffer his dignity to be participated with his subjects. The point of interest has been got over, that of honour is not to be removed by any means imaginable. The result of my attempts has been a declaration from M. de Carvajal, that if I did not think proper to sign, I must take the chance of future events upon myself; and if I did conclude, and my court should think this to be as material an article as I had done, the remedy was not to ratify the treaty, and leave matters as they were, for this article would never be granted."\*

Mr. Keene yielded, and all other difficulties were finally vanquished or tacitly passed over. On the 5th of October, Carvajal and Keene signed the treaty, by which the British nation were restored to the same immunities and privileges as in the time of Charles the second, together with the same advantages in trade as native Spaniards, or the most favoured nations. All innovations in commerce were to be revoked on the part of Spain, and prevented as far as possible on that of England, and mutual differences and demands to be extinguished. In return, the king of England renounced the remaining term of the *asiento* treaty, and accepted the sum of £.100,000 as a compensation for the claims of the South Sea Company on the Spanish

Oct. 5,  
1750.

\* Mr. Keene to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1750, N.S.

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crown. No mention was made of the right of search.\*

The satisfaction with which this arrangement was received by the pacific sovereigns of Spain, will appear from the audience of Mr. Keene, before the arrival of the british ratification.

Dec. 8.

" After presenting the letter, and accompanying it with the usual expressions of the king's friendship and esteem, I thought myself authorised, and even obliged to acquaint the catholic king with the satisfaction of his majesty at the conclusion of the late transaction, and his resolution to cultivate and augment the harmony so happily established between the two crowns, for their mutual benefit.

" I must confess I only expected the customary short answers to these general expressions. But he extended his discourse in a manner I had never observed before, upon his particular friendship and esteem for the king, his satisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty, his resolution to maintain and augment the union between the two crowns ; and added, that he did not doubt I had given a faithful account of his desire to compose our differences, and his readiness to grant all the facilities which could

\* Commercial treaty of Madrid, Oct. 5, 1750, in the collections of treaties.—Anderson's History of Commerce, v. 3, p. 277.—Tindal, v. 21, p. 421.

be reasonably expected from him for that end. He was then pleased to express his approbation of my conduct in general, as well as in this last instance, in such a manner, that I do not know whether it would be more vanity in me to mention it, or insensibility and ingratitude to be entirely silent upon it.

"I returned my most humble thanks in the best manner I was able, and seeing him without restraint, and in a humour to admit me almost to a familiar conversation, I took the liberty to add, 'As it had been the great object and desire of my life to see the two nations in the strictest friendship, I should think myself very happy in having served as an instrument in so glorious a work, which I now hoped would be completed under his just and auspicious reign. The experience of many years had shewn me that the interests and prosperity of both nations were so naturally combined, that the good or hurt they did to each other, retorted back on themselves reciprocally; in so much, that nothing was more true, than that, to be a good spaniard, it was necessary to be a good englishman.' But before I could reverse the sentence, he himself added, with a smile, 'That to be a good englishman likewise, it was necessary to be a good spaniard.' I continued, 'It is not only the particular interest and honour of the two crowns which will

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follow from their good intelligence and union; but likewise the security and happiness of the rest of Europe both required and depended upon it.' And it was then I heard, what I never did expect to hear from the mouth of a prince of the House of Bourbon, the Spanish proverb of *Paz con Inglaterra*; though, perhaps from that religious scrupulousness he observes in all his words and actions, he did not finish it with its second part, *con todo el mundo guerra*.\*

" My audience with the queen was so much the same, that it was easy to see they had agreed upon the manner of receiving me. She expressed great satisfaction at what had been done; and when I replied, how much it had been her own work, she said she was glad to have contributed to the good of both nations, and particularly to have had this opportunity of complying with the desires of the crown of Portugal.

" I have perhaps been a little too fond and particular upon the language which has been held to me at the Buen Retiro. But the unusualness of it in that place to a British minister, and the cordiality and pleasure with which it was accompanied, will in some measure excuse my falling into this temptation.

" I must still beg leave to add an anecdote that fell from Carvejal in one of our late confer-

\* Peace with England; war with all the world.

except. ‘Puy霖,’ said he, ‘can never forget how he served us at Aix la Chapelle; nor be surprised at our conduct on this or any other occasion. I have told the king that what was now done was only a sample of what might follow, in revenge for the usage Spain had experienced from France.’ Indeed it is difficult to give a true idea of the strength of his expressions and the honesty of his disposition, for preserving the lustre and independence of this crown, and cultivating the friendship of his majesty for that and other great ends.”\*

Even after this auspicious conclusion, Spanish prejudices manifested themselves, first in regard to the form of the instructions sent to the American officers and governors, for the prevention of future vexations; and afterwards in the arrangement of the home duties, without which the most essential articles of the treaty would have remained a dead letter. The secret author of these obstructions was doubtless Ensenada, though he affected the same zeal as his colleague for a good understanding, and threw the blame on one Valencia, director of the royal rents, and other inferior ministers, whom he represented as supported by the powerful influence of the confessor.†

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, Dec. 8, 1750.

† Ibid.

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Representations proving fruitless, it was found necessary to alarm the pacific monarch by threats of war, before this long pending transaction could be brought to a satisfactory issue. Carvajal himself, as the only expedient to baffle the intrigues of his colleague and the machinations of France, made no hesitation in laying the representation before his master. The result is triumphantly announced by Mr. Keene. "There has been a coolness of late between M. de la Ensenada and me, on account of my imputing these delays in some measure to him, and my pressing him so far upon these subjects, that he imagined I suspected his veracity and intentions. All was made up between us by general Wall, to whose behaviour in this whole transaction I can never do sufficient justice.

" But to return to my representation of the 18th June, M. de Carvajal took the earliest proper occasion to read it to their catholic majesties, and supported it in a manner becoming his integrity and desire to preserve the friendship between the two crowns. Several circumstances concurred at this time to raise serious reflections in this court upon so important a point. They were all turned to such advantage, that the question to be determined was, whether by refusing to give us satisfaction and preventing the injustices complained of, Spain would prefer a war

with England; which must necessarily throw her back into her old yoke to France, to the tranquillity, security, and independency she enjoys at present by her friendship with a crown whose interest obliges it to look upon the grandeur and happiness of Spain as necessary to its own. It has been shewn there was no medium between these two propositions, one or the other ~~must~~ be depended upon; and the choice has fallen where good sense, justice, and good policy should direct it.

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"The first information I had of so material a resolution, was from her catholic majesty; who took an opportunity, whilst I was attending upon her in the gardens of Aranjuez, to reflect upon the motives of the late war and the authors of it; and was pleased to add how glad both the king and herself were when they heard of my arrival at Lisbon. 'At present,' she said, 'matters are upon another footing; we shall preserve our friendship with his majesty, and I believe you will be satisfied with our resolutions upon your last instances.' I need not mention that I returned my acknowledgments in as proper a manner as the occasion would allow of. The french ambassador was at a distance when the queen began her discourse to me; but I was not displeased that the imperial minister was near enough to observe that what her majesty was

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saying gave her almost as much satisfaction as I had in receiving it."\*

Foiled in the attempt to obstruct this arrangement with England, the bourbon part of the ministry turned their attacks against the dutch settlement at Curaçao, which was the focus of an extensive commercial intercourse with the Caracas and the neighbouring provinces, with the hope that the exclusion of one trading power from those regions would pave the way to that of the other. Hitherto all attempts to check a traffic so highly lucrative had been frustrated by the nature of the country, which is intersected by narrow and difficult roads, and by numerous flat bottom boats which evaded pursuit by running under the shallow shores. Indeed the very attempt had given rise to disturbances which were with difficulty quelled. Ensenada, desirous to adopt more efficient measures, recurred to the advice of the marquis of Eslava, recently returned from the viceroyalty of Santa Fez, who urged that 1,200 men, commanded by a skilful officer, would suffice to crush the contraband traffic, and maintain the tranquillity of this quarter. In conformity with his advice, small armaments were formed with the utmost mystery at Cadiz and Ferrol, and in the commencement of 1751, the vigilance of our minister had traced the de-

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, June 30, 1752.

parture of a considerable body of troops under the command of major general Ricardo, the late governor of Malaga, who, after silently quitting the Spanish ports in a manner to evade the public observation, completed their equipment at the Canaries. These armaments formed the foundation of a new system of hostility against the foreign settlements in the West Indies, which was soon afterwards developed.\*

This period was marked by another commercial transaction, important in itself, but still more important in its consequences. The jarring pretensions of Spain with Portugal produced the same incessant disputes in the southern part of the American continent, as the contending interests with the British settlers, in the bay of Mexico. Arriving nearly at the same time as the Spaniards on the Rio de la Plata, the Portuguese claimed the territory between that river and the frontier of Brazil; and negotiations had taken place at different periods to settle an accommodation. When the two nations began to approximate, the Portuguese founded the colony of Sacramento in 1680, on the Rio de la Plata, at the extreme limit of the territory of which they claimed the sovereignty, nearly opposite to Buenos Ayres, in a position which commanded

\* Mr. Keene to the Duke of Bedford, April 22, 1751.

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the interior of Paraguay, and the navigation of the Uruguay and Paraguay.

Such an enterprise awakened the apprehensions of the spaniards, and before the close of the year the colonists were expelled and their fortifications razed. A negotiation ensuing between the two courts, the firmness of Don Pedro, prince regent of Portugal, reduced the spanish government to a compromise. In 1681, the colony was restored; and the portuguese were to retain possession of the contested territory till the right of property could be amicably settled.

Notwithstanding this arrangement, Sacramento continued an object of jealousy, and frequently of hostility. In the treaty with Portugal before the war of the spanish succession, Philip renounced his pretensions to this colony; and the same concession was afterwards made by the archduke Charles, when he obtained the support of Portugal in his claims on the spanish crown. It was conquered by the adherents of Philip during the war, but restored, though with the greatest reluctance, at the peace of Utrecht. Since that epoch it became the focus of an extensive contraband trade, not only with the interior of Paraguay; but with Buenos Ayres and the contiguous districts. It was in consequence exposed to frequent aggressions from the spanish governors.

Soon after the last restoration of peace, the intimate connection between the two crowns led to an amicable arrangement relative to this source of continual disquietude. In 1750, a treaty was concluded, by which Portugal ceded the colony, in return for the seven celebrated missions planted by the jesuits on the banks of the Uruguay, and the province of Tuy in Galicia. The usual reports and examinations were made, and proper officers deputed on both sides to carry the agreement into execution.

The design was however strenuously opposed by all the arts and influence of the jesuits. A public representation was made in the name of the whole body, and they were supported by the confessor of Ferdinand and the secret machinations of Ensenada, who readily interested the court of Naples in the dispute. By their instigation, the native indians assembled to the number of 15,000 men in the central colony of St. Nicholas, and after deputing an embassador to remonstrate with the governor of Buenos Ayres against the transfer, drove away the portuguese officers by force.

Both governments united to reduce these refractory people. The insurgents routed in a general engagement with the loss of 2,000 men, were compelled to take refuge in the neighbour-

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ing wilds. Possibly the arrangement might have been carried into execution, had not a change of government taken place in Portugal, by the death of John the fifth, who had been long reduced almost to imbecility by a stroke of the palsy. The new sovereign, Joseph, instigated by the active and enterprising Carvalho, afterwards marquis of Pombal, was less willing to relinquish his pretensions; and the colony remained in possession of the portuguese, to become the subject of new negotiations and new hostilities.\*

We cannot conclude without noticing a third transaction involving the interests of trade, as indicative of the change of principle with regard to England. During the administration of Campillo, baron Dehn, the danish envoy, who was high in his confidence, obtained the signature of a commercial treaty between Spain and Denmark. It was regularly concluded and ratified, and, though never yet published, yet it doubtless enabled the danes to carry on an advantageous traffic, during the suspension of the intercourse with England. These privileges, however, appear to have ceased soon after the accession

\* Silva Historia do Portugal.—Letter from Orrí to Torci, Oct. 22, 1744, Melcombe Papers.—Statements and Letters relative to this subject in the Keene Papers.—Sucinta Relacion de la desgracia del marques de la Ensenada.

of the new sovereign Ferdinand, and in consequence of the trade carried on by the danes with the barbary states, the treaty itself was annulled, notwithstanding the interference of France and the opposition of Ensenada.\*

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\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Madrid, Oct. 1, and Nov. 8, 1753.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-FIRST.

1749—1752.

*Struggles between the french and english parties at Madrid—Change in the french embassy—Characters of the duke de Duras the new embassador and Mr. Keene—Increasing rivalry between Carvajal and Ensenada—Negotiations for an alliance to maintain the neutrality of Italy—Fruitless opposition of France—Conclusion of the treaty of Aranjuez between Spain, Austria, Tuscany, Sardinia, and Parma—Opposition of the king of Naples—Spain refuses to admit England as a party—Diminution of the french influence—Disagreement of the king of Spain with his two brothers, the duke of Parma and the king of Naples—England increases her interest at Madrid by declining overtures from Naples—Account of general Wall, and of the ineffectual attempts of the french to remove him from the embassy in England.*

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AT this crisis the disputes between France and England, the result of the imperfect accommodation concluded by the recent treaty of Aix la Chapelle, were increasing to such an alarming degree as to forebode the renewal of hostilities. The struggle of the two contending nations at the court of Madrid forms the prominent feature of the present reign.

The affairs of France had hitherto been conducted with little ability, and in a manner by no means calculated to remove the prejudices of

Ferdinand, or to maintain that connection which had so long bound his father to his native country.

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The bishop of Rennes, a vain, officious, and domineering prelate, was ambassador at Madrid on the death of Philip. But having offended Ferdinand when prince of Asturias by his disrespectful and arrogant behaviour, it was deemed necessary to recall him at the commencement of the new reign. His successor, M. de Vaulgrevant, fell into the contrary extreme. Though sedate, prudent, and circumspect, he was deficient in activity and address, and too indolent to struggle against the difficulties of his situation; and successfully to counteract the English interest. He was also ignorant of the Spanish tongue, and therefore could not familiarly converse with Carvajal, who, partly from inability, and partly from dignity, would not willingly speak any other language than his own.

Besides numerous grievances of inferior importance, Ferdinand was offended with the want of confidence recently manifested by France towards Spain in general, and by the conclusion of the preliminaries at Aix la Chapelle, without his participation. He was likewise disgusted with the profligacy of the French court, and the universal licentiousness which pervaded every order of society, as well as the disgraceful con-

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tentions which agitated the national church. Above all, his pride was wounded by the refusal of the court of Versailles to accept his favourite sister, Maria Antonietta, as the consort of the dauphin, after the death of her elder sister. He pressed this match with the utmost zeal, and when the french king declined the overture, under the plea that the marriage of two sisters was contrary to the ordinances of the church, he testified his disappointment by exclaiming, “ Is then the catholic religion different in France and Spain ; and is not the power of the supreme pontiff the same in both countries ? ”\*

In these circumstances, the court of Versailles deemed it necessary to send an ambassador to Madrid, of such rank, talents, and character, as were calculated to remove the existing grievances; and combat the rising influence of England. Noailles, who knew the temper of the nation, and the character of the sovereign, observed, in a representation to the king of France, “ He should be of a rank too elevated to be tempted by the title of a grandee, and his manners ought to be equally adapted to win the people, and conciliate the great.” With a retrospect to the effects produced by the amiable character and captivating

\* Noailles.

deportment of the marchioness of Harcourt,\* he added, " his wife must be a woman fitted to grace society."

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By this recommendation, aided by the secret instigation of Ensenada, the duke of Duras, a relative of Noailles, was appointed to this important office; and, to create a prepossession in his favour, Noailles himself announced the choice, in a language seldom employed by a french minister to the court of Spain, since the accession of Philip the fifth. After expatiating to Aldecoa, the spanish chargé d'affaires at Paris, on the utility which would result from an union between the two crowns, he said, " I confess that Spain has had many and just causes of complaint against the behaviour of France, and none of a more flagrant nature, than the late instance of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. I confess likewise that our ambassadors at Madrid have at all times intruded themselves into your domestic affairs, affecting as much the part of spanish, as of french ministers. Some have interested themselves in private and lucrative concerns, and most of them have gone out of their spheres in vexing you with commercial disputes, which should have been left to consuls and inferior

\* Wife of the marquis, afterwards duke of Harcourt, french ambassador at Madrid, in the latter part of the reign of Charles the second.

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agents. In order to re-establish a good understanding and friendship, founded on principles of equality between our two courts, it is my intention that a person of talents, birth, and address, should be charged with this commission. As all these requisites meet in my relative, the duke of Duras, it is my wish that by your means, his catholic majesty may be induced to select him, in preference to any other who may be proposed. This is to be considered as private discourse, but you may cite your authority."\*

The appointment being secured, the cautious statesman was not sparing of his advice to the new ambassador. "Moderate," he says, "your zeal; confine yourself, for the first six months, to listen and develope the character of the court and nation, and particularly of the ministers. Become, if possible, phlegmatic, and take a dose of opium to reduce you to an unison with the greater part of the court. Do not urge the spanish gravity too far; do not display all your natural grace and elegance, which would imply a reproach on the national manners. But restrain yourself in the commencement of your mission, and recollect that you are under the eye of a suspicious ministry."†

\* Secret intelligence communicated in Mr. Keene's letter to the earl of Holderness, Madrid, June 31, 1752, N.S.

† Memoires de Noailles, t. 6, p. 278, &c.

He accompanied this advice with a faithful picture of the principal persons who figured at the court, touched on the mutual jealousies and rising rivalry of Carvajal and Ensenada, and did not fail to lay a proper stress on the influence of the confessor, and the ascendancy of Farinelli.

When the new ambassador entered on his mission, Noailles charged him with a representation calculated to further the designs of France, and implicate Spain in her cause.

The object of this memorial was to alarm the Spaniards for the safety of their colonies, which he represented as involved in the same danger with those of France, and he spared no argument to prove that the invariable design of England was to subjugate the greater part of America, in order to domineer in Europe, by means of the riches flowing from that inexhaustible source of wealth.

"Such," he observed, "is the celebrated balance of power; such is the famous equilibrium, which is so much vaunted by England, and which has been so long the subject of public discussion. As the only two powers who can oppose her are France and Spain, it is by dividing them alone, that these vast designs can be carried into execution. This is the true motive of the indefatigable efforts employed by the British court, to break the bonds of that union

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which has been so frequently cemented by the blood and treasure of both monarchies ; but these efforts, and the source from which they are derived, ought to be a warning to draw them closer. In fact, what are the courts which seek to divide them ? Those truly, who undertook to wrest by open force the throne of Spain and the Indies from Philip the fifth, the father of his catholic majesty ; those who, in all times, were the rivals and irreconcilable enemies of the different branches of the royal blood of France. What is the power they would render suspected to the catholic king ? That very power which, by its labours, its treasure, and the blood of its subjects, placed Philip and his posterity on the throne. And who is the prince they labour to separate from the king of Spain ? He who is attached to him by the triple bond of blood, of esteem, and friendship ; who has no other ambition than to preserve the general tranquillity, and to whom the glory and interests of Spain are no less dear than his own. Lastly, what monarch do our enemies endeavour to delude ? A king whose distinctive characteristic is probity ; a king who has adopted justice as the support of his government, and who does not yield to his christian majesty in the warmth of his friendship. No protectors are now left for Europe, but the kings of France and Spain : in their union, and

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in their foresight, are involved the safety of their own empires, and that of Europe in general.”\*

No minister was ever dispatched on a political mission, with stronger testimonies of royal approbation, than Duras. Besides the recommendations of his uncle, he was charged with a letter written by Louis the fifteenth in his own hand, loading him with praises, and soliciting in his favour the esteem and confidence of the Spanish monarch.†

Notwithstanding the anxiety manifested on this occasion, personal regard blinded the judgment of Noailles in the choice of Duras. He was graced indeed with all the accomplishments and shewy qualities of his nation; but these were accompanied with all its defects. He was impatient and irritable, vain and volatile, officious and importunate; incessantly goaded by that bustling activity and affected importance, which characterised the courtier at Versailles. A still more detrimental defect, in the sedate, tardy, and mysterious court of Madrid, was a sanguine imagination, which, overlooking all obstacles, and anticipating success from the most trifling occurrences, exposed him to perpetual delusion. Hence, he had scarcely passed the time marked

\* Noailles, t. 6, p. 278.

† Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Moraleja, March 27, 1752, N. S.

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by his sagacious uncle for his noviciate, before he deceived both himself and his employers, by considering his task as already completed. He represented the king of Spain favourable, Ensenada his intimate friend, Farinelli in his interest, the confessor guided by his suggestions, and even Carvajal, the cautious and prejudiced Carvajal, gradually yielding to his arguments and address. Finally, the ascendancy of France restored, the party of England and Austria daily diminishing.

Fortunately for Great Britain, and perhaps, without incurring the imputation of national prejudice, it may be said, for the true interests of Europe, the british embassy at Madrid was filled by Mr. Keene, a skilful and profound statesman, by the avowal even of his enemies.\* From a long residence in Spain, he was intimately acquainted with the language, manners, and peculiarities of the nation, and had perfectly assimilated himself to the spanish character. Originally an agent of the south sea company, he gained the confidence and esteem of his early patrons, the Walpoles, by his useful services ; and the papers of all our ministers, from the first moment of his appearance on the political theatre, bear an honourable testimony to his merits and talents. During his long and difficult probation,

\* “Keene politique adroit et profond,” Noailles, t. 6, p. 289.

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he had acquired and matured all the qualities of an able minister. In his language and deportment moderate and unassuming, he was conciliating without obtrusion or affectation, sagacious in the discernment of character, cool and circumspect, and no less master of the passions of others, than of his own. Suavity of manners, united with sound discretion, opened to him those sources of intelligence which neither address nor corruption could penetrate: he was acquainted with all the secret springs of action, and commanded those private channels of influence and communication, by which monarchs are swayed, and the business of nations conducted. He received an addition to his honours by the appointment of embassador extraordinary, and was soon afterwards decorated with the order of the bath.

Feb. 1751.  
1754.

At the moment when France and England began to contend for the ascendancy at Madrid, a breach took place between the two ministers. Ensenada, who at first had regarded Carvajal as an useful colleague, fitted only to share the drudgery of office, had the mortification to perceive him influencing the decisions of the king, rising in favour with the queen, and nominating to some of the most important appointments in the state, which he himself had hitherto conferred. The bias of personal character, and the

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influence of political rivalry, threw the two ministers into opposite scales. Ensenada, with brilliant and fertile talents, fitted for times of difficulty and danger, and hostile to the commercial prosperity and naval power of England, favoured the cause of France. Carvajal, partaking of his sovereign's love of tranquillity and peace, and zealous for the independence of his country, not only deprecated a rupture with England, but was inclined to promote a good correspondence with a nation, which he considered as the natural ally of Spain.

The consequence of this rivalry was an arduous struggle for the augmentation of their respective parties. Carvajal, profiting by the esteem which his uprightness and integrity had acquired over the minds of his sovereigns, and without condescending to petty intrigues, omitting no fair opportunity to promote his friends. Ensenada, employing all the resources of intrigue and corruption, among persons of every rank and profession, as well abroad as in Spain. He gained an extraordinary influence over the queen by splendid presents, and by attention to her taste and favourite amusements. He did not neglect to secure her portuguese attendants, conciliated the confessor, at first his implacable enemy, and obtained his powerful co-operation to promote the cause of France. He cultivated

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the friendship of Carvalho, and acquired the protection of the king and queen of Portugal, who always maintained considerable influence over their daughter. He kept up an intercourse of letters with the duke of Richelieu, the great favourite of Louis the fifteenth, and lavished his presents and flattery on madame Pompadour the royal mistress. Finally, he caballed with the queen dowager of Spain, and was engaged in a secret and constant correspondence with the courts of Turin and Naples. By these arts he preserved his favour, notwithstanding the rising ascendancy of Carvajal ; and was honoured with the golden fleece at the same time as his colleague, in contradiction to the rules of the order, and even to the previous determination of the sovereign himself, never to confer it, except on persons of high birth.\*

The conduct of the two ministers in the progress of the struggle, strikingly displays their principles and characters. Ensenada, who scarcely yielded even to Alberoni in talents and dissimulation, while he encouraged and directed the machinations of the court of Versailles, expressed the utmost repugnance to a connection with France ; and affected the greatest solicitude for the trade and welfare of England. He persuaded his friend Farinelli that his intrigues with

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, April 20, 1750.

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the french court were a mere artifice, and that he was at heart their enemy. In his conversations with Mr. Keene, he said, “ When you see me place the white flag above the spanish pavillon, drag me out of my house, and hang me up for the greatest villain that ever lived. I shall not venture to resist.” By the warmth of his language, he at first eluded even the penetration of Mr. Keene. “ His professions,” wrote the ambassador “ of an inclination to be well with England, are such as I could wish ; and if the disposition he expresses with respect to the french is real, I cannot desire it to be better. Their behaviour during the co-operation of their troops in Italy, to which he was long a witness, makes him open himself to me freely on that subject. He has assured me that the friendship of France has cost Spain about fifty millions of dollars, and one hundred and fifty thousand men ; by which they got their superiority in Flanders, while Spain is to be satisfied with Parma.”\*

Carvájal on the contrary scorned to deceive or tamper with the french, and rejected their overtures with equal firmness and candour. At the same time he did not suffer his personal esteem for Mr. Keene, nor his partiality to Great Britain, to bias his judgment. He frankly stated the principles which he had laid down as the rule

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Bedford, June 28, 1749.

of his conduct ; and invariably resisted all importunities to draw him from that pacific system of neutrality by which he hoped to establish the independence, prosperity, and consideration of his country.

The first proof of the alienation which took place between the courts of Madrid and Versailles, was a treaty concluded with Austria and Sardinia to secure the neutrality of Italy, which from the vague stipulations of the recent peace was likely to become again the theatre of war. By the clause that every thing should remain on the same footing as before the preceding contest, except what regarded the establishment of Don Philip and the cessions to the king of Sardinia, all matters originally in dispute were no less subject to cavils than before. Hence new troubles were likely to arise from the claims of the king of Naples on the allodials of Tuscany, and of the king of Sardinia on the reversion on Placentia ; and from the pretensions of Don Philip to the eventual succession of Naples. In all these points the king of Spain, and indeed the belligerent powers in general, were interested. Ferdinand in particular was desirous to retain his royal brothers in that dependence which he considered as due from the younger branches to the head of a family ; and at the same time to emancipate himself from the

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shackles of France. To attain these ends it was necessary to unite with the courts of Vienna and Turin, which were chiefly interested in the affairs of Italy.

The court of Versailles were speedily apprised of the views of Ferdinand, and endeavoured to intrude their agency by proposing a treaty in conjunction with Parma and Naples. But the overture was rejected, and the plan of the new alliance formed and matured at London. The courts of Madrid and Turin were first reconciled; and their union was cemented by the marriage of the infanta Maria Antonietta with Victor Amadeus, prince of Piemont. Much negotiation was next employed to remove those objections which naturally occurred against a connection between two sovereigns of the rival houses of Austria and Bourbon. After some hesitation, Maria Theresa charged her ambassador count Esterhasi, to make the first overture. But a new difficulty next arose with regard to a proper channel of communication.

In this dilemma a complimentary message brought from the queen by Farinelli induced Esterhasi to employ the agency of the musician. The progress and result of the negotiation are traced in the dispatches of Mr. Keene.

"Count Esterhasi came on purpose to my house last night to tell me Farinelli, who is an old

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acquaintance, had been with him in the morning, with a particular message from her catholic majesty ; having orders from the queen's mouth to declare that nothing could be more sincere than her esteem and affection for the empress queen, and that she would shew it on all occasions. Her imperial majesty might be convinced there was not the least trace of the old influence of the french in this country. It was entirely put an end to, and she herself might take upon her to say she had contributed all in her power to this great work, for the good of the common cause ; that the french at Paris, and their ambassador at Madrid, were in great anxiety upon what might be the fruit of the negotiation on foot here ; that nothing was to be apprehended from that quarter ; the empress might be entirely at ease ; the french interest was put an end to.”\*

“ At his coming here Esterhasi had private letters from the empress to the queen of Spain, which were to accompany the project of the treaty. He knew not what method to take to convey them secretly to her catholic majesty, and receive her orders, how and with whom to proceed in his negotiation. He proposed it at last to Farinelli, who refused ; but I suppose on giving the queen an account of what had passed, she permitted him to take the packet. Esterhasi

Aug. 5.

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, July 13, 1751.

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would have given it to him open ; but he insisted that it should be sealed before he would take charge of it. After keeping it for some days, the queen let him know by the same channel, that though nothing was done without her knowledge at the *despacho*, she had great precautions to take ; yet she would facilitate all the views of her cousin the empress, as far as she could. That he might present his project to M. de Carvajal, as she had seen and considered it, and she would forward it at the *despacho*. The same previous application to her, was to be observed on all other occasions ; and Farinelli had general orders for the future, to receive from the imperial minister any papers he might desire to put into her majesty's hands, taking strict care that it might not be known to any person whatsoever.

" The queen, he told me, answered the empress's public letter by the spanish messenger. But she sent her private material one to be inclosed in Esterhasi's packet, which was to go by the same conveyance. Esterhasi represented to her by Farinelli, that perhaps her ministers might be tempted to see what he had written, and in opening his letter would not fail of being surprised at finding one from her majesty inclosed, though sent by a spanish messenger. In such circumstances, she would be the best judge

whether they would respect her signet, and whether it would be proper to defer sending her letter till a safer opportunity by a courier of his own. She thanked him for his caution, and desired him to keep it, and I had it this morning in my hand.\*

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“ To the influence of the queen alone, the present disposition of this court is owing. Nothing less than her credit with the king could be capable of making him withstand the various artifices of the french, who attack him with studied, well composed letters from his most christian majesty on every occasion ; sometimes with cajoleries, at others with reproaches of ingratitude for the mighty things which France has done for the establishment of this branch in Spain ; and even with appeals to his conscience for the scandal it gives to the world, to suspect any separation between so near relations, attended with so many obligations on the part of Spain.”†

The negotiation thus opened, was conducted on one side by the intervention of Carvajal and Mr. Keene, and on the other by Esterhasi through the agency of Farinelli. Without openly affecting to interfere, the court of London

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Madrid, Aug. 5, 1751,  
very secret.

† Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Aug. 27, 1751.

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forwarded the design by their interest at Madrid, Vienna, and Turin. In vain the court of Versailles caballed and remonstrated, in vain Ensenada endeavoured to embroil the negotiation. It soon terminated in a defensive alliance, concluded without the slightest participation with France, and signed at Aranjuez on the 14th of June 1752, between the king of Spain, the empress queen as proprietor of the Milanese, and the emperor as grand duke of Tuscany, with stipulations for the accession of the kings of Naples and Sardinia, and the duke of Parma. The king of Spain and the empress queen were to furnish 5,000 men each, the kings of Naples and Sardinia 4,000, and the dukes of Parma and Tuscany 1,500 each, to be employed when necessary, in maintaining the tranquillity of Italy, and furthering the arrangements of the recent peace. The king of Sardinia and the duke of Parma accepted the invitation to accede. But the king of Naples, as he had already done at the peace of Aix la Chapelle, withheld his assent, because he considered this treaty as infringing his rights to the allodials of Tuscany, and the power of disposing of the crown of Naples on succeeding to Spain.

From the facility with which the negotiation was concluded, the British court conceived the design of bringing Spain into more direct oppo-

sition against France by means of this alliance. But it was soon discovered that the principles of Spain were as adverse to an engagement which might eventually render her dependent on England, as to her recent subservience to France.

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To an early hint of this proposal from his own court, the ambassador replied, “ I will make no hesitation in repeating what I have so often asserted, that Spain is absolutely detached from France ; uninfluenced by the counsels of that court, and in the resolution of maintaining herself independent. But although this is the case, she has no intention to quarrel with the french, or give them real motives to quarrel, either out of revenge for former ill-usage, or from what occurred at the beginning of the present reign.

“ The usual maxims at most other courts, of entering into new friendships when they retract the old ones, are not thought necessary at *this*, nor in the present circumstances. First, because as she has no design to offend any great power, so it will not be the interest of any great power to offend her. On the contrary, she looks upon herself as *a lady*, to whom every one will make his court, for the advantages of her favour and commerce. And secondly, if they should attack her, she has little to fear in Europe from any material damage that can be done to her :

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and less in America, where the event of the late war has taught her a secret she never knew before ; namely, that the climate was and would be her constant and natural guarantee. With the french, she revenges herself at present in letting them have the mortification (and a great one it is) to see the difference between this and the late reign. With regard to his majesty and his allies, she thinks they must be highly satisfied to find the french stripped of the credit and assistance, which I may say they *commanded* from this country in all their broils in the time of Philip ; a change which may deter them from attempting like disturbances for the future. She likewise encourages the allies by opening prospects, that what is now against them may in time come to be for them ; and that in the interval she is promoting their interests by her civil ill-usage of the french.

“ Was there a more martial spirit in the present prince ; more solidity, courage and union in the few persons that compose the government, *that time* I have mentioned might be hastened. But now, it must be waited for with patience, by cultivating the friendship of this court without ruffling it ; and watching for every favourable event to direct it, with dexterity and caution, to the great end proposed. Before they will dare to be active, or rather lend their name to mea-

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sures that may become active, they must have their fleet and army prepared against any immediate shock to which they may be exposed from their neighbours. I may talk as long as I please upon their having no occasion to fear, whenever they think proper to become a party to an alliance that all others must fear to offend. They will not trust to that alone. They change their system by degrees; leave their dependence on their old friends; but they will not leave them so far as to repose all, *all* their confidence in new ones, without further acquaintance. They certainly mean something by the future prospects they hold out; and as I have often wrote, there is not spirit and resolution enough to follow what seems to be their inclination. On what conditions this thorough union with Great Britain in particular, as the chief of all solid alliances, is to be brought to its full perfection, is what they are best acquainted with, though it may be guessed at; each of those I treat with hinting at the blame of shifting a load from their own shoulders to let it fall where I think fit to direct it.”\*

Being, however, commissioned to propose the formal admission of the king of England into the treaty for maintaining the neutrality of Italy, he

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Escurial, Nov. 6, 1751,  
N. S.

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replies: "On the arrival of your lordship's dispatches, I renewed to M. de Carvajal my instances for his majesty's admission in the most serious and formal manner. I know of no argument drawn from the dignity, weight, and security which such an accession would give to an alliance, whose object is safety and tranquillity, that I have forgotten. And when these did not prevail, any that can flow from gratitude and obligation for his majesty's friendship on all occasions, particularly in this last and great instance. At other times, I have tried what scruples and apprehensions would do. Whether the court of Turin, which they had acquired by his majesty's means, would come in and think itself safe without Great Britain, either with respect to its neighbours, which it does not love or trust, or to its benefactors, to whom it owes and pays confidence and strict friendship? 'I could not,' I observed, 'tell more than himself, (though I hoped for the best) what would be the effect of this alteration in the narrow scheme proposed by the court of Vienna. In case of difficulties, who, but my royal master, could prevail with them to alter their resolutions, or bring his allies into the same system, and combine their views and interests, sometimes perhaps against their real inclination?' I as frequently cite passages antecedent to his experience in

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Spain. I remind him, that not a piquet of spanish soldiers, nor the spanish name itself, would have returned to Italy, without his majesty's assistance ; and this *after* France had shrunk from the treaty of Seville, and the powers we had to deal with were averse to the introduction of the spanish troops. What crown, therefore, so proper to preserve their possessions in Italy, as that of England ? To whom did the king of Naples owe his second establishment, when the very power who now proposed to secure his possessions by itself, was restrained from attacking them by England ?

" I urged this argument also to answer an objection of Carvajal, namely, that we had no direct interest in Italy. But he is not to be persuaded that the catholic king, with two sons of Spain in Italy, with possessions conquered by his arms, and yielded to his brothers, has not a more immediate interest than his majesty. He spoke very handsomely upon the acknowledgments due to England for the execution of the treaty of Seville ; but let me perceive that *those were projects of the late reign, which would never have been thought of at present, and that Spain would have been much better without them.*

" To all my arguments, general replies have been returned, which is scarcely worth while to

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trouble you with. To my last instances, however, he explained more fully. ‘The king,’ he said, ‘looked upon the alliance of the three powers directly interested in the tranquillity of Italy, to be sufficient to provide for that end; and the admission of a fourth would rather diminish the superiority that two parts would have over a third, which should fail in its engagements.’ \* \* \* \* \*

“‘To be plainer with you,’ he added, ‘we see no sort of necessity for such a step. It is only capable of giving rise to preparations and alliances, which never would have been thought of without such a *tocsin*. In a word, you must know me enough, not to attribute any of these reasons to complaisance for France. I must not tell you all I know. You shall, however, be so far informed, that France has been offering projects on projects ever since your return hither, not only relating to general affairs, but lately to the security of Italy likewise; we have returned them all back upon their hands, and would have nothing to do with them. And after this, can you expect that, without any necessity, we can admit another prince into those engagements from which we have excluded them in every shape? It would be merely taking off the mask before the time. Believe me, the best way to do our work with that court, is to do it civilly,

and make up by exterior usage what we refuse interiorly. The time is not yet come.'

" ' When can you expect a better ? ' I replied ; ' You know what a solid friendship is settled between the king my master and the great princes of the north. You have only to join your name to it ; you need no new expence nor new forces ; you secure your being free for ever from both. Who will dare to attack a single member of so formidable an alliance ? When can you expect to see your neighbours in a lower condition in all respects than at present ? If ever you mean any thing by revenging Spain on France, either for former injuries in times of war, or worse usage if possible in the last fifty years of what was called friendship, or during even a later epoch, you must not think of adopting the ideas you are acquainted with.' ' Many things,' he replied, ' must happen before nations can totally change their systems. It is no little matter to have put things in the situation and disposition in which they are. You ought to be content with them. And besides, with regard to me, you know it is not easy to bring every body into my way of thinking.' So true is it, my lord, as general Wall told you, *that his countrymen did not like to be hurried.* They who treat with them must have much patience, and I am sensible

CHAP. 51. how much indulgence superiors must have for  
1749—1752. those whom they employ here.”\*

Respecting the principles of the Spanish government, the British court withdrew the application. Although this measure was less decisive than an Englishman might have wished, it was nevertheless a striking proof of the change in the Spanish policy, and the return of the king and nation to their ancient maxims. It was followed also by measures which shewed an increasing alienation from France.†

Family disputes contributed to widen the breach. During his whole reign, embarrassed with the intrigues of his half brothers, both in France and Spain, Ferdinand fostered inexpressible jealousy of the courts of Parma and Naples.

Philip, duke of Parma, was a prince of weak intellects, governed by his adherents, and devoted to France. He espoused the daughter of Louis the fifteenth, who carried into the petty court of Parma that taste for splendour and profusion, which had already proved so detrimental at Versailles, and exhausted the finances of her husband. Unable to maintain the expences of their establishment, they offended the economical spirit of

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Nov. 6, 1751. . .

† Beccatini *Storia di Carlo 3*, p. 178.—Muratori *Annali d’Italia*, 1751, p. 20.—Mr. Keene’s dispatches.

Ferdinand, by importunities for assistance. Failing in their applications, they neglected even the usual marks of attention between princes of the same family, and transferred their whole confidence to the court of France. A breach ensued; and it was one part of the commission with which Duras was charged to effect a reconciliation. For a long time, his endeavours were unsuccessful; yet his perseverance finally operated on the affections of Ferdinand, and an accommodation was arranged by the agency of the marquis Grimaldi, who had been already employed by the court of Madrid at Vienna. Don Philip obtained a sum of money for the payment of his debts, and an annual pension, amounting to £.10,000, with the promise of a future augmentation. But this reconciliation was neither cordial nor satisfactory. Increasing profusion compelled Don Philip to renew his instances for money, and these led to mutual complaints, which revived the former jealousy.\*

Don Carlos, king of Naples, had still more offended the sensitive monarch, by an affection of independence, and by caballing with the queen dowager, and a numerous party in Spain. Frequent remonstrances from the court of Madrid produced apologies and excuses; but Don Carlos never forgot that the weak health of

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\* Noailles, t. 6, p. 287—289.

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his brother, and the age of the queen, assured him the succession of the Spanish crown. He was not without hopes that the languishing malady of Ferdinand would throw the reins of government into his hands, even before a vacancy of the throne occurred. The jealousies arising from this source, produced endless bickerings between the two brothers, which were fomented by the court of Versailles, in resentment for the partiality displayed by Ferdinand towards England.

During the recent negotiation, Don Carlos not only opposed the views of his brother, but sent an agent, the marquis Caraccioli, to Versailles, in order to form a closer union with France, in opposition to the treaty of Aranjuez. He obtained a ready attention from a court which was alienated by the loss of its influence at Madrid, and pleased with an opportunity to conciliate the future sovereign of Spain.\*

To sow jealousies among the new allies, the king of Naples even made overtures to England, offering the most advantageous privileges of commerce in his actual dominions, and similar favours when he should be called to the throne of Spain. The court of London was too discreet to receive with coldness the advances of a prince, respectable from his present situation, and still

\* Beccatini, p. 179.

more from his future hopes, and without accepting his offers, testified an intention of sending a minister to Naples.

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This intercourse, however unimportant in itself, awakened the alarms and jealousies of Ferdinand, and he made the most animated remonstrances against a separate negotiation with Naples. So irritable indeed were his feelings on this subject, that Carvajal did not venture to apprise him of the nomination of a British minister to that rival court.

The British government, therefore, hastened to shew that preference to Ferdinand, which was so justly his due. Without evincing the slightest want of attention towards the king of Naples, they testified their resolution not to dispatch Sir James Gray, who had been appointed for the mission, except with the consent and approbation of the king of Spain. This instance of complaisance was received with a transport of joy, seldom witnessed at the sedate court of Madrid, which is best described in the words of the ambassador :

" I am now, with as much pleasure as I can contain, to acquaint you with the success of those friendly and cordial passages relating to the king's intended conduct towards the king of the two Sicilies, now he has the misfortune to be under the displeasure of so good a brother. I

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sent your letter on the 19th. instant, as the best testimony of the satisfaction the message I am charged with would give to the catholic king, and to his minister, our friend M. Carvajal, in particular. It came providentially, and was the more acceptable, as it was the less expected. I immediately translated and sent it to Carvajal's house, with a familiar billet, which he answered in the following words :

" In your whole life, your excellency will never be able to give me a greater pleasure than you have done, by sending me the extract of my lord duke of Newcastle's letter. I did not want this fresh proof of your being *hombres de bien*, (a familiar expression for men of probity and honour), but it is of service to me, because it enables me to serve you. Return a thousand compliments and thanks to my lord duke, and send him a thousand expressions of my friendship and esteem. Your excellency will likewise accept them from me, for the joy you have given me. Be pleased to transmit the inclosed to Hanover, in which I say nothing of this matter to Grimaldi ; and let his grace know it only conveys orders to that minister to make a formal notification of the treaty with the others."

" At night, when I went to his office, he leapt out of his chair and threw himself about my neck. He waited with impatience for the hour to attend

his master, to whom he had not yet told the disagreeable part of the tale. The next morning, at the conversation, where I regularly make my court to their catholic majesties, the king, on whose side I stood, did not let me long remain without shewing me by his looks and motions, how thoroughly pleased he was with this mark of his majesty's consideration and affection. But as I was in view of the foreign ministers, I received it in a reserved manner, to please the king. After the conversation, I communicated the whole to my worthy friend, the visconde de Ponte de Lima, the portuguese ambassador, that he might be apprised of it before hand, if the queen should think proper to speak of it, as I imagined she would, at his evening attendance. The king being hindered from taking his usual diversion that day, was in the queen's apartment when the portuguese ambassador was admitted. He broke out immediately on his obligations to his majesty, and said he had made me signs at the conversation how well pleased he was; but did not know whether I understood him. The ambassador replied, that I certainly did, for I had told him of it in the fulness of my heart. The queen observed, that, as I stood, it was impossible for her to speak to me without affectation; but if I had been nearer, she must have said something to me. In a word, they neither

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of them had patience to refer me to what their minister was charged to communicate to me on their part, but desired the ambassador to express to me, as soon as he could, (which was immediately) their thanks to the king for his friendly proceeding. They saw by it the sincerity and cordiality of his majesty's friendship for them; they judged from it of the king's resolution to cultivate their's, and assured his majesty of their constant and fixed determination to do all that depends on them for the promotion and establishment of this great object.”\*

Another instance in which the french court irritated that of Madrid, and diminished their own interest, was in their attempts to supplant Wall in his embassy in England, and substitute in his place their creature Grimaldi.

General Wall, or to use his spanish appellation, Don Ricardo Wall, who was made the subject of an arduous struggle between the two contending parties at Madrid, and afterwards became a conspicuous figure in the history of Spain, was a native of Ireland. Being a catholic, and possessing the enterprising spirit which marks his countrymen, he sought employment and promotion abroad. In the prime of youth, he entered into the spanish service, at that

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, August 30, 1752, N. S.

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period the common resource of adventurers from every country. He was a volunteer on board the fleet which invaded Sicily in 1718, and distinguished himself in the naval combat with admiral Byng. Afterwards he entered into the land service, and accompanied the army which, under Montemar, placed Don Carlos on the throne of the two Sicilies.

Being, however, unknown and unprotected, he continued to serve without promotion, till at length he found an opportunity to present himself to the commander in chief. When asked who he was, he replied, "I am, next to your excellency, the most distinguished person in the army." To the natural question, "How so?" he added, "You are the head, I am the tail of the serpent." The archness and singularity of his reply, together with his prepossessing appearance, pleased the general. He took him under his protection, and finding him active and intelligent, laid the foundation of his fortune.\*

He afterwards was recommended to the notice of the minister Patino. He was sent to the Indies, though in what capacity is unknown; and on his return in 1736, his activity attracted the notice of our ambassador. He appears to have accommodated himself to the ruling passion

\* Private information from a person, to whom it was communicated by Mr. Wall himself.

CHAP. 51. of the court, and employed his local and professional knowledge in devising a plan for the invasion of Jamaica.\*

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During the subsequent war, we can discover no trace of his progress till we find him established in the esteem of Ensenada. On the approach of peace, his knowledge of the English language, and the high opinion entertained of his talents, procured him the appointment of a private agency, first to Aix la Chapelle and Holland, and finally to England. Equally consulting his own feelings, and the views of his court, he displayed a zealous attachment to England, and greatly contributed to hasten the accommodation. Appointed accredited minister, he increased by his prudent behaviour, the good intelligence established between the two crowns, and became intimately connected with Mr. Keene.

His services in this post endeared him to all the friends of Spain in England, as well as to those of England in Spain. The high opinion entertained of his merits and services, was proved by his reception when recalled from his post to facilitate the arrangement of the commercial treaty.

"Mr. Wall," writes Mr. Keene, "was just arrived, and was waiting in M. de Carvajal's

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, July 5, 1736.

office for that minister. Upon his entering, it fell to my lot to present Mr. Wall, who was not previously known to him. The general was introduced immediately to their catholic majesties, who would not allow him time to change his english riding dress. The report he made to them of the honours he owes to the king ; his majesty's personal regard for their catholic majesties, and his sincere desire of cultivating the strictest harmony betwixt the two crowns and nations, has been such as might be expected from a sensible, grateful, and honest man. My intelligence must be good, for the queen herself was pleased to communicate it to me, while I had the honour to attend her last night in the gardens of Aranjuez.”\*

In the actual disposition of the court the machinations against Wall only served to draw on him additional honours and distinctions. His appointment was not only confirmed ; but Ensenada, who had zealously promoted the attacks of the french, was excluded from the share he had hitherto usurped in the appointment of foreign ministers. Mr. Keene did not fail to communicate this grateful intelligence to the british court.

“ General Wall left this place at two this

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Antigola, May 29, 1752,  
N. S.

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morning, after paying his court to their catholic majesties at their opera. He has been made lieutenant general by their majesties themselves, without any insinuation from their ministers, and so far from any solicitation of his own, that he begged them to suspend this mark of their royal favour; but they replied, they would let the world, and particularly the court in which he served, know how much they approved his conduct and services.

"He has had, contrary to all custom that I remember, three long conversations with their catholic majesties, at which M. de Carvajal assisted. The purport and conclusion of them are such as, I will venture to say, will give his majesty great satisfaction. Our most material points of dispute have been treated upon in them; and the whole is accompanied with the strongest resolution to preserve the friendship of the king."\*

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, Oct. 2, 1752.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-SECOND.

1752—1754.

*Rise of the disputes between England and France—Prospect of approaching war—Attempts of the two courts to gain the alliance of Spain—The replies of Carvajal to their respective proposals—His death.*

WE now proceed to trace the conduct of the court of Madrid in preserving their darling neutrality, at the moment when the contention between England and France rose to such a height as to threaten a new war.

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It was impossible that two nations so commercial, active, and enterprising, and at the same time stimulated by all the ardour of political rivalry, should long continue without disputes or clashing interests, either on the continent of Europe, or in the distant possessions of the East and West Indies. During the recent war, their hostilities had extended to the remote quarters of the globe; and both being equally anxious to enlarge their empire as well in America as in India, the stipulations of the peace, so far from forming a decisive arrangement, contained the germ of new contentions,

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or at best only suspended their respective claims. The article in the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, “that Acadia should be ceded to England according to its *antient* limits, and all things placed on the same footing as before the war,” was one of those captious conditions, usually introduced merely to evade present difficulties, and justify future pretensions. The *antient* limits of Acadia became soon the subject of difference; the french restricting, and the english extending them, according to their interests and designs.

New causes of dissatisfaction rapidly accumulated. On one side the establishment of an english company, trading to the Ohio; on the other, the attempts of the french to confine the colonies of North America, by a chain of forts stretching from Louisiana to Canada. Contradictory claims likewise arose respecting the islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago. As both parties were equally tenacious of their pretensions, all compromise was impracticable. Both endeavoured to strengthen themselves by alliances against a contest, which they knew was inevitable; and no country was the theatre of a more arduous struggle for the ascendancy than Spain.

It was the primary object of the french court to call into action that personal affection which

Ferdinand felt for the chief of the House of Bourbon ; by attacking him in so tender a part to prevail on him to extend a personal into a national attachment ; and under the pretence of maintaining the family correspondence to draw him into a negotiation which might end in a family compact.

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After various projects for treaties of friendship and commerce, which were eluded by Carvajal, the french ambassador presented at the Escurial a scheme for a perpetual alliance, reviving that of Fontainbleau, on the same principles as the treaty, afterwards called the *family compact*, between the two branches of the House of Bourbon, for their mutual preservation, and the guaranty of their respective possessions, both in Europe and America. To prevent Carvajal from modifying or suppressing it, or from discovering the artifice which lurked under so innocent an appearance, Duras insisted upon an answer in eight-and-forty hours. The minister replied, " his catholic majesty cannot agree to the proposed alliance, because it is unnecessary." The duke, however, pressing for an answer in writing, as he had a right to demand, Carvajal complied, and gave a declaration to the following effect :

" Having acquainted the king with the duke's

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earnest solicitation for an answer to the project of a family alliance, his majesty, after many civil expressions on his affection for the house from which they were both descended, and his resolution to support it, perceived no necessity for such an alliance at present. It would rather raise jealousy in the minds of those who were envious of its glory, and induce them to form counter-alliances, and attack them before they were prepared to repulse their enemies, than contribute to the security of the two crowns. Many family compacts subsisted between the two houses, which though contracted on particular occasions, and for particular purposes that exist no longer, may yet still be considered as subsisting with regard to the general principles of mutual affection. The king of Spain being persuaded that the king of France would not abandon him, if Spain should be overwhelmed, although there was no treaty or obligation between them but the ties of blood; so his most christian majesty might be assured of the same treatment, should he be reduced to extremities." After a dignified reply to some reproaches on the repugnance manifested by his catholic majesty to form an alliance with his cousin, the paper concluded with announcing his resolution, to live in peace and harmony with all, for the



general good, as well as for the consolation and happiness of his own subjects in particular.\*

A reply so ~~long~~<sup>long</sup> according with his expectations, roused the impetuous temper of the french ambassador. He indecorously taxed Carvajal with personal prejudice, and exclaimed, "The king my master will resent your partiality!" The sedate minister repelled this unbecoming sally with the calm and laconic observation, "It is my duty to serve his catholic majesty, not the king of France."

In addition to arguments and representations, the french court did not omit to tempt the spanish ministers with those glittering trifles which are frequently more attractive than substantial favours. The letters of our ambassador relate the address with which these lures were brought forward, and the dignified manner in which they were rejected by Carvajal.

"The french ambassador has whispered, where it was proper to be conveyed to the catholic king's knowledge, and Masones too has been desired to write it, that his most christian majesty intended to send three *blue ribbands* to be disposed of by the king of Spain. I have long since hinted my suspicions, that among other lures to gain Ensenada, who has four ribbands upon him already, this of the Holy Ghost

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Madrid, Dec. 28, 1753.

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has been held out by France to dazzle him, and make the fifth. The meanness of his birth, I thought, might have caused some difficulty, but that is winked at. Three orders are sent, to avoid the terrible stigma it would put upon Ensenada, if one was sent to him only. The hero of the piece is thus to be hid by multiplying the personages. The masks, it is thought, are to be M. de Carvajal and the duke of Medina Celi, a nobleman at Ensenada's disposition, made master of the horse by him, to attend his catholic majesty at his daily and constant diversion of the chace. This nobleman probably will be the third, both from his great quality, and to put him upon the same footing of honour and decoration as the duke of Huescar, who is openly known to be no partisan of Ensenada.

" After this intention was communicated to both their catholic majesties by M. de Carvajal, this worthy man turned to the queen, who was at a little distance from the king, but not out of his hearing, and addressed himself to her for her protection. He said, " As you have assisted me, madam, in obtaining his majesty's consent to excuse me from accepting the order of San Gennaro, which was sent by his brother the king of Naples ; I trust you will likewise grant me your patronage in obtaining liberty to refuse this of the Holy Ghost. His majesty," he continued,

" having conferred on me his own order of the Golden Fleece, I think no other, except that of my sovereign, can do me honour, but rather the contrary." The king heard this, and Carvajal saw approbation and joy sparkle in his eyes. This intelligence is undoubted; and I told the person who communicated it to me, that he would have sent me home in the most melancholy mood I ever felt in my whole life, had he acted otherwise or on other principles."\*

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But after eluding the french application, the spanish minister had a still more difficult duty to fulfil in declining a similar proposal from his friend Mr. Keene, enforced with those cogent arguments which none was more capable of employing. In making this overture, the british minister stated, " that the king of Great Britain did not mean to seduce Spain into positive engagements; yet he too well knew the weight of such a crown, not to be desirous to contract the most intimate alliance with it, in conjunction with her imperial majesty, which would render the three powers the arbiters and directors of Europe, and shed terror on all those who were contriving to disturb the public tranquillity. Such an alliance would be a common benefit, and redound to the honour of so pacific and great a prince as Ferdinand. The minister of his

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, Madrid, Feb. 19, 1754.

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catholic majesty was requested to consider whether the time was not arrived, when Spain should deliver herself from the mean timidity which she had felt at the march of every french regiment towards the frontier. The remedy is short and simple. Let M. de Carvajal, count Migazzi, and the british ambassador adopt the french project, sign it, and thus employ the artifices of the french against themselves. What a glorious figure will his catholic majesty make as principal in a treaty, formed as much to promote his own pacific views and the good of his subjects, as the plan proposed by the french was designed to thwart and baffle them! Such a defensive alliance is the sure, and indeed the only means of putting Spain in a condition to treat the menaces of France with contempt, and to occupy that place which, from her riches and extent of territory, she ought to hold in the political transactions of Europe." He at the same time adroitly hinted, that it was the only measure by which the queen could maintain her influence, or Carvajal his weight with the king.

Carvajal received this proposal with complacency, but declined it with address: He alleged his own want of power, the superior influence of Ensenada, devoted to the french, and the defenceless state of the kingdom. He expressed his disinclination to enter into a negotiation,

which he knew he had not influence to carry into effect; from a conscientious motive, derived from his unwillingness to deceive his friend and the British nation, which he so much esteemed and loved; and to lose the character of an honest man, which he was most ambitious of deserving.\*

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Immovable in his principles, the last conversation which Carvajal held with Mr. Keene evinced his native candour, and his own personal wishes for an union with Great Britain.

"I am as much convinced as you can be," he observed, "of the necessity of an alliance with England and Austria. My inclinations even go further than a vague alliance. I am anxious for settling a permanent friendship between the two crowns, not merely for the present occasion. This is the only means to make us superior to the rest of Europe. But I am not ashamed to confess to you, what you know too well, my want of power, and the obstructions to such an arrangement. And I will frankly own that, after having rejected the French proposals so lately and roundly, I cannot, for some time, make the same on the part of Great Britain and her allies. My enemies will take too much advantage of such a step, and by endeavouring to

\* Mr. Keene to the Earl of Holderness, Madrid, Dec. 22, 1753.

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serve you at an improper juncture, I may be incapacitated from serving you, either at present, or in future.”\*

April 8.

Within a few days, the death of this patriotic minister spread general consternation among the friends of the genuine spanish policy. The regret of Mr. Keene, who so well knew his virtues, is testified in the language of affection, esteem, and admiration.

“ This morning, between five and six, the world has lost, in his fifty-third year, M. de Carvajal, a minister of as much worth and integrity as ever lived in it.

“ The last time I saw him was on Wednesday, to take leave of him, before I retired, as usual, into the country, during the processions and devotions of the court. He then complained of a cold, that constantly accompanied him in the winter; but on the evening following, when he waited on their majesties at the *despacho*, they found him so weak and disordered that they were pleased to command him to return to his apartment, and take care of himself. He was then struck with violent rheumatic pains and a fever, the former of which left him, but the latter continued, and he soon became so weak, that the physicians (whom he was

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, May 17, 1754.

extremely averse to) found it too late to dare to bleed him when they were called in. He died of an inflammatory fever, which has been fatal to many others.

"The tears of the king and queen, when they appeared this morning, testify their sensibility at the loss of so faithful and upright a servant. You may easily believe my affliction at this event, both in my public and private capacity.\*

"It is certain the world never produced a more sincere, honest, and noble minded man. If I had my difficulties, and he on his side some particular defects, they were all made up to me, by the certainty I was under of not deceiving my royal master, by being first deceived myself by M. Carvajal. I was sure of keeping my ground, and that the french would never be able to advance their interests as long as he remained in office. But I was at the same time too well persuaded that he did not exert all the power he might with their catholic majesties, from a modest timidity, and some over-righteous notions which were inherent in him."†

\* Mr. Keene to the earl of Holderness, April 8, 1754.

† Mr. Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Antigola, May 17, 1754.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-THIRD.

1754.

*Effects of Carvajal's death—The duke of Huescar and the count of Valparaiso, in conjunction with the british ambassador, exclude Ensenada and his partisans from the management of foreign affairs—Their audiences of the king and queen—General Wall nominated the new minister, and Huescar charged with the office ad interim—Circumstances which suspended the fall of Ensenada—Arrival of Wall—His favour with the king.*

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THE sudden death of Carvajal alarmed the british cabinet, because it seemed likely to introduce an unfavourable change in the spanish administration, and opened to the french an almost certain prospect of regaining their lost ascendancy.

The french partisans were in fact extremely elated. It was rumoured that Ensenada would be appointed *Interino*, or director of foreign affairs, till the nomination of a new minister, and the confessor charged with examining the papers of the deceased. Ensenada affected an aversion to accept the office of *Interino*; but he confidently hoped to obtain it for his secretary and creature Ordeneña, in whose name he was sure to govern as despotically as if he himself held

the appointment. But the address and vigilance of Mr. Keene and count Migazzi, the austrian minister, triumphed over the arts of Ensenada, and the influence of his partisans ; in reality, the death of Carvajal hastened the downfall of Ensenada, and occasioned the temporary depression of the french interest.

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In this critical emergency, the antigallican party was headed by the duke of Huescar and the count of Valparaiso, who, from their situations as lord chamberlain to the king, and equerry to the queen, were the first consulted on the occasion.

The duke of Huescar, afterwards duke of Alva by the death of his mother, was a grandee, descended from one of the most illustrious families in Spain. He had recently filled the spanish embassy at Paris, and instead of imbibing a prepossession in favour of the people among whom he had resided, his prejudices gained new strength from the obvious defects of the national character. He returned to Madrid with a dislike of the french, amounting almost to antipathy. Too dignified to stoop to the arts of a courtier, he never concealed his hostility to Ensenada, but rejected all his advances with a dignity becoming the loftiest member of the House of Alva. On an occasion when the officious minister had obtained for him some royal

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favour without his knowledge, he repaired to the king and demanded its revocation, a proof of castilian magnanimity, which raised him in the estimation of his sovereign. The situation of Huescar, as lord chamberlain, gave him a constant access to the king and queen, and he soon acquired considerable influence in the cabinet. But as his ambition was combined with equal indolence and dislike of restraint, he took no active share in the administration, though he interfered in nominating or removing ministers.

Valparaiso was influenced by similar antipathy to the french, and, though superior to Huescar in application and activity, yet he was too timid or too fond of ease, to aspire to the arduous duties of a prime minister.

When the state of Carvajal became hopeless, these two noblemen united with the britiah and imperial ministers to avert the mischiefs which were apprehended from his loss, and to baffle the intrigues of Ensenada and the french. As neither of them could be induced to place himself at the head of the government, the earnest recommendation of Mr. Keene directed their views to general Wall, who had resumed his embassy in England. The privileges attached to their offices enabled them to anticipate the opposite party, and secure this important appointment.

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When Carvajal expired, Huescar and Valparaiso were the first persons of rank who entered the royal apartment. They found the sovereigns in tears, and under the greatest anxiety, lest the papers of the deceased minister should fall into improper hands. The queen in particular repeated the expression, "now that good man is dead, it will be difficult to repulse the attacks of France." As the duke proceeded to expatiate on the advantage of pursuing the present system, as safe, salutary, and honourable, she interrupted him by exclaiming with unusual vivacity, "It is the only one too, and whoever shall attempt to divert the king from it, ought to be considered by his majesty as men only actuated by their own private views, and no friends to his glory!" Then apostrophising her husband, she added, "Will your majesty now let the french govern you, as they governed your father?"

The duke, encouraged by the warmth of her expressions, represented, in forcible language, that the appointment of Ensenada, or one of his creatures, as *Interino*, would lead to an immediate and absolute dependence on France. Both king and queen were struck at the bare mention of *dependence*, and, in an agony of grief, commanded Valparaiso to be secretary for foreign affairs. But he threw himself on his knees, and implored permission to decline an office too great

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for his abilities, and continued to resist the repeated importunities of the sovereigns. Unable to vanquish his repugnance, the king asked, in a tone of increasing embarrassment, "whom then can you recommend?" Wall was now mentioned as the person best calculated to fill the vacant office, by his capacity and knowledge of foreign affairs. A slight objection to him as a foreigner was easily over-ruled by Huescar, who, after a warm eulogium on his merits, declared himself responsible for his capacity and integrity.

This point being decided, the next object was to settle the necessary precautions to secure the official dispatches from improper hands. Huescar respectfully proposed that the first clerk of the secretary's office should bring them to the door of the royal apartment, and deliver them into his own hands, or those of the officer in attendance. After a pause, the king, looking on the duke, said, "Huescar, will you assist me on this urgent occasion?" "On this, and all others," the duke replied, "your majesty knows my zeal and obedience. But I cannot pretend to charge myself with so great an employment any longer than till the arrival of Mr. Wall, although I shall obey your majesty's commands if you desire me to accept the office of *Interino*."

Wall was immediately remanded to Madrid with the utmost expedition, and Huescar took

charge of Carvajal's papers, which he found in the greatest order. The whole transaction was concluded with such secrecy, that Ensenada had neither time nor opportunity to tutor Farinelli, and his agents about the queen. Indeed, she herself was persuaded that her favourite minister would involve Spain in war, and hastened the conclusion from an apprehension lest his arts and address should vanquish her better judgment. Ferdinand himself announced the mortifying intelligence to Ensenada at the following *despacho*.

Elated by their success, and confiding in the favour of the sovereign, the antigallican party were encouraged to attempt the formation of a new ministry on their own principles. They therefore turned their batteries against Ensenada and the confessor, and expatiated on the misconduct of Ensenada in particular. Both the king and queen appeared to concur in their views, observing, "though you have said much, we are acquainted with far more serious charges against him!"

The duke, therefore, ventured to develope his plan. He proposed to reform the council of the Indies, and give the presidency to the duke of Albuquerque. He observed, that Ensenada had shamefully infringed its antient privileges, and urged, that such a change alone could restore

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its pristine lustre and authority, and root out that corruption which the french and their partisans had introduced. The king readily acquiescing, Albuquerque was summoned into the royal presence to receive the office. But he, contrary to expectation, threw himself on his knees, and declined the appointment, although his sovereigns condescended to importune him above an hour. While he was yet in suspense, the king observed, "We now want a good secretary for the finances; where shall we find one?" Although Huescar had already destined his friend Valparaiso for the appointment, he probably discovered, by some look or gesture of the queen, that he had proceeded too rapidly, and, for fear of disobliging her, evaded the question, by replying, "Your majesty has many able and faithful subjects proper for the post; but it is too important a choice for an instant decision."

This momentary suspense enabled the french party to maintain their ground. The event proved that the duke had not miscalculated on the jealousy of the queen, and her bias towards Ensenada. The discomfited party, rallying, united against their assailants. The confessor not only parried the attack against him, but even recriminated on his accusers, and Farinelli, throwing off his ordinary caution, employed all his credit with the queen in favour of Ensenada.

"Count Migazzi," wrote Mr. Keene, "made the strongest and most able representations to Farinelli, shewing him the injury he did to the princess, to whom he was so much obliged; his aversion to her good, and that of her cousin the empress queen, if he supported a minister so evidently inclined and engaged to France as Ensenada. Farinelli seemed to yield a little at first; but having had time to see Ensenada, and acquaint him with what Migazzi had said, he persuaded the poor musician of his error: nothing can take it out of his head, that Ensenada for private views feeds the french with appearances only; and that he is at heart their enemy.\* It is feared, that Ensenada will support himself by the powerful friend who has hitherto supported him with her catholic majesty."

Indeed the ascendancy of the british interest, and the attacks of his enemies, stimulated the ardour of Ensenada to brave the political storm which gathered round him, and many circumstances concurred to favour his hopes. Although the queen had assisted in excluding him from the direction of foreign affairs, he was well aware that she was jealous of the least encroachment on her influence; and at the same time that she entertained an advantageous opinion of his abilities, was desirous to maintain two parties

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, May 17, 1754.

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in the cabinet, in order to profit by their mutual rivalry.

Huescar could not employ all his credit with the king without the permission of the queen; and was obliged to concert with her the matter and manner of his representations. As he had seldom an opportunity of conversing with her more than half an hour in the day, he was effectually thwarted by Farinelli and the other agents of Ensenada, who possessed the advantage of a constant and familiar access. They wrought on her jealousy lest Huescar should gain too great an ascendancy over the king; they did not omit to recall to her recollection, that he was a descendant of the celebrated Olivarez; and might aspire to the same controul over Ferdinand as the Conde Duke had exercised over Philip the fourth. This mistrust outweighed all the representations of Huescar. When he respectfully represented that she had only two parties to chuse, either to give her whole confidence to Ensenada, or remove him from all his posts, she was so divided between her inclination to support Ensenada, and her conviction of the necessity of his removal; between her esteem for Huescar, and her jealousy of his power, that she burst into tears, and continued in an agony of distress from which it was not possible to rouse her.

May 17.

In the midst of this struggle of contending

parties, Wall appeared at Madrid. Such a minister was calculated to turn the balance in favour of the antigallican interest. He possessed great knowledge of the world, activity, penetration, understanding, and judgment. He blended these solid qualities with sprightliness of conversation ; and transacted business in so easy, perspicuous, and agreeable a manner, that the king seemed to be suddenly endowed with new faculties for government. He observed to the confessor, it was time to put himself out of pupillage, repeated that he was never before so fond of being a king, and, with that piety which marked his actions, represented the appointment of Wall, and the exclusion of Ensenada, as the effect of divine inspiration, in recompense for his upright intentions.

We borrow the language of Mr. Keene himself, to describe the impression made by this important change.

" When I compare all these favourable circumstances with the gloom I was under at the death of Carvajal ; when I reflect on the miracle of our escaping the hands of those who have the conscience and purse of his catholic majesty ; and not only having escaped them, but seen introduced into authority the very persons whom I would have chosen, had the choice been referred to me ; I confess I am still in amaze, and must

CHAP. 55. beg leave to offer my most humble felicitations  
<sup>1754.</sup> to his majesty upon these favourable appear-  
ances.

" But at the same time, I must not be elated so far as to forget the many accidents that may blast our hopes. The least variance among the persons I have mentioned, the least jealousy, will undo the whole, and we shall fall into more confusion than ever. Yet even supposing their union and harmony should continue, as I hope it will, their plant is very tender, and must be nursed with great attention and delicacy. It will be easy to overload the carriage. They must have time and indulgence to go on in their own way ; and it is a comfort for me to say, that such delays will not be mere inventions, but the surest methods of coming to the great object we all propose.

" Besides, as I have already observed, I look upon the great work to be but half done. Till its completion, if that ever happens, these new servants must be very cautious in guarding themselves against the obloquy of such sharp-sighted and sharp-tongued opposers, as they have to their measures. Huescar is already accused of being an austrian, Wall as an englishman. They both despise the accusation, but neither will give any real foundation for it. Another precaution against the fairest appearances, is the great

difference there is in the generality of mankind CHAP. 53.  
from their very selves, either as *they are in or  
out of office*; and the consequences that frequently flow from such a variation in their state and circumstances.

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" At the duke of Huescar's dinner, where all the foreign ministers were present, Mr. Wall took up the greater part of the discourse, and left the side where Ensenada was, to put himself by me. His whole talk was upon England. The french ambassador, indeed, kept up his vivacity; but such was the confusion and humiliation that appeared in the face of Ensenada, and his man Ordeneña, that the least informed in the company came to me to ask whether I could guess the cause of such an alteration.

" I waited upon the spanish minister at night in his office. When I repeated to him what I had said at our first interview, he desired me to assure his majesty of his sense of the eternal obligations which the king had laid upon him. That he had acquainted his catholic majesty with the king's most particular esteem, and particular friendship; that in the few occasions he had had of seeing his sovereigns, they had turned their discourse entirely upon the affairs of England. The king in particular had been very inquisitive about the state of his majesty's health, and most explicit in his heartiest wishes, that Providence,

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for the good of mankind, would prolong the life of so good and great a prince. Mr. Wall observed, he had not as yet warmed his seat in his office, and that he must have some little time, before he could enter into more particulars with me.

" As he came hither with a despondency upon him, both the king and queen have promised him their assistance and protection; and animated him in the strongest, and I may say the most friendly manner. \* \* \* \* \*

" Such has been the care of the duke of Huescar that the state office is delivered to Wall, clear, and with all the honours and authorities that were ever attached to it. His care of Wall's interests has not been less. He has procured him very noble appointments; and has very prudently and kindly freed him from the inspection of buildings, and the nurture of the manufactures so fondly entered into by Carvajal from love of his country; and though always despised by Ensenada, the duke has turned them against Ensenada himself. By these means, Wall is not exposed to a work disagreeable in itself; and more so, in that it would have subjected him to ask money of the treasury, which was one of the greatest causes of the frequent squabbles between Carvajal and the marquis.

\* \* \* \* \*

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"The king of Spain, fatigued with the frequent offers of the blue ribbands made by the french court, has ordered Masones to declare, that he is sensible of the compliment, but not having at present an intention to dispose of these orders, he will ask for them, should any occasion present itself in future."\*

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Antigola, May 19, 1754.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-FOURTH.

1754.

*Hostile principles of Ensenada against England—His secret connections with the french court—His orders to exterminate the english settlements on the mosquito shore—Mr. Keene's account of his disgrace—Exiled to Grenada—Remarks on his character and conduct—Changes in the administration.*

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NOTWITHSTANDING this unexpected victory, gained by the antigallican party, there is little doubt, that the address of Ensenada, seconded by the influence of Farinelli, and his numerous partisans in the palace, would have enabled him to maintain his ground, had not his own eagerness to re-establish his credit, hurried him into an act of violence, which left no alternative but his immediate dismission, or a rupture with Great Britain.

He imagined that the only resource to regain his ascendancy, was to plunge Spain into a war with Great Britain, which must lead to an intimate connection with France. With this view, he had already employed the agency, first of Pignatelli, spanish ambassador at Paris, and afterwards of Aldecoa, the chargé d'affaires, to maintain a communication with the french court;

and, without the knowledge of his sovereign or his colleagues in office, had arranged the project of an indissoluble alliance between the two branches of the House of Bourbon. He also secretly furnished considerable loans to the french East India company, for the purpose of promoting the hostile designs of France against England in that quarter of the world. To give effect to these clandestine arrangements, he took advantage of the interminable disputes relative to the american trade and settlements. He collected from the different governors, various complaints against the incroachments and aggressions of the english; and reported them to the king with such unguarded warmth, that the queen ordered him to moderate his language. Unrestrained by this check, he persuaded the king to refer these complaints to a junta, of which Don Sebastian de Eslava was the chief. From them he procured a report calculated to further his design, first detailing and exaggerating the grievances against Great Britain, secondly recommending measures for defence in America, and lastly urging the king to make a strong, but amicable demand of redress.

He did not succeed in obtaining the king's assent to the last article; but he nevertheless concerted with the court of Versailles, a general attack against the english settlements in the Bay

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of Mexico.\* By means of the *via reservada*, or secret channel of his office, he dispatched private directions to the viceroy of Mexico, to prepare an armament at Campeachy, and drive the english from their settlement at Rio Wallis. These orders, though issued with the most profound secrecy, did not escape the vigilance of Mr. Keene; and copies of the instructions to two naval officers belonging to the squadron at the Havannah, who were to be employed in this enterprise, were transmitted to London, as a ground for a formal complaint from court to court.

At this juncture news arrived of the rebellion excited by the jesuits in the missions of Paraguay. The alarms which this commotion occasioned, joined to the remonstrances of the british court relative to the hostile design against their settlements, furnished to Huescar and Wall the opportunity to spring the mine which was already laid against the confessor and Ensenada. The account of this intrigue will be best given in the words of Mr. Benjamin Keene himself, as one of the principal actors.

\* From the correspondence of Mr. Keene, we find that Ensenada had long fostered this design. A letter dated June 30, 1753, to the earl of Holderness, transmits an account of a plan for the expulsion of the english from the mosquito shore, which was to have been executed by a Don Pedro Flores de Sylva. The design was suspended by his death in the preceding February.

(Most Secret, No. 1.)

Madrid, July 31, 1754.

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“ You will have seen in my ordinary correspondence, that the concluding of this great affair did not keep pace with my wishes.

“ I had, indeed, the satisfaction to find that the delays did not proceed from any strong opposition to the measure itself; but rather from a necessity of waiting for opportunities of time and humour, and more from a disinclination to take any resolution, than to take that which was now proposed. At last her catholic majesty, pressed hard by M. de Huescar and Wall, replied, ‘ They knew the king’s temper as well as she did, and left it to them to begin their attack whenever they should think proper.’

“ The duke, in the presence of their catholic majesties and M. Wall (on the 14th at night), opened this matter in a very solemn manner. He read over a paper which contained an account of the rebellion of the jesuits in Paraguay, in opposition to the late treaty between this court and Portugal; with intercepted letters, written by the king’s confessor, father Ravago, encouraging his companions of the society in their resistance.

“ It was judged necessary to begin with the confessor, because, if the king thought proper to dismiss him, Ensenada would be an easy conquest; or, if the confessor happened to be still retained for any time, his credit, at least, would

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be so diminished, that he would not dare to intermeddle in a matter so foreign to his profession, or to support Ensenada. Nor would, in that case, his catholic majesty condescend to consult him. The king listened with great attention, and said, ‘ I have perceived, for some time past, that you had disagreeable matters to communicate to me, and have accordingly prepared my mind to receive them. I have resolved not to put myself into any uneasiness; but on the contrary, to apply the best remedies to cure the disorder.’ He expressed himself stronger against the jesuits than could be expected from so devout a prince; and ordered the duke and Wall to prepare a scheme for quashing the rebellion.

“ This first attack being successful, they resolved to leave the king in repose for some days. They prepared the scheme for their operations, with the number of troops they proposed to send to America, and the manner of assembling those already in that part of the world. Wall told the king he would not accept of the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru; but as a soldier, he offered to go and head the troops. Huescar did the same.

“ The proposal of different cedulas and orders to be transmitted thither, for the secret execution of the plan, was accompanied with a most artful hint, that as those cedulas must be signed by the

secretary of state for the Indies, (no other signature being regarded in that part of the Spanish dominions) and M. de la Ensenada being himself, with the confessor, at the bottom of all these disorders, it was left to be judged, whether instructions signed by that minister would ever be carried into execution.

" Matters being thus disposed, and the queen hinting to these ministers that they might now attack Ensenada, they designed to play off their batteries on Sunday, the 21st instant, or sooner, if they found the king in temper to hear them. But luckily on the 19th, in the morning, d'Abreu's messenger arrived, with the honour of your dispatches of the 8th, and gave new motives and vigour to their operations.

" I was waiting in the king's apartment to make my court, when Wall desired me to call at his office. The duke de Huescar was with him. Wall told me, in his good humoured manner, that I had put all England into an uproar; and read over part of d'Abreu's dispatch, (which was applauded) containing the conversation of his majesty's servants to him, upon my intelligence relating to the projected operations of the Spaniards in the West Indies. I asked whether they expected less from us on such a crying occasion? That he (M. Wall) could not be any ways

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surprised, for I told him of it when I wrote it to my court, and had been ever since expecting his majesty's commands. He gave me my packets; and we agreed to meet again at night.

" I had two objects to consider, which in effect were but one. To procure the immediate revocation of the hostile orders sent to America, and to destroy the wicked author of them. The first could not be procured with security without the complete execution of the latter..

" At our conference at night, I had no pains nor merit in convincing the duke and M. Wall of the immediate necessity of revoking the orders, or in other words, of putting an end to the war. There could be no contradiction or reply to my representations, and I shall not trouble you with a detail of what passed on either side.

" The principal point was, to enable these ministers to give conviction to their catholic majesties ; to furnish them with materials and arms against Ensenada ; and put it out of his power to elude, by any tricks and artifices, the accusation which was to be produced against him.

" I will now confess the indiscretion I have been guilty of, in order to bring it to bear.

" They doubted not of the truth of my intelligence, but pressed for more particulars. I had considered, that on such great occasions,

common rules of prudence must sometimes be swerved from, especially in cases like this, where I was morally sure no misfortune could ensue.

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" I, therefore, put into M. Wall's hands a paper, which was nothing less than an exact copy of the instructions, given by the commander of the squadron at the Havanna, to the captains of the frigate and the xebecque, which, by orders from the viceroy of Mexico, he had equipped to join the forces and preparations made by the governor of Jucatan ; that by this combination, they might exterminate the english from their establishments upon the river Wallis, &c.

" They were astonished and dumb when they read it. The time, the manner, and the hostile terms employed in the instructions ; all struck them. There was no room for any of Ensenada's chicanes and evasions. The fact was clear. Two great nations, who thought themselves in peace and confidence, were actually at war, without knowing it. Unspeakable mischiefs were brought upon both, by the most worthless minister ever employed by so great, or by any crown.

" I continued, and laid before them the series of observations I had made from the time Ensenada first hinted to me the idea of forming a company between the subjects of the two nations, for cutting and vending logwood, for the mutual

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interests of particular persons, and the preservation of the friendship between the two crowns, till he most shamefully and clumsily let that method drop ; sent back to Cadiz a most worthy intelligent merchant, who came to court to solicit the conclusion of the project, with the concurrence of some of his majesty's considerable subjects in commerce ; and took up a most ridiculous one, presented by one Don Juan de Isla, a fellow who knew not where Campeachy lay, only because he was protected by the first clerk of the marine, and was a distant relation of the confessor. . . Because, also, this new project carried violence and interruption of harmony between the two nations, and breathed a different spirit from the other, which, to encourage him to persevere in it, I remember to have once called divine inspiration.

" I did not stop here. I had still more criminal observations to make upon Ensenada's conduct. It was evident to any one, who would lay the following circumstances together, that it was not the marquis's affected concern for the interests of Spain, but a plain combination with France, that produced this change of conduct and principles.

" The king, queen, and Carvajal, might, if they pleased, adopt a system of friendship with his majesty and the empress queen ; the marquis

did not approve it ; and it seems, would show that he had it in his power, as well as inclination, to frustrate their intentions, and make them french whether they would or not. I recalled to their recollection the indiscretion of the french ministry, in discovering their hopes of raising so many vexations in Spain against the english; that, knowing our vivacity, we should begin and fall upon Spain, to redress our grievances.. The whole tenor of this man's conduct with Duras ; the continued discourses of the latter, and particularly for near a twelvemonth past, upon the impossibility of the continuance of peace between England and Spain. Not only the french ambassador, but his emissaries, were constantly dispersing their reports with an indecent assurance. And even since the death of Carvajal, an intimate and a relation of Duras, established high in this country, had been simple enough to tell me; he should be glad of the embassy to England, were it not, that peace could not subsist long between the two courts, and that, consequently, it would not be worth his while to go thither.

" I desired them to join to these particulars,—the discourses of all the french ministers at different courts, and, namely, at Naples, upon new acquisitions and establishments of the

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english in America ; M. d'Ossun's\* affected apprehensions to sir James Gray, that these matters might bring on new troubles ; Duras's conversation to Wall, upon Rio-tinto ; hints of service to join the spaniards in reducing us to reason ; and still more particularly, the frequent mention of the Musquito shore, and Rio-tinto, which St. Contest had made to M. Masones,† as appeared by the letter which M. Wall then read to me from Masones, by Abreu's messenger.

" To all these, I would still add a most convincing consideration, namely, the time and conjuncture wherein France was to attack us in our possessions in America by land, and the spaniards both by land and sea. Was it possible these attempts should so accidentally have happened without a secret verbal convention between Ensenada, for I would not say Spain, and France ?

" Great Britain was to be astonished at these different attacks, and either obliged tamely to bend her neck, or to declare war at once against two such great powers. No one who knew two and two made four, could doubt of these evidences. I only instructed and reminded, I said, without any exaggeration. I hoped they would not take it amiss, if a foreign minister presumed

\* French minister at Naples. † Spanish ambassador at Paris,

to recommend the preservation of the honour and reputation of their master, one of the most just and faithful princes that ever filled a throne.

" The duke of Huescar said, as we were all of us working towards the same object, he would beg me to leave my paper with them, that they might let their catholic majesties have an ocular proof of what I had advanced with regard to America. I had foreseen this application, and determined to comply with it, knowing the necessity of striking the blow before Ensenada could have time to ward it off by frauds and falsities.

" Before I agreed to it, I told them, I would not take so unusual and blameable a step, without M. Wall's word and honour, that he would make the following representations on my part to his catholic majesty.

" As I had so long experience of his catholic majesty's goodness to me, I took the liberty to give him that paper as a private information, tending to the preservation of his own honour, and the real interest of his crown. Yet as I could not but be apprehensive, that, however sincere and upright my motives were for this confidence, it might possibly cause offence that a foreign minister had procured a paper of this nature, and give uneasiness upon the means by which I had obtained it; I protested, therefore,

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it was not by any corruption on my side, or infidelity in any of his servants ; but it came into my hands by one of those casualties, which Providence sometimes furnishes in order to bring about great and salutary events. I flattered myself their catholic majesties would believe these solemn assurances, from a person who would not dare to tell them a formal falsehood for all their Indies. M. Wall performed this part for me in the strongest and kindest manner ; and was as strongly seconded by the duke de Huescar.

" The king said, he had no difficulty to believe any assurances I should give him. Their majesties then shewed much curiosity in guessing what excuses and pretences Ensenada could find for his conduct. The paper was read to them very distinctly, and heard with great attention. The hostile expressions in it shocked them, particularly the term of ' enemies,' which made the king interrupt the lecture ; and, repeating that word several times, he said, ' I have no enemies.'

" Both king and queen were impatient to know what Ensenada could say for himself. The king was thinking in what manner he should behave towards his minister ; but added, that in all cases, he would not betray the trust Keene had placed in him, and has been pleased to look upon my indiscretion as a sacred point

of honour and confidence between two private persons.

" Their majesties knew that d'Abreu had given to Ensenada as particular an account of all what had passed in England, in consequence of my intelligence, as he had done to M. Wall, to whom he had likewise sent a copy of what he wrote to the marquis. Ensenada appeared at the *despacho*, but their majesties were under the greatest surprise, when he only coolly produced out of his bag some trifling matters of course; and, finishing his business, retired without giving the least hint imaginable upon this crying occasion.

" The next time the duke and M. Wall entered into the cabinet, their catholic majesties expressed their curiosity upon what could possibly be the motive of Ensenada's silence. The queen attributed it to his not having as yet had time enough to look out for excuses and justifications. The king turned to M. Wall for his opinion, who said in substance, he was in the naval engagement near Sicily, in the year 1718, and it never could be proved whether England or Spain fired the first gun. Ensenada might have had this in his head, and on commencing hostilities in America, might have trusted to his artifices, to impose upon their majesties, a belief,

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that the English were the aggressors. Hence M. Wall took an opportunity of shewing the king his situation, with respect to other powers. All of them, except France, wished his greatness, lustre, and independency. It was their interest to do so, as much as it was that of France to desire the oppression and degradation of the Spanish monarchy.

“ ‘ I have,’ he observed, ‘ heard your majesty say, you would not be a viceroy to the king of France upon the throne of Spain. The duke of Huescar and I will assist in this glorious resolution, with all our abilities and fidelity. But it is impossible for me, in my present situation, to exert either, when your menial servants, inferiors in the office, and your very messengers, are all of them corrupted by Ensenada.’ ”

“ All this passed on Friday, the 19th instant; and, though the great attack against Ensenada (in a paper formed by Huescar) was not designed to be made till the Sunday evening; the duke, who knows how to take his time, as well as any one living, thought proper to exert himself whilst the iron was warm, and made his representations with great respect, firmness, and success. Her Catholic majesty assisted, and all of them acted their parts, in a great and becoming manner.



" I had intelligence of what had passed, and went as usual to court the next morning.

" Appearances were not favourable. I found by several tokens, the king was in bed, though it was noon. We waited till near three, when the court was dismissed, with an excuse, that the queen being in her hunting habit, and designing to accompany the king à la chasse, their majesties would not appear that day at the conversation. Their ministers were with them in their cabinet. They did all they could to comfort and fortify the king. M. Wall did wonders, and put himself into all shapes. So much did it cost to get a resolution to be taken, even after the strongest conviction of its necessity, though against a minister who never had the friendship and good will of his master.

" The duke and Wall were ordered to return between eight and nine that evening. They then put the finishing stroke to the ministry of Ettenada, who was waiting in his office to be called for by the king. But at near half an hour after eleven, he went home, supped with his usual company, and was scarce asleep, when an exempt of the gardes du corps, accompanied with a lieutenant of the spanish guards, and a magistrate, awoke him, with the king's order to arrest his person.

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" He bore it pretty well, till they desired him to order his coach ; but faltered a little when he saw his house surrounded with the spanish guards.

" Ordenaña\* was arrested at the same hour, in his own house, and accompanied by a lieutenant of the spanish guards, to Valladolid.

" One abbé Facondo, † a constant confidant of the marquis, and supposed to be deep in his intrigues at Naples, was arrested, examined, had his papers taken from him, and was sent in banishment to Burgos, his own country.

" And thus, Sir, an end has been happily put to the ministry of a vain, weak, but rash man, who thought himself secure of preserving his power, according to poor M. Carvajal's phrase, three days after his death, and who seemed persuaded the queen did not dare to abandon him ; such a powerful advocate had he always by her side ; or if it was his fate to fall, it would be in the same soft manner, that old Villarias and others have fallen, and be left quietly to enjoy all his baubles and extravagancies. He had many more jewels on him at a birth-day than his master ; and the remaining part of a gold

\* First clerk of the war office.

† Facondo Mogrovejo, a man of considerable talents, who had acted as secretary to the neapolitan embassy, and afterwards attached himself to Ensenada.

service arrived from Paris, but a few days before his disgrace.\*

" The duke and Wall have continued the same unbounded confidence with which they honoured me, when they began this attack against Ensenada. They have shown me their papers and draughts; and told me their progress and difficulties. But good fortune at last put it in my power to lend them such an assisting hand, that I much doubt whether it would have succeeded so soon, or so well, without his majesty's just complaints, upon the hostile orders sent to America. Nor would these complaints have had the same effect, had they been made in any other manner or time, than when they came.

" Every circumstance succeeded to my wishes and expectation; I saved my good faith with Huescar and Wall, when I acquainted them with what I wrote to my court upon this matter.

\* Copy of a Note from general Wall to Mr. Keene on the fall of Ensenada, preserved in the Keene papers, which is here given as a curious specimen of corrupt english, and a proof of his confidence in our ambassador :

" The thing is done, my dear Keene, by the grace of God, the king, queen, and my brave duke; and even you wil read this scrape, the mogul will bee five or six leagues of going to Granad.

" This newse will not displease our friends in Ingland,

Yours, dear Keene,

for ever,

Dix."

" At twelve a clok Saturday nighth."

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"I should have broken the force of my sovereign's direct application to this court, if I had done more than I did when I could only speak my own thoughts; and nothing less than my lucky indiscret confidence in the king, and the sight of my paper, could have warmed their catholic majesties to the point, that was necessary to break through their natural bent towards irresolution. This prepared the better reception for the duke of Huéscar's representations, upon all the accusations with which he charged Ensenada. And our royal master will have the satisfaction to find the opposer of public tranquillity; the friend to France; the enemy to England, and to his own country, has been destroyed by the same measures, which he had employed to bring about his wicked intentions."\*

The opponents of Ensenada endeavoured to complete his disgrace by bringing him to a public trial. With this view they produced from his papers irrefragable proofs of a clandestine correspondence with the courts of Versailles and Naples, and the queen dowager at St. Ildefonso, in which he had disclosed the secrets, and thwarted the operations of government. But the queen decidedly opposed the measure, declaring that a formal process would carry him to the scaffold, and that she would never consent to

\* Mr. Keene to Sir Thomas Robinson, Madrid, July 31, 1754.

the spilling of blood. The next attempt was to obtain a confiscation of his effects, by a charge of peculation. This accusation was supported by proofs drawn from his immense riches, and immoderate expence in living, such as a private individual, without landed or monied property, could never have amassed, unless he had embezzled the public money, or received bribes from foreign courts. Accordingly, an inventory of his effects was taken by the officers of justice, and naturally swelled to an enormous amount.\* But in this hour of danger, Farinelli, who had omitted no effort to obtain his restoration to office, threw himself at the queen's feet, and

\* *Inventory of the property of Ensenada.*

	dollars.
Value of the Gold.....	100,000
— Silver.....	292,000
Sword mounted .....	7,000
Jewels .....	92,000
Badge of the order .....	18,000
Porcelaine .....	2,000,000
Paintings .....	100,000
Hams of Galicia and France .....	14,000
Salt fish, Olive Oil, and Chick Peas to a vast amount.	
Furniture of his cabinet, of inestimable value.	
40 watches of various classes, some repeaters, &c.	
1,500 arrobas of chocolate.	
48 rich suits.	
150 pairs of drawers.	
1,170 pairs of silk stockings.	
600 tercios of snuff.	
180 pairs of breeches.	

From some of these articles, it appears that he must have carried on a species of traffic.

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interceded so warmly in his favour, that an immediate order was obtained to suspend the valuation. On this favourable symptom, the confessor also ventured to appeal to the humanity of Ferdinand, and touched by his representations, a mind naturally scrupulous and compassionate. Being secretly supported by the queen, he so far prevailed that a yearly pension of £. 2,000 was conferred on Ensenada, under the title of a charitable donation, to maintain his dignity as a knight of the golden fleece. He was also permitted to reside at Grenada, in full ease and liberty, except the restriction of presenting himself daily before the chancery.\* During the remainder of Ferdinand's reign, he lived in a most elegant and sumptuous style, more as a minister than as an exile; and consoled himself in his disgrace with the hope of new favour on the accession of Charles the third.

We have thus described the fall of Ensenada, drawn from authentic information, written on the spot, by the very person who planned and assisted in its execution. But candour obliges us to add, that we must not adopt without qualification all the accusations levelled against the disgraced minister; nor detract from his real merits, in consequence of his hostility, however unjust and impolitic, towards England.

\* Decreto Real, Sept. 27, 1754.

At this distance of time the services of Ensenada may be estimated even by an englishman without passion or prejudice. In numerous instances, he shewed himself superior to the maxims of his most enlightened predecessors. Under his ministry, strenuous efforts were made to revive the national agriculture, hitherto in a state of neglect. The literary treasures of the Escorial were explored, and the translation of a valuable arabian manuscript into the castilian tongue was commenced, which was intended to open to the spaniards the excellent system of culture pursued by the moors. The duties which precluded the transport of corn from province to province were abrogated, and the first steps taken towards the improvement of internal communications. Among other plans for this purpose, neglected by the caprice or inconsistency of his successors, was the canal of Campos, intended to form a communication between the sea and the kingdom of Old Castile, a country which had more particularly suffered from the disadvantages of its inland situation. He also opened a passage between the two Castiles by a causeway, which has been the admiration of modern travellers.

He simplified the collection of the revenues; and following the footsteps of Campillo, again reduced the provincial taxes to a royal adminis-

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tration, instead of the system of farming; to which they had been subjected after the disgrace of Orri. He even formed the beneficial design of delivering the kingdom of Castile and its dependencies from the *millones* or excise and other provincial taxes, which operated to the detriment both of agriculture and trade. Accordingly he established in the department of the finances a chamber or board for the purpose of superseding them by the *unica contribucion*, a single tax on every species of income and property, as had already been done in Catalonia. Justly considering also the precious metals as mere commodities, he abrogated the absurd decrees which forbade the export of silver under the heaviest punishment, and made what had hitherto erroneously been considered as an evil, a source of revenue, by rendering it legal on the payment of a certain duty.\*

He endeavoured to crush that spirit of monopoly which was derived from the restrictions imposed on the intercourse with America, by establishing register ships which were allowed to trade to the colonies, independent of the regular communication by the flota and galleons. But this regulation, though it tended to open the trade, did not fulfil its object, and was abolished on his fall.

\* For silver drawn from Spain, 3½ per cent; and from America 6 per cent.

He made unexampled exertions for the improvement of the marine. He drew timber from Naples and other parts of Europe, and invited able ship-builders and engineers from other countries. Besides improving the arsenals already established, he caused Ferrol to be fortified, and changed it from a mere village into one of the noblest ports of Europe. He contributed also to the construction of the castle of San Fernando near Figueras, which has been since rendered a master-piece of military architecture, and the bulwark of Catalonia.

He sent numerous persons abroad to learn the arts and sciences of other countries, and naturalise their various improvements in Spain ; he established or augmented schools of drawing, the mathematical sciences, botany, and surgery. In the midst of all these improvements, he introduced such order and œconomy into the finances, that he left the Spanish treasury richer on his dismission, than it had been at any preceding period, since the accession of the new dynasty. Lastly, we ought not to pass unnoticed, a project, though of doubtful utility, and though we cannot ascertain whether eventually designed for public or private benefit ; namely, the establishment of banks in various parts of Europe, to purchase the commodities required for Spain and the colo-

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nies, and to monopolise the exportation of Spanish wool, with the funds of the sovereign.\*

We forbear to dwell on trifling errors and personal failings; but in a general estimate of his character and conduct, we cannot omit to notice the most reprehensible defect of his administration. Erroneously persuading himself that his country had nothing to fear from France, and every thing from England, he sacrificed the military to the naval department, and suffered the army to dwindle into that insignificance from which it had been raised by the care and labours of his predecessors.

His perspicuous parts, extensive knowledge, precision, and activity in the transaction of business, have seldom been surpassed. The monarch himself rallied some of his successors, who were indisposed by their application, by declaring that he had discharged a minister, who performed all their duties without a head-ach.

The different departments which Ensenada had united in himself, were divided among persons, most of whom, if not adverse to his principles, had joined in promoting his disgrace. The count of Valparaíso was minister of the finances; Don Sebastian de Eslava received the department of

\* La Borde.—Burgoing *passim*.—*Sucinta Relacion de la desgracia del marques de la Ensenada.*—Mr. Keene's dispatches.

war ; Don Julian de Ariaga was intrusted with those of the marine and the Indies.

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Throughout the whole of this delicate transaction, Mr. Wall displayed consummate discretion, and increased the favour of his royal master by his disinterested conduct, fully proving that he did not contribute to the fall of Ensenada from motives of personal interest. "Mr. Wall," says Mr. Keene, "desired, in a noble disinterested manner, his catholic majesty to relieve him from the secretaryship of the Indies, and join it to the marine, as has usually been practiced. The king would not admit his resignation ; but the matter has been accommodated. Ariaga is to be secretary for the affairs of America and the marine ; but with a clause in his commission, that he is not to perform a single act, or take any measure in that country, which may bear the least relation to the possessions or disputes of any foreign power whatsoever, without previous consultation with Mr. Wall.

" By this method the latter remains, I may say, secretary, and Ariaga as his first clerk. But Wall, by sacrificing the profitable part of that lucrative employment, has charmed and surprised their catholic majesties. The king says, he will make his disinterestedness known to the world ; and the queen observed, that while most

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others were grasping for power and wealth, Wall endeavoured to excuse himself from both."\*

The immediate consequence of this political revolution was a general change in the system pursued by Ensenada.

"Ensenada's mighty projects of a marine," wrote Mr. Keene, "have been cut short. No more ships are to be built. And I find, that notwithstanding the discharging so many hands as were employed on this branch, Valparaiso is still very uneasy at the sums Ariaga demands. The count's œconomy I take to be a good check against any marine undertakings, which, when carried to a higher pitch than necessary for the real service of this country, never have had, nor ever can have any other view, but against Great Britain.

"This disposition is followed by another still more favourable to his majesty's interests in the present situation. The Spanish infantry will be very considerably augmented; and the army put in a condition not to dread every little menace from France. You may have seen, Sir, in former letters during M. de Carvajal's ministry, that one constant, and not ill-founded reply, was returned to my solicitations for acting more vigorously towards France; that Spain by Ensenada's management had no army, and was left at

\* Mr. Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Madrid, July 31, 1754.

the mercy of the French. The expence of Spain being therefore now changed from an object intended against us, to another in order to support its independency against France, may be regarded as a favourable beginning to the future contingencies mentioned by M. Wall.

" Nothing was more visible than that Ensenada proceeded upon principles entirely opposite to those foregoing ; and but few weeks before his fall, he himself discovered his scheme to the duke of St. Elizabeth, the neapolitan minister, who was then upon his departure for his court. A friend of mine was employed by the marquis to bring the duke into his cabinet after dinner, and Ensenada, affecting to have no secret for a minister in the same interest, began with an account of the immense quantity of artillery he had made, and then vaunted that he had as many seventy gun ships as the English. That he would always have a squadron of twenty near Cape St. Vincent, another off Cadiz, and a third in the Mediterranean. That in bad weather they could easily retire into the ports of the respective departments : and wear out his majesty's fleets in storms and fatigue. In the mean while, he would let loose privateers of all nations upon our commerce. But he did not add a single reason for all this wrath. People, he said, may be surprised why I have neglected the army, but it

CHAP. 54. would be an useless expence. *As I am sure of France, I have nothing to fear from that quarter.* I had all this from the third person, who was present, and from hence may be guessed, how little satisfied the french will be, at the augmentation now proposed, though they may probably give it another turn."\*

\* Mr. Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Escurial, Oct. 25, 1754,  
Secret.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-FIFTH.

1754—1755.

*State of the court and ministry after the fall of Ensenada—Divisions in the british party—Ineffectual intrigues of Duras and the french partisans to engage Spain in a family compact—Ferdinand demands his recall—Disgrace of the confessor Ravago.*

THE fall of Ensenada disconcerted all the schemes of the french, at the very moment when they deemed themselves most secure of success; and, to use the expression of the biographer of Noailles, “burst upon them as sudden and unexpected as a clap of thunder.” The event was equally flattering to the english party, who confidently hoped to draw the court of Madrid into their views.

But, notwithstanding these sanguine expectations, and although the ambassador expressed himself as dating his letters from a new epoch, the triumph of the english party was incomplete. We may even make the remark, which, at the time, would have appeared a paradox, ‘as the death of Carvajal tended to reduce the french influence, so the disgrace of Ensenada contributed to diminish the ascendancy of England.’ A brief

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CHAP. 55. review of the state of the court and public affairs  
1754—1755. will explain this apparent contradiction.

The queen retained many of Ensenada's creatures in the ministry and subordinate departments, as well from the remains of her antient predilection, as from a jealousy of the duke of Alva and Wall, and the principle she had constantly pursued, of holding the balance, both between the ministers, and between the contending parties of England and France. From this motive, she frequently thwarted propositions which were brought forward by Alva and Wall, that their authority might not appear too considerable; and strenuously opposed those overtures from Great Britain, which were likely to implicate Spain in the existing disputes. Her weak and fluctuating state of health also frequently suspended the transaction of business; for, during the attacks of her disorder, no minister could venture to make the most trifling proposal to the king, for fear of incurring her displeasure.

The duke of Alva was naturally as indolent as he was high-spirited. Impatient of the checks which he experienced from the queen and french partisans, he frequently absented himself from the court, under the plea of ill health, but in reality from reluctance to implicate himself in affairs of state, in the critical circumstances in which the country was placed.

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Wall was sufficiently occupied in combating the cabals of the french. Naturally honest and upright, neither all his obligations to Great Britain for his rise, nor his long and intimate friendship with Mr. Keene, could induce him to contravene the darling system of neutrality adopted by his sovereign. As a native of Ireland, and avowedly inclined to Great Britain, he dreaded the national prejudice against foreigners; and suffered his judgment to be biased by the apprehension of appearing under the influence of an improper partiality towards his country. Occasional bickerings also arose between him and the duke of Alva; and perhaps nothing but the address and interference of the british ambassador, prevented a breach between two persons, whose union was so necessary to support the cause of England. His honourable, though impolitic conduct, in declining the secretaryship of the Indies, threw the management of the most delicate affairs, particularly the colonial disputes with Great Britain, into the hands of Ariaga. For, though he had endeavoured to secure the revision of this important branch of administration, the experiment, as sir Benjamin Keene observes, 'proved more promising in theory than in practice; and, next to his own scrupulous timidity, was one of the principal causes of his subsequent embarrassments.'



## MEMOIRS OF SPAIN.

The minister of the marine department, Don Julian de Ariaga, had attained the rank of chef d'escadre, and owed his rise to Ensenada, under whose administration he had been employed in affairs of importance. But before his fall he succeeded in conciliating the chiefs of the english party, or at least rendered himself necessary by his skill in naval and colonial affairs. He was a man of probity and disinterestedness, stiff and formal in his manners, and of an unbending disposition ; and he was supposed, from friendship for the confessor, and partiality to the jesuits, to be under the influence of their order. It was hoped, that the separation of his office from that of the finances, would prevent him from becoming as dangerous as Ensenada ; but the framers of the new administration departed from this principle, by conferring on him the department of the Indies, which gave him a greater accession of influence than was consistent with their system of policy. In this situation, he soon forgot his obligations to his patrons, and though perhaps he did not aggravate, he certainly did not contribute to allay the long pending disputes with England.

Valparaiso, for his service in promoting the disgrace of Ensenada, had been placed at the head of the finances. Though intelligent and active, he was not fitted for this difficult post,

either by his acquirements or habits, and was therefore under the guidance of secretaries, who had been introduced and tutored by Ensenada. Being incumbered with a family; he was less disinterested and independent than Alva or Wall, and as he still retained the post of equerry to the queen, his natural unsteadiness was aggravated by deference to her unstable and suspicious temper.

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The secretary of war, Don Sebastian de Eslava, was a veteran officer, whom we have already noticed as the defender of Cartagena. He had now attained the rank of captain general, the highest in the Spanish army. During his residence in the West Indies, he had incurred the imputation of partiality to the English; but after his return to Europe, he became the confidant and adviser of Ensenada, and was probably introduced into the ministry by the influence of the queen. He is at first described as zealously attached to his sovereign, of unsuspected probity, superior to the prejudices of his countrymen, and with the steadiness of advanced age, uniting the promptitude and spirit of youth. But circumstances soon developed his real character. He shewed himself violent and irritable; and from his own inclination, as well as the artifices of his relatives and dependants, he embraced the cause of France with such zeal, as to extort the

CHAP. 55. avowal from our minister, that "the spirit of  
1754—1755. Ensenadaism seemed to be revived in him."

Unfortunately, the influence of the queen in this, as in the other departments, not only retained the partisans and dependants of Ensenada; but even promoted others to important situations. Among these was Gordillo, a comptroller of the household, who succeeded as chief secretary or clerk in the office of war, to Ordenafia. Besides these principal and subordinate officers in the different departments of administration, whose disposition towards the reigning system and the interest of England, was at best doubtful, the different offices and tribunals were filled with a venal tribe. The governors of the principal ports, Barcelona, Alicante, Malaga, San Lucar, and even Cadiz, were likewise avowed partisans of France.

Notwithstanding the reverse which the french party had sustained in the fall of Ensenada, the increasing contests with England, and the certainty of war, induced them to redouble their efforts for the ascendancy at Madrid. In the East Indies, an open breach had taken place between the rival companies to the disadvantage of the french; and a convention for the arrangement of their disputes, proved only a temporary pause, for a more vigorous prosecution of hostilities. In America, the two nations had pro-

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treeded to still greater extremities, though without a formal declaration of war. A series of desultory conflicts had taken place along the banks of the Ohio, and the frontier of Nova Scotia. The attacks of the french had not only been repulsed, but, in many points, they had been driven from their incroachments. Both courts endeavoured to gain time by negotiation, while they vigorously prepared for war, till the armaments respectively dispatched to the new world, brought the important question to an issue. A considerable expedition, which sailed from Brest, was followed by a similar armament from England; and though the fogs, which prevail in the north western seas, prevented the two fleets from meeting, two scattered french ships, the Alcide and the Lys, were captured off the coast by two english cruisers, the Dunkirk and Defiance. The sword was drawn; but both courts, to maintain the appearance of moderation and love of peace, continued for a time a captious negotiation, while they employed all the artifices of intrigue to implicate other nations in their quarrel.

The duke of Duras literally deluged the court of Madrid with memorials and representations, and persecuted the sovereigns and ministers with demands and proposals.

"Duras," observes our ambassador, "must

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be perpetually negotiating. Wall's answers cut him short, leave him no room to get through his long worn-out story. The duke of Alva avoids him. Ariaga sends him to Wall on all political subjects. Eslava is very old, stubborn, and deaf; so that the french ambassador has no minister to whom he can display his parts, but Valparaiso, whom he finds a courtier willing to hear him, and much more willing to report to their catholic majesties what he gets out of him. It is no very honourable part Valparaiso is acting; but I apprehend no great harm from it; neither can I imagine he will dare to present a state paper to the king, without shewing it first to the minister of its proper department.”\*

In private and repeated audiences, Duras vainly endeavoured to rouse what was called the *Bourbonism* of the king, by expatiating on the insolence and ambition of Great Britain, and alarming the spanish court for the american colonies. Repulsed by the ministers, and unsuccessful with the king, he condescended to apply to Farinelli. All the reserve and caution of the timid Italian were not sufficient to weary his perseverance. These applications did not escape the penetration of his political rival. “The embarkation,” Mr. Keene says, “on the Tagus,

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Madrid, April 7, 1755, Most Secret.

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which is directed by Farinelli, gave both the french ambassador and embassadress an opportunity of intruding upon him, as he generally comes to the king's barge near an hour before their catholic majesties. Duras employed this time in begging, caressing, and making offers to Farinelli; but his answer, as he assures count Migazzi, has constantly been, that he was a musician, not a politician.”\*

Applications, both formal and informal, not producing the desired effect, the court of Versailles transferred the negotiation from the ambassador to the duchess his wife. Having obtained a private audience of the queen, under the pretence of thanking her for an appointment conferred on a relation, the duchess took an opportunity of expressing the zeal which the king of France felt for her interests; and requested her consent that he might testify the extent of his friendship by a private correspondence. Although Barbara declined the proposal, the embassadress, in a second audience, ventured to present a letter from Louis the fifteenth, which she intreated might be kept inviolably secret from the king, and particularly from the ministers, because they were influenced by private views and partialities. She also desired the queen to reply in the french language, that her royal

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Fox, July 16, 1755.

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master might not be obliged to communicate the letter to his servants, but that their confidential intercourse might be confined to themselves. The queen laconically answered, "The ties of blood between the two kings need not my interference to strengthen them." She received the letter, and presented it to her husband, in the presence of the ministers.

Ferdinand was indignant at this attempt to influence his consort, and ordered an answer to be given by Wall, as secretary of state, in the Spanish language. When it was debated how it should be conveyed to Paris, he said, "It shall not be delivered to the duchess; but presented by my ambassador. I keep ministers at foreign courts for such purposes." A cold and formal reply was accordingly dispatched. "The zeal and diligence of the duke of Duras," it was observed, "deserve all the commendation which his most Christian majesty has bestowed upon him. M. Masones, the Spanish ambassador, is fully enabled to bear testimony to the sentiments of friendship which both the king and queen entertain for his most Christian majesty; and her majesty, on her part, will always take pleasure in cultivating them in the mind of her husband, though it is superfluous and unnecessary."

The embassadress, ignorant of the effect of her application, obtained a third audience, in

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which she renewed her accusations against the ministers, particularly Wall, whom she depicted as a creature of England, and prejudiced against France. She concluded by expressing the desire of her sovereign, that some other minister might be named to treat with his ambassador ; because M. Wall did not acquaint his royal master with any circumstance unfavourable to England. The queen replied, " His catholic majesty chose, and is pleased with his servants, and I myself have reason to be satisfied that they keep nothing secret from the king, nor act without his positive commands. It is therefore impossible for me to intermeddle in this affair." The embassadress persisting in her indecorous importunities, the queen silenced her with the observation, " We women can know nothing of these high matters. They must be left to the king and his ministers, and never more mentioned to me."\*

As the news now arrived of the naval combat off the coast of Newfoundland, Duras himself once more appeared on the stage. He presented a memorial in the name of his sovereign, exonerating as before on the boundless ambition of the English, and their vast designs of conquest in America; and proposing a firmly compact for the security of the House of Bourbon. There followed a series of invectives against the dupli-

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Fox, July 30, 1755.

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city of the english, in attacking the french ships; after the most solemn assurances to the french ambassador; complaints of this unprovoked aggression; and a demand of succours in virtue of the love and union between the two branches of the House of Bourbon, against their perpetual enemies. It concluded with an earnest appeal to the gratitude of the spanish monarch, for the blood, and treasure which France had sacrificed to place his father on the throne.

After presenting the memorial, the french ambassador begged permission to read a paper, which he produced as a part of his speech. This was a vehement accusation of the whole ministry. A general combination, he urged, existed among them to keep their majesties ignorant of all the transactions in America, and even of what passed in the peninsula itself. Hence, he represented, it was expedient, as well for the interest of his catholic majesty, as for those of his people, to call for the representations and advice of his councils, which were kept in the back-ground, and browbeaten from the royal presence.

This unbecoming attempt to dictate to a sovereign in the management of his government, would have excited the indignation of a prince far less jealous of his dignity than Ferdinand. He was several times, as he afterwards informed his ministers, tempted to snatch the paper from

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the hand of the ambassador. He, however, restrained his temper, and closed the audience with the brief remark, “I will consider what is proper to be done.” He instantly summoned the duke of Alva and Wall to relate the circumstance, and insisted on the immediate dismission of Duras. But he was soothed by their representations, and at the suggestion of Alva, a moderate and dignified reply was made to the french memorial.

After expatiating on the state of Spain, and expressing the aversion of the catholic king to unnecessary wars, considerable stress was laid on the alliances with Austria and England to complete the arrangements of the late peace, respecting both Italy and America ; and the punctuality with which these had been fulfilled. “Hencey” it was urged, “the king of Spain is resolved not to interfere in the present quarrel ; but to preserve the repose of his subjects after the hardships they have experienced. Their good is the principle of all his actions and engagements. He sees with great concern the beginning of new disturbances, while Europe yet feels the smart of the last ; and he intreats the same attention to his persuasions as he shewed to those of the french king at the peace of Aix la Chapelle, when he sacrificed his own hopes of advantage for the sake of the public tranquillity.” It concluded with a wish to live in friendship.

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with France, according to the ties of blood and affection, as far as the good of his own people would permit.\*

The last artifice of the french court was a proposal to accept the mediation of Spain, for the arrangement of the colonial disputes with England, in the hope that during the progress of the discussion, opportunities would occur of inflaming the commercial jealousy of Spain; and if the mediation itself should prove fruitless, of working on the feelings of the king, to entangle him in the contest. This artifice, however skilfully conceived, could not overcome the firm determination of Ferdinand to avoid every measure which had the most distant tendency to implicate him in the cause of either party. He replied, " It would be improper for me to charge myself with this mediation, while I have my own disputes to adjust with the british nation. Nor can I indeed expect that the king of England, however convinced of my justice and impartiality, will consent to refer such difficult and important points to the decision of a prince of the House of Bourbon. For my part, I am resolved to settle my disputes with Great Britain and Germany amicably and directly, and I advise his most christian majesty to follow my example,

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Madrid, July 30, 1755, Most Secret.

in conformity with his professions of his earnest desire and endeavours to preserve the public tranquillity, which no sovereign has more at heart than I have.”\*

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To terminate these importunities, Ferdinand consulted at once his honour and repose, by demanding the recall of the french minister, who departed from Madrid in the beginning of October.

The event of this struggle gave new courage to the english party; and our minister soon announced the successful result of a second attack against the confessor.

“ After I had made the several communications to this court, pursuant to his majesty’s command in the earl of Holderness’s dispatches of the 28th August from Hanover, I had but few and short conversations with the spanish minister, whose time was usefully employed in bringing about a very great event. I mean the driving father Ravago, the king of Spain’s confessor, from the confessional chair; and with him the whole jesuitical order.

“ This essential alteration has been wrought in great secret, and with the greatest ability. The manner of doing it has been by laying before his catholic majesty, the materials col-

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, October 25, 1754.

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lected against the confessor, at the time of the attack against Ensenada ; but now increased with many proofs furnished by the court of Portugal. From the consideration whereof, his catholic majesty of his own accord took his resolution to dismiss him ; and named a very mild and worthy person in his stead.

" It would be superfluous to enter into any further particulars of what passed in this transaction ; and not less so to point out the importance of it to you, Sir, who have read so many long relations from me, wherein this jesuit has had his share. But I shall only make a few observations.

" The first is, that the Ensenadists have lost their hopes and their protector. The new ambassador, at his coming, will be disappointed of the aid and counsel he might expect from father Ravago. Those who are best intentioned towards maintaining the friendship between the crowns of England and Spain, have gotten great reputation to themselves, given great satisfaction to the public ; shewn the influence of their counsels over the king's mind in the tenderest matters ; and opened a way towards extricating themselves out of a dispute, between two courts so allied and combined, as this is with that of Portugal.

" The consequence of this dispute I always

dreaded for their personal sakes ; because, whatever party should be taken with their advice, it might have displeased one court, and most likely both. Portugal has insisted upon a cassation of several articles in their treaty with Spain. The spanish ministers thought the example a dangerous one, and have refused to advise the king to set it ; and Carvalho has more than once informed the portuguese embassador here, that the fall of the confessor might give room to adjust their disputes.

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" But whether Carvalho be as good as his word or not, Spain must be thinking of means to preserve her authority by force against the jesuits, in those distant countries, where these difficulties subsist. I am in hopes of seeing this blow against the confessor followed up, on some worthless persons of Ensenada's choice, still retained in office."\*

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to sir Thomas Robinson, Escurial, Oct. 15, 1755.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-SIXTH.

1756—1757.

*Commencement of hostilities in Europe—Union of England and Prussia against France and Austria—Events of the war in Germany—Efforts of the french and austrian partisans at Madrid—Capture of Minorca by France—Different proposals to gain the co-operation of Spain—Offer of Minorca—Ferdinand persists in his neutrality—Bickerings between Spain and England—Successful machinations of the french partisans to embroil the two countries.*

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IN this situation, and in the midst of these intrigues at Madrid, the disputes between England and France broke out into an open contest, which spread from America into Europe. The great object of the french court being to excite a continental war, a struggle ensued between the two powers for the ascendancy in Germany ; and two considerable armies were collected on the french frontiers, one to threaten the Netherlands, the other to invade the electorate of Hanover.

In this danger, England relied on the co-operation of Austria, and entered into a subsidiary treaty with Russia to purchase the assistance of an army of auxiliaries. But the british cabinet had ill calculated on the silent, though fatal change, which had taken place in the dis-

position of the empress queen. The petty squabbles relative to the barrier treaty, aggravated by female pique, and the wounded vanity of the minister Kaunitz, had imperceptibly led to an alienation from England, and a virtual dissolution of the alliance with the maritime powers. Accordingly, the demands of the British government, for a force to defend the Netherlands and Germany, were evaded on the plea, that not a single man could be spared for distant objects, and the whole strength of Austria was become necessary to repulse the attacks of the king of Prussia, a nearer and more dangerous enemy than France. In conformity also with this principle, a secret negotiation was opened between the courts of Vienna and Versailles; and the project of an alliance was speedily formed, which wanted no other formality than the signature.

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The evident symptoms of this change in Austria, joined to these secret negotiations, naturally threw England into a new system of policy. The support of Prussia was sought, as the only power capable of counter-balancing the united weight of Austria and France; and the alliance was cemented by a convention signed at London, for the purpose of maintaining the public tranquillity, and preventing the entrance of foreign forces into Germany.

To excuse her own defection, the empress

Jan. 16,  
1756.

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queen profited by the conclusion of this convention ; and publicly announced her union with France by a treaty concluded at Versailles, May 1, 1756, for the guaranty of their respective territories in Europe.

The effects of this alliance were speedily felt in other quarters. Almost at the same moment, the empress of Russia annulled the subsidiary treaty with England, to join with Austria and France. The dutch, resenting the shameful desertion of their cause by England at the peace of Utrecht, and trembling at the dangers which they had incurred in the late war, embraced a safe but impolitic neutrality. Sweden espoused the cause of France ; Denmark remained neutral ; while the superior force and influence of Austria gained the majority of the german princes, particularly Augustus, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, the situation of whose territories favoured an attack against Prussia.

These political contests were, as usual, only the prelude to actual hostilities. Frederic, king of Prussia, with that decision which marked his character, led a powerful army into Saxony, captured the saxon troops at Pirna, and forced Augustus to take refuge in his polish dominions. Master of Saxony, he instantly transported the war into the hereditary countries, and defeated the austrians at Prague. But his victorious

career was arrested at the fatal battle of Koljn, and he was driven into Silesia, while the russians over-ran eastern Prussia, and the swedes made an irruption into Pomerania.\*

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June 18,  
1757.

At the moment when Frederic was struggling with a superior power, the numerous troops of France defeated the british forces at Hastembeck, over-ran Hanover, drove the remnant of the discomfited army towards the Elbe, and reduced them to accept the dishonourable convention of Closter Seven. A second body occupied the prussian territories in the circle of Westphalia.

July 24.

Sept. 10.

Knowing the anxiety with which Spain had always looked to Gibraltar and Minorca, the court of Versailles turned their earliest attention to the reduction of these places, as the means of luring Spain into the contest. With this view, an expedition of 12,000 men, escorted by twelve sail of the line, was equipped at Toulon, and as early as April, 1756, directed its course to Minorca, under the command of marshal Richelieu. The troops were landed without opposition ; in a few days the british forces were confined to the castle of St. Philip, which commands the town and port of Mahon ; and a siege immediately commenced.

The troops composing the garrison defended

\* House of Austria, v. 2, chap, 32 and 33.

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May 20.

June 28.

Nov. 1756.

July 1757.

themselves with bravery; though much straitened for want of provisions and ammunition. They therefore looked forward with anxiety for the arrival of a squadron under admiral Byng, who had quitted Spithead with reinforcements and supplies, at the same time that the french expedition sailed from Toulon. But their hopes were fatally disappointed. After a partial action, the french squadron prevented Byng from throwing in the succours with which he was charged; and the garrison, discouraged by this failure, were obliged to yield a place, which, from the strength of its works, was considered as a second Gibraltar. The loss of this important station, the misfortunes in Germany, as well as the negligence and incapacity of the ministry, raised the most violent indignation in England. The duke of Newcastle and his adherents were driven from power, and the helm was transferred to Mr. Pitt, the idol of the nation. But this arrangement was only temporary; for after a struggle of parties, unexampled in violence, he was forced to coalesce with the ministry he had expelled. The duke of Newcastle was replaced at the head of the treasury, and Mr. Pitt received the seals of principal secretary of state, with the uncontrolled direction of the war. This great minister succeeded in gaining the favour of the king, and the confidence of his colleagues, without losing

the slightest portion of his extraordinary popularity. He infused a new spirit into every department of the government, rallied all parties under his standard, and called forth the whole energy of the country to retrieve the past misfortunes.

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Meanwhile the rival parties had maintained a vigorous struggle at Madrid; and the interest of England at first appeared to gain the ascendancy. Both sovereigns approved the connection of England and Prussia, and equally reprobated the treaty of Versailles. The queen in particular, notwithstanding her partiality for her cousin, the empress, testified her astonishment that, in so short a time, she had forgotten her obligations to England, and the injuries she had received from France. Wall also expressed his alarm at this new revolution in policy, and declared his conviction that, if the united forces of Austria and France should gain the ascendancy, the balance of power would be destroyed, and Spain must share the general ruin.\*

But the weakness of the Newcastle administration, and the misfortunes which attended the first operations of the war, greatly contributed to diminish the British interest. The changes and embarrassments which had ensued during the recent contest for power, augmented the

\* Sir Benjamin Keene's dispatches.

CHAP. 56. advantages of the french, and redoubled the zeal  
1756—1757. of their agents and partisans. They accordingly repeated their lures in every shape, calculated to tempt the cupidity, or inflame the pride of the spanish court.

Among other expedients was an offer to concur with the court of Vienna in raising Don Philip to the throne of Poland, on the vacancy which was daily expected, from the declining health of Augustus. But Ferdinand, with a tacit reproach on the ambition of the queen dowager, by whom the project was favoured, refused to imitate the conduct of the preceding government, and to plunge the country into war for the aggrandisement of a younger branch of the royal family.

The next proposal was better calculated to produce an effect. The french had no sooner reduced Minorca, than they tendered it to Spain as the recompence for her accession to the confederacy against England, and they did not neglect to accompany the offer, with the usual promise of their assistance for the recovery of Gibraltar.

The sensation occasioned by this proposal, appears from the correspondence of our ambassador.

“ Considering the force of the impending attack upon the duke of Alva and M. Wall in all

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its circumstances, I have endeavoured to get as many assurances as possible relative to the determination to refuse the island of Minorca. I find, by our conversation, that M. Wall, as a stranger, when it comes to be actually proposed, will desire his master to have it debated, and consult others upon a matter of so much weight. But his, and the duke of Alva's opinion, are so strong for it, that if their catholic majesties should waver from what appears to be their present dispositions, M. Wall, at least, will quit the service, or to use his own expression, 'either retire to one of his *commanderries*, or be sent to a *chateau*.' The other ministers will follow the example, except Eslava, who is old, and led by some young officers, and therefore not consulted on such matters. But Mina, at Barcelona, is for accepting the offer; and I suspect the new confessor, out of regard for the catholic religion in Minorca, will not be averse to it, if the king should propose it as a matter of conscience, without which the confessor will not venture to begin of himself. \* \* \* \*

"Upon the whole, our royal master has the same security for the refusal of this offer, as there is for the continuation of the present administration. If that falls, all other favourable sentiments towards Great Britain must fall with it;

CHAP. 56. for the whole attempt is to bring in Ensenada  
1756—1757. again, if these storms are not repelled.”\*

These proposals were strongly supported by all the influence of the empress queen. When she discovered that it was vain to combat the resolution of Ferdinand by direct applications, she made a new attack in desiring his accession to the treaty of Versailles. With this view a preamble was drawn up, containing the most solemn professions, that the contracting parties were resolved not to involve other powers in the particular disputes between France and England; and the invitation to accede was accompanied by a private letter to the queen. After apologising for not having sooner communicated the treaty of Versailles, because she was bound by solemn obligations to secrecy, she warmly approved the conduct of France, wished for a perfect union between the two great monarchs of the House of Bourbon, and concluded with testifying her apprehensions of the detriment which would ensue to the catholic faith, from the heretical union of Prussia and England.

Ferdinand was too sagacious not to discover the bait which lurked under all these professions.

When Wall was reading the preamble of the treaty, he stopped him at the words “ His most

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Fox, Antigola, May 31, 1756,  
Most Secret.

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christian majesty desiring not to envelope any other power in his particular quarrel with England"—exclaiming, " Except me." He also highly approved the answer which the queen returned to the letter of Maria Theresa. She expressed herself coolly upon the satisfaction of her imperial majesty with the conduct of France. With regard to an union between the two crowns, she observed, she left such considerations to the king her lord, as they were not proper materials for her private correspondence as a friend and a woman. To the excuses for the secrecy maintained with respect to the treaty of Versailles, she replied, " They are superfluous, for the communication was sufficiently early."<sup>\*</sup>

Notwithstanding the repugnance manifested by the sovereigns, the views of the empress queen were ably served by Farinelli, who, as well from devotion to her, as from resentment for the disgrace of his friend Ensenada, had lost much of the grateful attachment which he had hitherto professed to Great Britain.

" Here is another person," wrote Mr. Keene, " not inconsiderable in many respects, whose strong attachment to his friend Ensenada has

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Fox, Oct. 1 and 6, 1756, Most Secret.

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caused as strong an aversion to the duke of Alva and M. Wall, though more particularly against the former, which will naturally lead him to assist in any scheme that may tend to an alteration in the ministry, in hopes of reinstating the marquis in favour and employment. Farinelli will not indeed assist the french for the love of France, as long as he finds his mistress so firm against the attacks of that nation, upon what I call the *Bourbonism* of the king. But he may be imposed upon again, as he was by Ensenada, who made him believe, and he believes to this hour, that Ensenada was preserving the queen from falling into their power, while he was delivering up both her catholic majesty and this country bound hand and foot into their clutches. The case is different with regard to the court of Vienna. The queen, he believes, has other sentiments for her cousin the empress. France too believed it, when Duras applied to this person for his private interests and for public alliances. The shoeing horn used always to be the great regard that France bore towards the empress; and the advantage the queen of Spain might acquire for that princess, provided she would engage to abandon the english. These considerations will more than probably induce Farinelli to support the empress in the good opinion of her catholic majesty, and to do his endeavours to

weaken her present just way of thinking. To this I may add, that the presents and condescensions of both their imperial majesties (not to make use of a harsher term) towards a person of this class, have attached him to that court much more than to Great Britain, and I am sure I have often heard from Migazzi certain circumstances that he could never have learned but from Farinelli, nor he from any one, but from the second person in the kingdom. Such engagements and dispositions will therefore bend him to favour the court of Vienna, as occasion may offer. I do not hereby pretend to set him in the light of an enemy to Great Britain. For he has always expressed his gratitude towards us; and, as I have been well informed, never spoken ill of me; but much on the contrary, both in the cabinet and in public. My behaviour towards him has been measured by his towards me. I have not indeed thought it decent to make any sort of court to him as others have done, because, however it might have been overlooked in them, it would have lost me any little share I might have in the esteem of their catholic majesties, as well as in that of the public."

The court of Vienna, not discouraged by a single repulse, applied for private subsidies to maintain the honour of the catholic faith against

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the attacks of heretics. Failing in this instance, the empress brought forward a petty demand for a sum of 10,000 pistoles, which had been long due from the court of Spain. Even this application, however, was evaded by the reply, that the king could not grant so small a sum, because in the actual state of affairs, it would be construed as a species of subsidy.

It would be tedious to develop all the artifices employed by the two courts, or to recapitulate all the letters, memorials, and representations with which they endeavoured to draw from the king of Spain a tacit or partial approbation of the war against England. It must, however, be confessed, that these artifices, if not immediately successful, gradually made an impression. Nor was ingenuity tardy in devising new pretenses to create a misunderstanding with England. That Bourbonism which had been restrained when concentrated in a single minister, confounded all human vigilance when ramified into every department of state; and finally enabled France to create an almost irreconcilable misunderstanding between the two nations, in opposition to the settled principles of the administration, and the ruling passion of the sovereign.

This sinister influence appeared in the protection afforded by the Spanish governors and officers to French privateers, which, even in the face of

a British squadron, were encouraged to prey on the English trade, and intercept the supply of provisions from the Barbary coast to Gibraltar. No British admiral could suffer this insult to his flag to pass unresented. After repeated and fruitless representations, Admiral Hawke, who commanded on the Mediterranean station, rescued one of the prizes as it was carrying into a Spanish port, and threatened the severest reprisals, if satisfaction was not made in the persons of those who had been permitted to insult the flag of England.

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In compliance, however, with the remonstrances of Spain, the British government restored the prize without delay, and even recalled the admiral. But this condescension was not sufficient to satisfy the punctilious spirit of the court, urged on by all the efforts of the French partisans; and the favourable reception of this meritorious officer by his sovereign became the source of new and violent complaints. At the same time, the hostile disposition of the subordinate agents was manifested in the renewal of the Spanish depredations on the British trade in the West Indies. Promises of redress were extorted from Spain, but the same abuses were permitted to continue; and Saunders, the successor of Hawke, was soon involved in similar contentions with the Spanish officers.

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On the other hand, pretexts were equally seized to advance complaints against the misconduct of the english privateers. One instance in particular shews the prevalence of french influence in the subordinate departments ; and the measures taken to involve Spain in the dispute. The Antigallican, privateer, captured the Duc de Penthiere, a french east-indiaman, off the port of Corunna ; but in its way to Gibraltar with its prize, was forced by stress of weather into the harbour of Cadiz. Meanwhile, the proper documents were forwarded ; and the prize, regularly condemned by the court of vice admiralty at Gibraltar. In the interim, however, the french agents employed their usual manœuvres, represented the capture as irregular, and violating the neutrality of the spanish shore, and obtained through Eslava an order for the immediate restitution of the Duc de Penthiere. The captain resisting this aggression, force was employed, and two spanish ships of war compelled him to surrender.

The first news of this outrage made a violent impression on the catholic king. To use the words of sir Benjamin Keene, “ He railed at Eslava ; asked Wall why he was not turned out ; declared he would discharge the old dotard immediately ; he would have no more Ensenadas ; and then gave orders to stop further proceedings.”

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He was calmed by the queen, but a sudden attack of her habitual indisposition suspended the discussion ; for Wall's apprehension of incurring her displeasure prevented him from applying to the king without her participation. Notwithstanding this glaring abuse of authority, Eslava was still permitted to retain his dangerous office.

"The catholic king's honour," he adds, "must be covered ; he must not pass for a prince who lets his ministers impose on him ; and yet those ministers must not be chastised ; because their imposition will be discovered by such chastisement, and the punishment carried further than the tender negligence of this government will allow.

"Wall, as a stranger, does not care to push at Eslava, an old man, and looked upon as an honest one, while he has the full use of his senses ; but carried away at present by his clerks and others, all of them corrupted by the french. The duke of Alva would not refuse to assist in turning Eslava out of his office. But the great secret which retards so proper a measure, is, that the queen, knowing by experience the anxieties the king fell into when he turned out Ensenada, trembles at the thoughts of seeing him again nearly in the same circumstances, if he takes a resolution to discharge Eslava ; not for affection for their persons or services, but to avoid

CHAP. 56. the pain it gives to take a vigorous determina-  
1756—1757. tion.

“ I wish I could be clearer upon such confu-  
sion. M. Wall hates his office, and suffers at  
these matters as much as myself. He sees, as  
well as I do, the danger to which two great  
crowns are exposed, from matters of so insignifi-  
cant a nature, compared with their peace and  
good correspondence. There is, I believe, no  
premeditated intention in this court to break with  
England. I think they are not more ready than  
we are to add fuel to the present unhappy situa-  
tion of affairs ; and yet who can secure us from  
the effects of low malice, negligence, ignorance,  
fear of the french, and want of resolution ! I will  
add, of corruption too in the very tribunals,  
which his majesty knows as well as any one,  
complains of, and yet does not remedy.”

“ Many,” he adds in a subsequent letter,  
“ may have the liberty to throw out aspersions  
against the english. Few or none, as the court  
is constituted, dare to stand up in their defence.  
And the corruption M. Wall has been charged  
with in favour of the english, has given him a  
timidity from which I thought his integrity would  
have kept him free. Join to this his hatred of  
business, because he cannot do what his good  
qualities prompt him to, and his desire to retire  
from it. There is not one step the court has

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taken in this unlucky affair that has been regular. Eslava has done it all. Wall's authority has been set aside ; and not only his, but that of Ariaga likewise, who as minister of the marine should have been applied to for orders to the two ships of war employed in the safe, but cruel combat in the bay of Cadiz.”\*

The feeble mind of Ferdinand was unequal to the vigorous determination which the state of affairs required. Eslava and his partisans, relying on the protection of the queen, prosecuted their design to frustrate the justice of the sovereign with increased audacity. Instead of a regular negotiation from court to court, they contrived to refer the transaction to the cognisance of the council of war ; and on the partial evidence which they found means to adduce, extorted a royal order for the restoration of the prize, and the detention of the captor, till he should make a compensation for damages.

At the same time it cannot be denied that the english privateers, particularly those fitted out by the american colonists against the french trade in the West Indies, retaliated for the depredations of the spaniards, and in many cases found means to baffle the vigilance, and to evade the justice of their own government.

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Pitt, (Most Secret,) March 6, and April 21, 1757.

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In consequence of these causes of reciprocal complaint, the discussions were revived with new acrimony on the interminable subjects of dispute, the contraband trade and extension of the British settlements in the bay of Honduras, and the Mosquito shore. Such, indeed, was the influence of the French in this department, that even after Ferdinand had solemnly pledged himself for the revocation of the hostile orders which had led to the disgrace of Ensenada, Eslava and his party contrived to elude the performance of the promise, with regard to the contested settlements, and to give new strength to the complaints arising from that source.

These multiplied and increasing vexations affected the good understanding which had hitherto subsisted between the two courts, and excited asperity in the communications between M. Wall and Sir Benjamin Keene, who had so long lost the formalities of the ministerial office, in the candour and cordiality of friends.

"Friend," said Wall, in one of these disagreeable discussions, "I told your ministers when I left England, that if I could not promote and cultivate the scheme of politics I had learned and adopted in my embassy, I would renounce all my employments. I will now tell you, with the same truth, I will not take this matter, if insisted on, upon myself. The other ministers

shall be consulted. That is not all ; for, if they agree to it, I will not only oppose it, but will give up my employment, if your interpretation is accepted by them. For, as yet, I defy mine enemies to have any hold on my conduct. My colleagues would easily find means to retract their opinion. It would be laid entirely to my charge : and then the french would come with this glaring proof, as they would call it, of my being sold to the english, by sacrificing the rights of a treaty so punctually observed on the part of France towards Spain, who, it will be urged, is obliged by honour and by treaties to procure the restoration of french goods taken under the protection of the spanish pavillion.”\*

\* Sir Benjamin Keene’s dispatches to Mr. Pitt.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-SEVENTH.

1757.

*Attempts of the british ministry to gain the concurrence of Spain against France—Offer of Gibraltar—Memorable dispatch of Mr. Pitt, and reply of sir Benjamin Keene on this subject—The offer declined—Wall's intention to resign—Prevented by the queen—Death of sir Benjamin Keene.*

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THE new administration in England was no sooner consolidated, than Mr. Pitt made a decisive effort to win over Spain from a dubious neutrality, which was scarcely less detrimental to England than actual war, and to terminate those petty discussions which had kept alive a continual irritation on both sides. He well knew also the effect produced by the repeated offers of France to restore Minorca, and assist in recovering Gibraltar: he was apprehensive lest such lures, aided by the jealousy arising from the colonial disputes, might finally throw Spain into the power of France. He therefore determined to turn the machinations of the french against themselves. Sir Benjamin Keene was authorised to offer the restoration of Gibraltar, and the evacuation of the settlements in the Bay of Mexico since 1748, provided Spain would join with

Great Britain against France, and assist in recovering Minorca. The motives and effect of this delicate transaction will best appear from the correspondence of the ministers themselves.

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*Mr. Secretary Pitt to Sir Benjamin Keene.*

(Most secret and confidential.)      *Whitehall, Aug. 23, 1757.*

" Sir ;

" The most important and confidential matter which I have the honour of the king's commands to open in this dispatch to your excellency, and his majesty's orders and instructions herewith transmitted, cannot but affect you with the deepest sense of the great and particular trust which the king is most graciously pleased to repose in your known experience and long approved abilities. It is greatly hoped, that the state of your health will be found so well restored by the late use of medicinal waters, as to leave nothing more to desire, for the proper and ablest discharge of a commission of such high moment, and which peculiarly demands the utmost circumspection, vigilance, delicacy and address.

" It is judged the most compendious and sure method of opening and conveying to your excellency with due clearness and precision the scope and end of the measure, to refer you to the minute itself, unanimously approved by his majesty's servants, consulted in his most secret affairs ; and containing the sum and substance at

CHAP. 57. well as the grounds of the king's royal intention  
1757. in this violent and dangerous crisis.

“ ‘ Their lordships having taken into consideration the formidable progress of the arms of France, and the danger to Great Britain and her allies resulting from a total subversion of the system of Europe, and more especially from the most pernicious extension of the influence of France by the fatal admission of french garri-  
sons into Ostend and Nieuport; their lordships are most humbly of opinion, that nothing can so effectually tend, in the present unhappy circumstances, to the restoration of Europe in general, and in particular to the successful prosecution of the present just and necessary war, until a peace can be made on safe and honourable terms, as a more intimate union with the crown of Spain.

“ ‘ In this necessary view, their lordships most humbly submit their opinion to your majesty's great wisdom, that overtures of a negotia-  
tion should be set on foot with that court, in order to engage Spain, if possible, to join her arms to those of your majesty, for obtaining a just and honourable peace; and namely, for recovering and restoring to the crown of Eng-  
land the most important island of Minorca, with all the ports and fortresses; as well as for re-  
establishing some solid system in Europe; and in as much as it shall be found necessary for

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attaining these great and essential ends, to treat with the crown of Spain concerning an exchange of Gibraltar for the island of Minorca, with the ports and fortresses; their lordships are most humbly of an unanimous opinion, that the court of Spain should without loss of time be sounded with respect to their dispositions; and if the same shall be found favourable, that the said negotiation should be carried forward and ripened for execution with all possible dispatch and secrecy.

—Their lordships are further of opinion, that satisfaction should be given to Spain on the complaints touching the establishments made by the subjects of England on the Mosquito shore and in the Bay of Honduras, since the treaty concluded at Aix la Chapelle in October 1748; that all establishments so made be evacuated.

“ Your excellency being informed, by the perusal of the minute, of the views and consequence of the arduous and critical negotiation committed to your care, it becomes necessary for your guidance, to furnish you, by the several inclosures herewith transmitted by order of his majesty, with such lights, informations, and intelligences, concerning either the fatal events already come to pass, or the accumulating of more desperate mischiefs, now meditating, and too probably depending, as will enable you to form yourself, far better than any deduction of

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mine can do, the melancholy picture of the present war.

" Though his majesty is so fully persuaded of your distinguished zeal for his service, that the suggestions of any considerations to animate you in this great work, are entirely superfluous ; yet it is impossible for me to pass in silence, that affecting and calamitous part of the subversion of Europe : namely, the french conquests and desolations in Lower Saxony, which affords the afflicting spectacle of his majesty's ancient patrimonial dominions, transmitted down with glory in his most illustrious house, through a long series of centuries, now lying a prey to France. And, still further, the fatality of his majesty's army of observation, now retiring under the orders of his royal highness to Stade, exposed to the most alarming uncertainties, whether even the royal magnanimity of his majesty, seconded by the valour and ability of his royal highness, can find means to surmount the cruel necessity of receiving the law of the conqueror.

" As it would be needless to lead your excellency further on in this gloomy track of mortifying reflections, I will only observe, before I pass to the execution of the plan now opened, that the day is come, when the very inadequate benefits of the treaty of Utrecht, THE INDELIBLE REPROACH OF THE LAST GENERATION, are become the neces-

story, but almost unattainable wish of the present; when the empire is no more, the ports of the Netherlands betrayed, the dutch barrier treaty an empty sound, Minorca, and with it the Mediterranean, lost; and America itself precarious.

" From this state of things, calamitous as it is, your excellency has a fresh proof that nothing can ever shake his majesty's firmness, or abate one moment his royal concern for the glory of his crown, and the rights of his kingdoms. Nor can any events withdraw the necessary attention of his consummate wisdom from the proper interests of Europe; or divert his generous cares from endeavouring to prevent the final overthrow of all Europe, and independency amongst the powers of the continent. In this salutary view it is, that the king has, in his great prudence, come to a resolution of ordering the dispositions of the court of Madrid in this alarming conjuncture to be sounded; and as the same shall be found favourable, a negotiation to be, without loss of time, opened on the grounds and to the ends contained in the minute above recited.

" The king is pleased to repose such confidence in your ability, and perfect knowledge of the court of Madrid, that he judges it unnecessary to send you particular orders and instructions, as to the method and manner of

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breaking this idea, or presenting it at the first view in lights the most likely to captivate the several characters and passions of the court. It is hoped, however, that the spanish dignity, and natural feelings of the duke of Alva, may on this occasion coincide with the great transcendent interest of Spain, who can no longer indulge the little, false, selfish interest of a lucrative, but inglorious and dangerous neutrality, at the expence of the subjection of Europe, without weakly and shamefully renouncing her wise and so much boasted capital maxim, of reviving and re-establishing the independency and lustre of the spanish monarchy. Nor can M. Wall fail to discern how particularly it imports a minister to embrace with ardour the national and darling points of honour of the crown he serves. These considerations, amongst many others, give reasonable grounds to hope that the court of Spain, whatever its present unpromising complexion may be, cannot suffer itself to be surprised and captivated by any alluring offer made, or to be made on the part of France, it being self-evident that all such offers, however dazzling, can be nothing but the price of dependence, insecurity and dishonour.

" I must not here omit, in obedience to the king's commands, to open further to your excellency a very material concomitant branch of the

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measure in view, and naturally springing from it; which, as it concerns so nearly the interest and favourite wishes of the presumptive successor, may, it is hoped, in your hands, prove a source from which your address may possibly derive facility to your negotiation, and add essential strength to the execution of a belligerent plan, should you be so happy as to succeed in so great a work. This favourite object of the king of the two Sicilies, conformable to his non-accession to the treaty of Aranjuez, can be no other but to secure to his second son, the eventual succession to the kingdom his sicilian majesty now enjoys, in case he shall hereafter mount the throne of Spain. The king deems it of the highest importance that your excellency should endeavour to penetrate the disposition of the king and royal family, as well as of the spanish nation, with respect to such a contingent event. And I am commanded by his majesty to recommend the greatest address and circumspection in expressing and touching so delicate a matter, concerning which we are much in the dark, and which so intimately and personally concerns the interests, and affects the domestic passions, of so many crowned heads and princes of Spain. With regard to the court of Turin, from a situation and connection so essential to any plan that concerns Italy, it is superfluous to observe, that:

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every consideration dictates an extreme caution and reserve in bringing their name in question, till things shall be in some degree ripening. Whenever that shall be the case, the more the pride of Spain is left to take the lead, and call on the powers of Italy to co-operate with her, the better probably the views of his majesty may be answered, in rendering the condition of a firm and affectionate ally, the king of Sardinia, more advantageous to himself, and more beneficial to the future system of Europe. It may be useful to add here, that we understand, on very good grounds, the just umbrage the court of Naples takes at the dangerous designs of the House of Austria, whose plan of power in Italy is visibly this; to render incomunicable the states of the kings of the two Sicilies and Sardinia, by cutting Italy in two; and possessing a contiguity of territory from the tuscan sea to Saxony, and to Belgrade.

" I am now, before I close this long dispatch, to discharge his majesty's particular commands by recommending to you, in the strongest manner, to use the utmost precaution and circumspection in the overture of this conditional idea with regard to Gibraltar, lest it should hereafter come, although Spain shall decline the sole condition of such an intimacy, to be construed into a promise to restore that place to his catholic

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majesty. And you will take especial care through the whole course of the transaction relating to Gibraltar, to weigh and measure every expression with the utmost precision of language, so as to put it beyond the possibility of the most captious and sophistical interpretation, to wrest and torture this insinuation of an exchange on the sole terms above expressed, into a revival and renewal of any former pretended engagement with respect to the cession of that place. And for greater and clearer indication on matters of this extreme importance, I am, though unnecessarily, expressly to acquaint you, that the king can in no supposed case ever entertain the thought of putting Gibraltar into the hands of Spain, until that court, by a junction of their arms with those of his majesty, shall actually and effectually recover and restore to the crown of England the island of Minorca, with all its fortresses and harbours.

" With regard to that part of the minutes concerning the establishments made by british subjects on the Mosquito shore, and in the Bay of Honduras, you will observe, on the perusal of the inclosed copy of M. d'Abreu's last memorial on that subject, that notwithstanding the generality of that paper, yet towards the conclusion of the same, he expressly gives to understand, that his court woud for the present content

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themselves with the evacuation of the Mosquito shore, and the recent establishments in the Bay of Honduras ; which he has explained himself to mean, those made, as expressed in the minute, since the conclusion of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

" I am sorry to find it necessary at this time to mention again the king's great anxiety for the property of his subjects concerned in the Antigallican's prize, which, from the known equity of his catholic majesty, the king trusts, will receive a decision agreeable to justice and the friendship subsisting between the two crowns."\*

The embassador was too well acquainted with the complexion and principles of the spanish court, not to be convinced that no lure, not even the offer of so darling an object as Gibraltar, would tempt them to swerve from their neutrality, and engage in a contest with France. He could not, however, hesitate in fulfilling the commands of his sovereign, though he knew and anticipated their inefficacy. Indeed he received this dispatch with an irritable impatience not consonant to his usual tranquillity of mind, peevishly exclaiming against the impropriety of such

\* According to the information of my late worthy friend James Rivers, esq. under secretary of state, Mr. Pitt dictated this important dispatch with peculiar solicitude, and employed three days in its composition.

an attempt at that period, which, if sooner made, might have produced the expected effect.\*

After acknowledging the receipt of these important orders, the ambassador continued :

" By several expressions in your dispatch, you appear sufficiently informed of the unfavourable complexion of this court, which, being but too true, I considered with more than ordinary care the most proper manner of procuring an attentive reception of the insinuation I had to make to the spanish minister. I obtained it by a previous conversation, which I had with him, under the pretence of asking an hour more at his leisure. I was not mistaken when I imagined, that if I gave him an opportunity of venting his passion in this short conversation, I should hear less of it in the more important one I had asked of him.

" As what passed at this visit is applicable in great measure to our subsequent interview, I shall take the liberty to acquaint you, that he bewailed, in a warm fluency of words, his uneasy and dangerous situation, which he attributed

\* I was informed by the late reverend Mr. Harper of the British Museum, who resided in his house in the capacity of chaplain and secretary, that when he delivered to him the packet, sir Benjamin Keene read over the dispatch of Mr. Pitt with marks of great perturbation, and throwing his cap on the ground, exclaimed, " Are they mad on the other side of the water? What can they mean! It is now too late! But I must fulfil my orders, whatever may be the consequence."

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to the usage he had experienced from those he had desired to serve. Two points were uppermost in his mind. The insults Spain had met with from our privateers, whereof, he said, not a single one had been chastised, during the two years in which they had lorded it over her sea-coasts and subjects, without sparing their properties or lives. ‘What can I say,’ he exclaimed, ‘to the reproaches which fall on me on all parts, in excuse or alleviation of such grievances? The form of your government may indeed be something for those who know, or care for it, but who in Spain does either? On the contrary, the general way of reasoning is, what friendship can be cultivated or preserved with a nation that cannot or will not chastise its notorious delinquents!'

“The next point was upon what he called our usurpations in America, on which he ran pretty largely. He did not spare his minister d'Abreu, for soliciting an answer to his memorial on that subject, which he said he should have left to our choice to give or not. The other parts of this minister's conduct did not escape the censure of his principal; but it was not for being too active or too lively in his proceedings with his majesty's ministers. As my design was to let him satisfy his passion now, I contented myself with short answers; and he appointed me to meet

him the next morning early in his apartment, not in his office.

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" I was punctual to his time, and addressed him in a manner to revive our old friendship and confidence. I told him he had been a little warm the day before; but surely the unaffected delay in punishing some villains on either side, was not an object to stop the greater views and ideas that these calamitous times might make necessary for our courts to take into their consideration. He broke out again, ' Not a single villain to have been punished in two years ! How can I support myself ? You know this country as well as I do. How can I hold up my head ? ' But not to go on in the old round, I told him, that as to the other point of his resentment against us, for what he called the usurpations, I had all imaginable reason to be persuaded he would receive satisfaction by the first courier d'Abreu dispatched to him.

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" He again blamed d'Abreu, and entered into a detail of what had happened since the time he had said the king, out of regard to our circumstances with France, was willing to remit those points to a friendly determination between the two courts. ' What,' he asked, ' has been done by you since that time ? Not so much as a memorial answered. What calumny has not been

CHAP. 57. raised against me by the council, for agreeing  
1757. to submit to a discussion of matters so evidently  
the property of the crown of Spain, whose rights  
had been invalidated by such a concession ?'

" In a word, that I may not be too prolix on this point of restitutions, I may collect the whole, in presuming that I believe Spain will endeavour to do herself what she calls justice, if she thinks we do not ; for such I take to be the meaning of M. Wall, when he let fall the following expressions : ' On several occasions, the spanish governors, in virtue of their usual orders and instructions to defend the territories committed to their charge, had driven the english logwood cutters, and other intruders, out of the places of their labour and residence, without the imputation of an act of hostility against Great Britain. On the contrary, the two nations had continued in friendship, till in course of time, by the negligence of the spanish governors, and the artifices of the logwood cutters, the latter crept back to their huts on the bogs and lakes, which gave rise to new disputes. Spain,' he continued, ' has fourteen sail of ships of war at sea, and can add six more when she pleases.' "

After stating the manner in which he had employed the arguments suggested to him, and tendered the offer of Gibraltar, the ambassador proceeds :

"I have used greater brevity in giving his majesty an account of the part I acted on this delicate occasion, in order to come to what is much more material, I mean the manner in which M. Wall received this insinuation.

"The weight of the business gained the attention it deserved. His lively imagination wanted no information of the wretched circumstances in which Europe was nearly overwhelmed; nor did his memory want to be refreshed by my recapitulating to him the noble maxims he purposed to follow when he came into office. After running through both these subjects with great precision, he replied to my insinuation, relative to the conditional restoration of Gibraltar, with a cool politeness. 'You know,' he said, 'I am a stranger in this country; alone, without support or aid from any of my colleagues, whose inclinations, as well as the general bent of the nation, are not, I believe, for entering into a war against France in your favour.'

"He then accused England of ruining the credit he might have had with this nation, if we had supported him with acts of justice and attention, though we should have strained a point to serve him; a credit, he said, which would have been warmly employed for the service of both crowns, notwithstanding all the suspicions which

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his birth and education might have exposed him to. But both the one and the other made but weak impressions on a mind, that by the experience and knowledge he had gained in England, saw that he could not better repay his obligations to Spain, than by cultivating a sincere friendship between her and England. I thought I observed something of a regret, either that this proposition should come too late, or in circumstances when he would not, or dared not, make use of it.

" You will blame the length of my letter if I charge it with more particulars than are necessary for his majesty to form a true idea of what has passed here. I shall therefore cut short in this place, since there needs no further addition to shew M. Wall's resolution, not to charge himself with, or mention, much less support, the adoption of the vigorous measures which the execution of this project requires. Neither did he give me the least room to think, but quite the contrary, that he would take notice of it to his master or his colleagues.

" Whoever is upon the spot, will see and bewail the indifference with which the present situation of Europe is regarded in the highest places at this court ; and how easily their thoughts are diverted from such interesting objects, and employed in very trivial occasions,

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of which I could give you fresh instances. And whoever sees the nature of this administration, will be but too well convinced, that there is neither activity, spirit, or union of sentiment among them, to flatter himself with their daring to propose, on any account whatsoever, the drawing of the sword against the french, in favour of heretics. These, I presume, will rather look out for excuses to cover their tame-ness, than means to support their honour and independence.

" I make these reflections, in order to reply to that part of your dispatch, wherein you are pleased to mention my addressing myself to the characters and passions of such of the court, as I have the honour to deal with. They are all reduced to M. Wall alone. There are four secretaries of state, who are chiefs in their sepa-rate departments. He that is charged with state affairs, has nothing to do with the marine, war, or the finances ; and were I to address myself to either of the latter on such subjects as the pre-sent, they would shrug up their shoulders, and set me worse than I am with M. Wall; for this unusual and suspicious application. The duke of Alva has been long absent from court, and has permission to prolong his absence. He seems tired of meddling in political affairs. The king loves him ; but the queen does not care to

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trust or confide in his influence over her royal consort, and cuts it short ; nor will she allow too great a harmony between the rest of the ministers.

" It would be a task above the present state of my strength, to give you a thorough description of this court. I will only say in general, that the secretary of war, Eslava, led by some warm-headed young relations, is rather inclined to war against us. The marine secretary, Ariaga, would have no war at all ; but in case of one, is rather against us than for us. The count of Valparaiso, who has the finances, would rather increase his treasure and not employ it either for or against us. Give me leave, therefore, to refer it to your better judgment, whether from these qualities either of the ministers, or principals, it would not be illusion in me to flatter myself with raising the least spark of that generous spirit, which Spain has so great and noble an opportunity of exerting for her own good, and for that of the public.

" Permit me, sir, to say a word or two in answer to that idea, which is proposed as a concomitant branch of the measure in view. I mean for facilitating the designs and desires of the king of the two Sicilies, to secure to his second son the possession of those kingdoms, in case he should mount the throne of Spain.

" That matter is indeed unhappily out of the question, by the inattention or refusal of the great point now offered to the consideration of Spain. But in the supposition of a negotiation begun, I believe it would not have been agreeable to the king of Spain to have heard any mention made of his brother of the two Sicilies by England, or any other foreign power whatsoever. Those matters are looked upon by this court as family concerns, in which no others are to meddle. The king of Spain expects submission to his will and example. Don Carlos does not care to make the figure of a sort of vassal. From these different principles, the two courts are not always in the best humour with each other. The two kings write to each other by every courier; but they never talk of their affairs; their letters are only accounts of the game they have killed in the foregoing week. It has happened accidentally, since I received the honour of your dispatch, that I have been authentically informed, when the neapolitan ambassador has made application to this court on the subject before us, he has been told, surely the king of Naples may be content with the crown of Spain in the same manner as his elder brother now wears it.

" The opinion of the spanish nation in general, is, that those dominions should revert to

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the crown of Spain as being conquered by its arms and treasure; and that the late king and queen had no power or right to separate them from the monarchy.

" It is time that I should come to the last period of this attempt upon the court of Spain to support her own independence with that of Europe. And I am sorry to add, that if the foregoing part of this letter gave no hopes of success in that attempt, what follows will be a much stronger confirmation of their repugnance, or rather absolute refusal, to enter into such salutary measures.

" On the 19th inst. I received a note from M. Wall, desiring to see me before the french post departed that evening. It was to communicate to me a long letter he had received from d'Abreu, which he read to me in a very grave manner, telling me he would spare me the pain of hearing any of his observations, the facts would be sufficient. They were reduced, as well as I remember, to three. The hints given to the spanish minister by some of his majesty's servants, that he should have a favourable answer to his memorial upon the affair of the Mosquito shore and Honduras. To this, M. Wall said, he had done wrong to speak of it to our ministry any more. Had he himself been in England, he would have left it entirely to their pleasure.

The second was upon the interpretation of the treaty of 1667, with regard to contraband goods, and our retracting the interpretation with respect to East India goods. The third related to the not punishing our privateers after all our fair words to Spain. M. Wall has written d'Abreu a very sharp letter accusing his lukewarmness, which I apprehend will sharpen his expressions still more.

"I gained but little by endeavouring to set these lesser matters in a true light, in opposing them to the greater objects in view. It was much easier to irritate than convince. 'Are these times and circumstances,' he said, 'to talk on such points as the liberties of Europe, and a closer union with Spain, when you have given us so much room to be dissatisfied with you? Not only are we ourselves, but your enemies the french and the austrians, are continually blowing up the coals against you for your behaviour towards us! What worse can happen to us when the liberties of Europe are gone, than what you do to us? If we are to be despised, let it be by the strong, by our own blood and relations. And what are we to expect from you in your successes, if such is your treatment in the present state of your affairs? You may possibly make a peace, and I hear there are already some overtures to France, perhaps by the danish

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minister, lately arrived there. But I shall leave it as a legacy, not to be friends with England after her peace with France, if we have not satisfaction for the complaints I have mentioned.'

" What shall I say, sir, in excuse for this long and disagreeable letter, unless that, in answer to such a commission as I was honoured with, it was necessary his majesty should see every step I have taken, and their unfruitful effects. I have chosen to do this in M. Wall's own words and manner, rather than by my conception of his meaning.

" Sure I am, that I need not say a word of the pride and honour I should have been covered with, if in this late part of my life, my little fortune and abilities had not encountered such unsurmountable obstacles in the execution of his majesty's commands. But since I have not had that happiness, I beg leave to repeat my most humble prayers, that his majesty would be graciously pleased to grant me that which nothing but the uncertain state of my health, which frequently renders me incapable of satisfying my zeal for his royal service, could ever have obliged me to request, as long as his majesty should have thought proper to accept my poor services at the court where I reside."\*

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Pitt, Madrid, Sept. 26, 1757.  
Most Secret and Confidential.

As M. Wall foresaw the fatal result of these incessant bickerings, he was anxious to withdraw from his perilous and irksome situation ; and the public rumour even designated the marquis of Grimaldi as his successor.

Sir Benjamin Keene details the circumstances which prevented the execution of this prudent and independent determination.

*Madrid, September 26, 1757.*

“ Since I have been able to get through the long letter you will receive by this messenger, I shall not detain it in looking out for other materials to accompany it. It is of itself of sufficient importance, and though it will give no pleasure, it will convey some instruction on the dispositions of persons and things where I am. I may, however, add an anecdote which will cast a little further light on the situation of persons here, or confirm at least what I have already sent you.

“ During the time of my being at the waters of Sacedon, M. Wall, ill in his health, and tired of his office, drew up a formal paper containing his reasons for desiring leave to retire from his post. The queen had notice of it, as she has of every thing that passes before it proceeds higher. The effect was, that the substance of the paper was known, but the paper itself was not delivered. Her majesty desired M. Wall to stay where he

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is ; the king did the same ; and the conclusion is, that he has been very honourably and kindly pressed by both to have patience for some time longer. But not a single favour or increase of authority has been produced by a transaction, wherein there was great regard and tenderness shewn him. The duke of Alva and M. Wall are both of them in the same inclinations to retire if possible, and seem not to be intirely content with each other, either for their reciprocal conduct during business, or for the way of leaving one another in endeavouring to get out of it. The duke has permission to stay in the country till the court returns from the Escorial ; and though I apprehend no alterations from all these motions and propositions, yet if any are to happen, they will not be before the latter end of December.

" As M. Wall's intended demission got vent, and it was known that the marquis Grimaldi had leave to absent himself from his ministry at the Hague, the common voice created him imme- diately successor to M. Wall. But I may give the king the satisfaction of knowing that mea- sure will not be taken ; and that if the opinion of the present possessor is to have weight, when- ever he retires, neither Grimaldi, nor any other stranger, will ever be placed in the spanish

ministry. A most salutary maxim, whether that stranger may be for or against the interests of Great Britain.

" I have dared to mention so inconsiderable a matter as my health at the conclusion of my long letter, not thinking I should have been able to trouble you with another. But since my indispositions have given me a little respite this morning, I would for once beg leave to give you an account of my situation, and then you will judge of my concern when I find myself honoured with any important commission.

" Your dispatches of the 23rd August, found me confined with an inflammatory fever attended with painful and dangerous circumstances for several days preceding. I made the best shift I could, and as soon as it was possible for me to go out and execute his majesty's commands ; and at different times got through the long letter which accompanies this. I have had relapses since that twice, which have weakened me extremely. I am ashamed on my own account to say so much of myself ; yet, sir, I cannot say less with respect to carrying on his majesty's service, at this most critical conjuncture ; and I may add, with as great truth as submission, that if his majesty's gracious permission for me to retire from hence does not come soon, I have too

CHAP. 57. much reason to apprehend it may come too  
1757. late."\*

The presage which closes this letter was unfortunately verified ; for the offer of Gibraltar was the last public act of our able and intelligent minister. Sinking under the effects of a lingering malady, his mind was harrassed by the indecision of the late administration ; and his spirits were broken by the little attention paid to his long and meritorious services. While Duras had been liberally rewarded for a fruitless and temporary mission, sir Benjamin Keene had received no other recompence for his arduous negotiations than the mere approbation of his conduct. At length his success in effecting the disgrace of Ensenada, procured him the order of the Bath, which he had long solicited in vain, not from motives of personal vanity, but to give dignity to his mission in the eyes of a court where scarcely any public minister appeared without the decoration of a ribband. This grace was followed by the pension usually granted to foreign ministers ; and he received a tardy permission to return to England for the benefit of his native air. But the indulgence came too late. He died a few days after he had

\* Sir Benjamin Keene to Mr. Pitt, Madrid, September 26, 1757.  
Private.

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written this memorable dispatch, leaving a sad void in the diplomatic circle of England, at a time when his profound knowledge and superior address were doubly necessary. His loss was but imperfectly supplied by the earl of Bristol, who, though a nobleman no less distinguished in talents than rank, was deficient in that local knowledge and acquaintance with character, which his predecessor had acquired by long experience.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-EIGHTH.

1758—1759.

*Death of queen Barbara—Its melancholy effects on the mind of Ferdinand—His afflicting illness and death—Remarks on his character and administration—Intrigues for the disposal of his crown in favour of Don Philip, duke of Parma.*

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UNFORTUNATELY both for Spain and England, the happy and pacific reign of Ferdinand was drawing to a close.

The frequent illnesses of the queen visibly exhausted her delicate frame; and already the most indecorous cabals were forming at Madrid, as well as in the other catholic courts of Europe, to supply her place. The french minister confidently announced madame Victoire, the youngest daughter of Louis the fifteenth, as her successor, and the courts of Vienna and Turin evinced equal anxiety to give a queen to Spain. But these eager and selfish politicians little knew the rooted and ardent affection which Ferdinand felt for his consort. Her death, which happened on the 27th of August 1758, produced a fatal effect on a mind too feeble to struggle with affliction, and threw him into the most deplorable melan-

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choly. He immediately immured himself in the palace of Villaviciosa, refused to attend to the business of state, maintained an obstinate silence, and deprived himself both of food and rest. Medicine could not minister to his diseased mind ; deep and rooted sorrow rapidly exhausted the powers of nature. The condition of the royal sufferer is feelingly described by lord Bristol, the british embassador.

" The extraordinary situation of this country from the catholic king's indisposition, is the cause that all business is at a stand. He has kept his bed for seven days, he was blooded twice within a few hours, and has been physicked ; but his aversion to business, and his reluctance to see any one, except the two physicians, increases daily. M. Ariaga went to Villaviciosa, but was by the king's orders denied admittance. M. Eslava was refused his accustomed entrance. M. Wall has not seen his majesty these six days. The duke of Alva came to Madrid on the 23d, where he now is, but the king receives no one ; and for the last three days, even the infant Don Louis has been refused access to his brother by his express commands. There is a melancholy in the king which nothing can divert, and such a settled taciturnity prevails, that no direction can be given, nor any order issued.

CHAP. 58. It is impossible to see what will be the result of  
1758—1759. this unsettled scene.\*

"The catholic king continues at Villaviciosa without any apparent change in his health. It would be difficult to describe the present situation of the spanish ministry. M. Wall did not deny that the melancholy disposition of the catholic king had now almost entirely affected his head; but added, that he had not uttered a weak, extravagant, or injudicious sentiment. He will not be shaved, walks about without any covering but his shirt, which has not been changed for a surprising time, and a night gown. He has not been in bed for ten nights, nor is he thought to have slept five hours since the second of this month, and that only by intervals of half an hour, sitting upon his chair. He declines lying down, because he imagines he shall die when he does so."†

From this melancholy state, Ferdinand was relieved by death, on the 10th of August 1759, in the forty-seventh year of his age, and fourteenth of his reign.

According to the description of a contemporary writer, Ferdinand was short in stature, with an expressive and prepossessing though not a hand-

\* The earl of Bristol to Mr. Pitt, Sept. 25, 1758,

† Ibid. Nov. 19, 1758.

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some countenance, a keen eye, and a physiognomy perfectly bourbon ; and though of a tranquil and sedate character, his manners and deportment had more of the vivacity and ease of a frenchman, than the gravity and composure of a spaniard.\*

Ferdinand was a prince of inferior capacity, but of upright intentions and pacific disposition. In laying down a system of policy most advantageous to the real interests of his country, and pursuing it with probity and firmness, unshaken by threats, temptations, and promises, and in opposition to the ties of blood and the bias of private inclinations, he exhibited a spectacle uncommon in the history of nations. The prejudices of an interested policy, the zeal of party, the spirit of misguided heroism, have stigmatised the reign of this amiable monarch with the imputation of tameness and a dereliction of national honour. A more cool and dispassionate posterity have done justice to the wisdom of his measures, and distinguished him by the epithet of Ferdinand the Sage. During his tranquil reign, which was a longer period of peace than Spain had enjoyed since Philip the second, and while the surrounding nations were involved in the horrors of war, his people continued to flourish and improve in agriculture, manufactures and commerce, and conferred on him a

\* Beccatini Storia di Carlo 3, p. 191.

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fame superior to that derived from sanguinary triumphs, in adoring him as the father and restorer of his country.

Ferdinand was œconomical, but not parsimonious; for he was liberal both in his public and private charities. One among many instances is recorded in the correspondence of the British minister. "I must mention a noble charity of his majesty. The provinces of Andalusia are reduced to such extremities from the terrible dearth, that great numbers of people who have neither money to purchase bread to support themselves, nor corn to sow the next season, were abandoning that country to retire into Castile. The king, to remedy these misfortunes and disorders, has sent the corregidor, the chief civil magistrate at Madrid, with a sum of £. 100,000 to distribute for these purposes, and a credit upon the different treasuries in the provinces for a much larger sum, to be employed in the same manner if necessary."\*

Notwithstanding these and other benefactions, Ferdinand left in the royal treasury the amount of three millions sterling. But it must be confessed that this principle of rigid œconomy produced a measure as impolitic as it was unjust. By the sophistry of the confessor, and the representations of Ensenada, he was induced to

\* Mr. Keene's dispatches.

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suspend the payment of his father's debts ; and thus established a precedent which subverted public credit, and greatly diminished the resources of the crown.

The reign of Ferdinand was distinguished by an important change of policy towards the church, the necessity of which had been long and deeply felt by his predecessors.

Before this period the popes had nominated to all benefices and ecclesiastical dignities which became vacant during eight months,\* for that reason called apostolical months ; and at all times to the benefices of which the possessors died at Rome. They had also claims on every benefice under the different names of expectatives, reserves, indultos, annates and fifteenths, and enjoyed the property of deceased prelates, and the revenues of all consistorial benefices during a vacancy. Finally, they gave bulls for those in ecclesiastical patronage, which became vacant during the eight reserved months.

Innumerable abuses flowed from this extensive system of patronage. The benefices in the gift of the see were usually filled with foreigners, and charged with pensions, and frequently with what were termed *cedulas bancarias*, a species of contract by which the candidate was bound to

\* January, February, April, May, July, August, October and November.

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the apostolic chamber for a certain sum of money. If this sum was not immediately liquidated, the forbearance of the chamber was purchased at an enormous interest, and agents were kept in Spain to enforce the performance of the contract. The administration of the revenues from vacant benefices and the property of deceased prelates, called *spolios y vacantes*, was also intrusted to a board of italians, who embezzled a great part of the produce. Under these various pretences, vast sums of money were yearly drawn from a country already impoverished by the defects of its government, and of its political œconomy. Their amount may be estimated from the single remark, that the *cedulas bancarias* drained the spanish benefices of one fifth of their revenues.

The agent employed by Ferdinand to deliver his crown and kingdom from this spiritual bondage, was the abbot Figueroa, whose mild and conciliating temper fitted him for so delicate a task. By his address and discretion, and by liberal concessions on the part of the monarch, a concordate was concluded with Benedict the fourteenth, on the 11th January 1755, and ratified by a papal bull in the following June.

By this concordate, the pope confirmed the kings of Spain in their antient right of nominating to all consistorial benefices, renounced the patronage of the apostolic months, and the right

of charging the benefices with *cedulas bancarias*; and agreed that the *spolios y vacantes*, should be administered by an ecclesiastic, and appropriated to religious purposes. But the king was tacitly permitted to direct the disposal of the fund, and even to employ a part for the encouragement of industry, and the reward of military services.

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In return, the court of Rome was to receive a compensation of nearly a million of roman crowns, to enjoy the patronage of fifty-two benefices, and to retain the produce of marriage licenses, and the bull of the cruzada was to be made perpetual.\*

Like his father, Ferdinand was solicitous for the improvement and augmentation of manufactures, but his regulations display far more attention to the national agriculture.

Although he cannot be ranked among the sovereigns who have most liberally patronised the arts and sciences, yet he fostered and promoted the institutions of Philip. The school of painting, sculpture, and architecture, founded by his father, was erected into a royal academy, and endowed with funds for sending the most promising students to prosecute their studies at Rome. He also established the botanical garden at the Pardo, which was the first institution of

\* Laborde, v. 5, p. 23.—Burgoing, v. 1, ch. 12.

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the kind in Spain ; and he had the merit of promoting the endeavours of Ensenada to naturalise the arts, sciences, and improvements of foreign countries.

His queen also is distinguished as the foundress of the convent of Las Salesas, for educating daughters of noble families.\*

Ferdinand made a nuncupatory testament, which was authenticated by the great officers of state, constituting his brother Charles his successor, and appointing the queen dowager regent till the arrival of the new sovereign.

During the declining health of Ferdinand, and especially during the species of interregnum occasioned by his last illness, active cabals took place for the disposal of his crown, and a strong party was formed either by french influence or connivance, in favour of Don Philip. These machinations, first discovered by the capture of the papers of Augustus the third, in 1756, were afterwards traced by the intelligence of the british court in other quarters. At this distance of time, and in transactions of so mysterious a nature, it is difficult to penetrate to the truth ; but the intelligence was judged of sufficient importance and authenticity to be communicated to the court of Naples. We give the secret and confidential letter written by

\* Yriarte Hist. d'Espagne, p. 257.

Mr. Pitt, on this subject, to our minister, sir CHAP. 58.  
James Gray. 1758—1759.

*Whitehall, Dec. 1, 1758.*

“ The king has received a piece of intelligence of the greatest authority, concerning matters of so high a nature, and touching so personally and essentially the king of Naples, that he has commanded me to communicate the same to you for information. I will at the same time observe to you on this subject, that both the extreme delicacy of the matter, and the peculiar secrecy of the channel conveying it, are such, that the king cannot give a greater mark of his reliance on your prudence and discretion, than by commanding me to impart to you lights of this very extraordinary nature, which it is his majesty's pleasure you should only use, in case of a proper opening to do it with advantage, and then also to do it with the utmost circumspection and secrecy. The said intelligence is in substance as follows :

“ The court of France, seeing it could no longer count upon the re-establishment of the king of Spain's health, (who, besides great indispositions of body, is in some sort disordered in mind) has renounced the designs laid during the illness of the queen ; and what had been ripened since the death of that princess. To these has succeeded another design, viz. it has

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been in agitation three weeks or a month preceding the fourteenth of November, the date of the intelligence, to engage the king of Spain to abdicate and demit the crown in favour of Don Philip. However, this project prevents not France from employing the greatest managements towards the court of Naples, in order to put Don Carlos, as they call him, in their interest, in case he should mount the throne of Spain. In a word, the affairs of that kingdom make the chief object of the attention of the court of Versailles, and there will very shortly happen a great change in Spain.

" I am to add, that different advices, all concurring in something of the same nature, strongly establish the high probability that some very dark and dangerous practices are on foot among the partisans of France, at the court of Madrid. In this state of things, it would be superfluous to enforce the king's former orders to you, to give the most watchful attention to all that is passing at the court of Naples, particularly to penetrate to what degree the actual alarms and agitation of the court may really go, in so critical and suspicious a situation : to seize also this favourable, and perhaps decisive moment, of applying to their hopes and fears, and setting before their eyes, in the most striking manner, the evident utility, to their own most capital interest and



immediate safety, of entering into the views of his majesty, who has nothing more at heart, than to give the king of Naples the most essential proofs of his cordial friendship in support of his great family object."

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Whatever credit was due to this information, it did not fail to awaken the attention of Charles, and produced an effect on his queen Amelia, advantageous to the interests of England, during the short period in which she survived the accession of her husband to the throne of Spain.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTY-NINTH.

1759—1760.

*Accession of Charles the third—He regulates the order of succession to the thrones of Naples and Spain—Exclusion of his eldest son for imbecility—Disgrace of Farinelli and pardon of Encenada—Arrival at Madrid, and arrangements of his government—State of the Spanish court and ministry; and account of the army and navy from the dispatches of the earl of Bristol.*

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BY the demise of Ferdinand without issue, the crown of Spain devolved on his half brother Charles the third, king of Naples. On the intelligence of this event, Charles assumed the regal title of Spain, and confirmed the appointment of his mother to the regency during his absence; but he deferred his departure to take possession of his new throne, until he had arranged the succession to the crown of Naples, which was attended with some difficulty.

By the peace of Vienna, the two Sicilies were settled on Charles, on the condition that they should always be separated from Spain. By the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, however, the duchies of Parma and Placentia were assigned to Don Philip, with the reservation, that if Charles should be called to the throne of Spain, and

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Philip should succeed him in that of Naples and Sicily, the duchies of Parma and Guastalla were to revert to the House of Austria, and all the duchy of Placentia except the capital and the district beyond the Nura, should be ceded to the king of Sardinia.

As this arrangement combined the interests of Austria and Sardinia to promote the elevation of Don Philip to Naples, it had been invariably opposed by Charles; and he was not without apprehension, that when the contingency for which it was calculated, actually arrived, he should experience great opposition in transferring the two Sicilies to one of his own sons. Fortunately, however, for his views, the king of Sardinia, who was most likely to excite troubles in Italy, was not able to oppose any arrangement alone, while France and the court of Vienna, then engaged in a war with England and Prussia, were inclined to conciliate the new king of Spain. Accordingly an accommodation was concluded, by which a sum of money was given to the king of Sardinia, and the austrian court withheld their claims. The union which had recently taken place between the Houses of Austria and Bourbon was still further consolidated by an alliance between the families of Austria and Spain. The archduke Joseph was to espouse a princess of Parma; and Leopold, who

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was designated as successor to the grand duchy of Tuscany, a spanish infanta.

Another difficulty, however, still arose from the incapacity of the elder son, Don Philip, who was the heir-apparent to the crown of Spain. Being subject from his infancy to epileptic fits, he was reduced to a state of mental imbecility. In this unfortunate situation, Charles acted with equal affection towards his son and justice towards his people. The young prince being visited by physicians, and examined by the royal council, was declared to be in such a state of mental incapacity as to be wholly devoid of intellect, and without the smallest hopes of recovery. From these circumstances, the king found it necessary to set aside the first born, to designate his second son Charles as successor to Spain, and to declare the third, Don Ferdinand, king of Naples and Sicily. To obviate all objections, and prevent future evils, he gave the most public authenticity to this proceeding. Having summoned into his presence all his own ministers and principal barons, the deputies of the city of Naples, the foreign ambassadors, and a member of the council of Castile, he seated himself on his throne, and exercised his authority as king of Spain and Naples, by creating several grantees, and distributing the orders of the golden fleece and St. Januarius. He then caused this act

of succession to be publicly and formally proclaimed.

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" Among the heavy cares in which the monarchy of Spain and the Indies has involved me since the death of my brother the catholic king Ferdinand the sixth, is that derived from the notorious imbecility of my royal first-born. The spirit of the treaties concluded in this century, proves that all Europe desires the separation of the spanish power from that of Italy, at least as far as is consistent with justice. Seeing myself therefore required to provide a legitimate successor to my italian states, now I am on the point of passing into Spain, and of chusing among the many sons whom God has given me, I am obliged to decide which of them may be deemed the second born, fit to conduct the government of my italian states, separated from Spain and the Indies. This conjuncture, in which the tranquillity of Europe requires that I should incur no suspicion of any desire to continue in my own person the spanish and italian powers, obliges me now to take my resolution. A considerable body of my counsellors of state, a member of the council of Castile, of the chamber of St. Chiara, the lieutenant of the Sommaria of Naples, and the whole junta of Sicily, assisted by the six deputies, have represented to me, that after every possible investigation, they have not

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been able to find in the unhappy prince the use of reason, nor any trace of reflection ; and that such having been his state from infancy, he is not only incapable of religious sentiments and the use of reason at present, but no shadow of hope appears for the future. They therefore unanimously conclude, that this prince cannot be disposed of as nature, duty, and paternal love would require. In this fatal crisis, seeing then by the divine will the capacity and right of second birth devolve on my third son Don Ferdinand, still in his pupillage, it is my duty as a sovereign and a father, in the transfer of my Italian states, to adopt measures for his guardianship, which I should not be justified in exercising over a son, who is as independent a sovereign in Italy, as I myself am in Spain."

He then established the succession in the male descendants of Ferdinand ; in case of extinction, in the females ; in default of both, on each of his younger sons and their posterity in the same order ; and in total failure of his own issue, on his brothers, Philip and Louis, and their issue in succession. Then signing and sealing this instrument, he delivered the sword to his son, and in presenting it, said, " Louis the fourteenth, king of France, gave this sword to Philip the fifth your grand-father. I received it from him, and now resign it to you, that you may use

it for the defence of your religion and your subjects." The ceremony was concluded with the usual homage to the new sovereign, and Charles vested the administration of affairs, during the minority of his son, in a regency, at the head of which was the marquis Tanucci.\*

The same evening, accompanied by his queen and all his family, except Ferdinand, he proceeded to the place of embarkation, where a fleet of sixteen ships of the line waited to convey him to his new dominions. As he passed through the town, the houses were splendidly illuminated. On reaching the shore, he was surrounded by a large concourse of all ranks and ages, mingling acclamations and congratulations for his accession to a greater throne, with tears of regret and concern for the departure of a sovereign, who had proved himself the father of his people; who found Naples the neglected capital of a distant province, subject to the caprice and exactions of an unstable government, and had restored her to her antient splendour; a sovereign who had regenerated the laws, revived commerce, improved the arts and sciences, disciplined the troops, restored the honour of the neapolitan flag in the neighbouring seas, and recalled to

\* Desormeaux, tom. 5, p. 258.—Beccatini.—Muratori.

This was the identical sword which the present king presented to lord Nelson.

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recollection the happy times of the norman princes, and the glorious memory of Frederic the second.

The elements smiled on the progress of Charles. A favourable breeze wafted him to the coast of Catalonia in four days, and he landed at Barcelona amidst the joyful acclamations of his new subjects. During his short residence in this city, he gave an instance of his clemency by restoring many of the rights and privileges of which the catalans had been deprived for their rebellion in 1640, and their opposition to Philip the fifth. He took the road through Saragossa, and reaching Madrid on the 9th of December, displayed the affectionate solicitude of a son, by visiting the queen mother, from whom he had been separated twenty years. Assuming the government, he employed the first months of his reign in those arrangements which were necessary after a change of sovereigns.

It is remarkable that the first act of Charles, as sovereign of Spain, was an order issued at the instigation of the queen dowager to Farinelli,\*

\* The departure of Farinelli from a country endeared to him by long residence, and still more the abruptness of this order, affected his mind. He frequently observed, that as he had never abused his influence with the queen, he did not deserve such a disgraceful dismissal. Retiring to Bologna, he built a large house, and lived in great hospitality and magnificence. He was always fond of receiving english travellers, from a sentiment of gratitude to the country where he had acquired a considerable fortune. He re-

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enjoining him to quit Spain without delay ; but he continued the pension granted him by the deceased sovereign.

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Ensenada and his partisans exulted at the accession of the new sovereign, hoping to rise again to power under the government of a prince to whom they had testified such a zealous devotion. They soon, however, found that Charles had other views to follow, and other partialities to gratify. The only favour granted to the disgraced minister and his confidant Ordenaña, was a pardon, and permission to return to court.

May 13.

Charles evinced his respect for the memory of his brother by retaining most of his ministers, particularly general Wall. He dismissed only Valparaiso, to intrust the finances to the marquis Squilaci, whose talents and integrity he had proved in his neapolitan dominions. He conferred on the duke of Losada, a nobleman long attached to his person, the post of esquire of the body, a distinguished place in the royal household ; and he accepted the resignation of the duke of Alva, but allowed him to retain his

tained the highest respect for the memory of sir Benjamin Keene, and mentioned his death as a great misfortune to the courts of England and Spain. One of the apartments of his house was ornamented with the portraits of his illustrious patrons, Philip the fifth, Elizabeth Farnese, Ferdinand and Barbara, Charles Emanuel, king of Sardinia, and pope Benedict the fourteenth. He died in 1782, in a very advanced age. Burney's Tour through France and Italy, v. 3, p. 222.

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honours and appointments. His arrangements being adjusted, he made his public entry on the 16th of July, and concluded the ceremony with the national spectacle of a bull-feast. On the following day, after the celebration of mass, by the primate archbishop of Toledo, he took the usual oaths, and received the homage of his subjects. The incapacity and exclusion of his first born were again announced as at Naples; and Charles, his second son, was acknowledged prince of Asturias, and successor to the Spanish throne.

As Charles had long made the theory of finance and commerce the objects of his particular attention, and had witnessed the advantages of an improved agriculture in his Italian states, the earliest period of his reign was distinguished by operations of political economy. To remedy the mischiefs derived from the impolitic parsimony of the deceased sovereign, he adopted measures for the liquidation of his father's debts, by instalments of 6 per cent, which commenced in 1762; and he formed a plan for the gradual discharge of those incurred in preceding periods, the interest of which absorbed the best revenues of the crown. He next directed his attention to agriculture, which had been a great object of his care in his Italian dominions. He remitted to the land-holders of Andalusia, Murcia, and Old

Castile, all the sums advanced by the royal treasury, during the recent years of scarcity ; and imported considerable supplies of grain, to revive the culture of those provinces which languished for want of seed.\*

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We present the reader with a picture of the new sovereign and his court, drawn by the earl of Bristol soon after he assumed the office of british ambassador, in a dispatch to Mr. Pitt.

" In order to give you a thorough light into the spanish system, I lay hold of this opportunity to acquaint you, not only with the characters of the different personages who compose this court, but also with their connections or friendships. By this you will be able to judge of the situation of affairs.

" I begin with the very respectable one of the catholic king, who has good talents, a happy memory, and an uncommon command of himself on all occasions. His having been often deceived, renders him suspicious. He ever prefers carrying a point by gentle means, and has the patience to repeat exhortations, rather than exert his authority even in trifles. Yet, with the greatest air of gentleness, he keeps his ministers and attendants in the utmost awe.

" As a branch of the House of Bourbon, the catholic king has an affection for France ; but as

\* Burgoing, v. 2, p. 29.—Beccatini, p. 204—208.

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a spaniard, and as a powerful prince upon a distinct throne, he wishes not to have it thought that his kingdom, during his reign, is directed by french counsels, as it was in the time of Philip the fifth. What he takes most to heart, is, to secure his son, the king of Naples, upon that throne where he has placed him. Every view, and each negotiation, to procure tranquillity to Spain, is with the prospect of being entirely at liberty to assist the young sicilian monarch, in case any power should attempt to disturb him in the quiet possession of his dominions.

" The queen mother's capacity is not equal to what it was once reputed to be. Her majesty, one may infer from many little artifices, has not yet discovered, what every other person is convinced of, that she neither has nor will obtain any influence in affairs. She notoriously slights the three principal persons here, general Wall, marquis Squilaci, and the duke of Losada ; and I have myself been present, when she has ridiculed some of them in a manner which was not to be expected from one in her majesty's station.

" The marquis Squilaci is not bright. He is fond of business, and never complains of having too much, notwithstanding the variety of departments that center in him. He would be averse to any war ; and as the royal coffers are far from

being full, and the measures he has already taken - CHAP. 59.  
to replenish them have occasioned a great <sup>1759—1760.</sup> clamour against him, he thinks he could never stand his ground if the exigency of the state drove him to invent new methods of raising additional taxes. I believe his excellency is incapable of taking any bribes, but I would not be equally responsible for his wife the marchioness's indifference with regard to presents. She is suspected to receive considerable remittances from France, but this being difficult to prove, I relate it as the general opinion. However, the marquis d'Ossun's behaviour gives ground to these suspicions.

" The duke of Losada has a moderate genius, but an incomparable character for worth and honesty. The strongest encomium of him, is the king of Spain's having so invariably distinguished him for upwards of thirty years. For had there been any thing amiss in this nobleman, the discernment of his sovereign would have detected it, and that would have occasioned his catholic majesty's withdrawing his friendship from this confidant. The duke does not interfere with the political affairs of Europe; and, therefore, my mentioning him here is chiefly because he bears so principal a part in the palace.

" As several other persons have opportunities

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of talking to the king of Spain, who are from their offices immediately about the royal person, and for that reason can now and then drop words or hints about affairs, without presuming to offer advice, I will continue to give the characters of some, whose names perhaps have never reached England.

"The marquis of Montealegre, mayor domo mayor, is a thorough spaniard, one who concerns himself only in the discharge of his office, and who will ever be inclined to peace; yet, from bigotted principles, would chuse to have a war with heretics, rather than with those of his own communion.

"I have, upon a former occasion, sent word, that the duke of Medina Celi was an illustrious cypher, whose great name procured him the post of master of the horse, in which employment he attends upon the catholick king every day at his hunting. But this great nobleman's capacity does not reach far enough to govern the royal stables, or even those which are dependent upon himself, with propriety. I believe, if he was asked where England lay on the map, he would be at a loss where to point at the spot; yet he is so good a courtier, that he would clamour for any war, the instant he thought his sovereign was inclined for it.

"Don Pedro Stuart, grandson of the late

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marshal Berwick, waits upon his catholic majesty as regularly, in the office of master of the horse, and officiates in the absence of the duke of Medina Celi. He is a lieutenant general in the marine, and reckoned the best sea officer in the spanish service. He has great vivacity in his imagination, with good parts, though uncultivated. He is well looked upon by the king, and has been very explicit in his sentiments, how prejudicial a war with England, at all times, must be to Spain.

" Prince Masserano, the dukes of Bourronville and Baños, three captains of the body guards, have all frequent occasions of being in conversation with their sovereign. The first, by descent an italian, is most servilely attached to the french interest. The duke of Bourronville, with excellent talents, but the most corrupted morals, is by birth a fleming, and, though he wishes well to France, there is no cause he would not either adopt or relinquish to serve any private purpose. The catholic king likes neither of them ; but distinguishes the duke of Baños, a spaniard of the antient house of Ponce de Leon, who thinks of nothing but the business of his profession, and with a moderate capacity, has conduct enough to behave unexceptionably to all parties.

" M. Ariaga, the secretary of state for the

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marine, is a quiet man ; but too easily led by the jesuits. He is convinced that the spanish navy neither is, nor can be in a situation to cope with that of Great Britain. He would be against a war, and from principle, as well as experience, is satisfied that Spain could not be a gainer by interrupting the present peace it enjoys.

" I cannot omit Don Joseph Augustin de Llano, nephew to Don Sebastian de la Quadra, formerly secretary of state for foreign affairs. He is the first secretary to M. Wall, and does almost the whole business in his excellency's department ; and to his opinion M. Wall pays the greatest deference. Although he is young, he has been for a great number of years in that office, and is as able a man as any in this country. I wish, for that reason, he was more inclined for England than I fear he is. As general Wall is not the most correct writer, M. de Llano pens all the dispatches and memorials of consequence : I have discovered that the celebrated peevish one from this court delivered to me at the beginning of the present year, was of this gentleman's composition.

" The marquis de la Ensenada must not be forgot. He is vain and presumptuous, has some experience, but never had any application. The three first secretaries of the different departments he once possessed, did the whole business of

those offices. They prepared notes for him, which were to be carried to the *despacho*: and he received his lessons from them, because he neither had the capacity requisite for business of such importance, nor would give himself the trouble necessary to examine into affairs. Yet this man flatters himself with the prospect of being employed. He has dedicated all his attention to the duke of Losada, whom he has gained, and is very assiduous in the palace, where he makes his appearance both in the town and country seats.\*

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" His views are to succeed the marquis Squilaci, some time or other, which the marquis knows, and from apprehension of his driving that point too fast, has grown shy of him. He has never been even upon speaking terms with general Wall; as the order for his arrest passed through that minister's hands. General Wall and the duke of Losada are apparently well together; yet there is no connection between them, because of that nobleman's unaccountable partiality to M. de la Ensenada. The duke of Losada and the marquis Squilaci are upon the same terms, and for the same reason. M. Wall, Don Julian Ariaga, and the marquis Squilaci,

\* It is perhaps scarcely necessary to apprise the reader, that this character of Ensenada is evidently drawn from the representations of those persons with whom, in the actual state of the Spanish court, a British minister naturally associated.

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without being particularly united, sincerely wish each other to continue in their several employments, for none of them attempt to encroach upon what is out of his peculiar province. Of course, they go on with harmony, and are ready to serve each other upon all occasions. So that, notwithstanding the duke of Losada's favour towards the marquis de la Ensenada, that strong triumvirate serves as a barrier to Ensenada's ambition, a passion that would guide him to devote himself either to the english or french interest, whichever would best answer his purpose to get into power; although he would, when he was rivetted, shew himself to be what he was before stigmatised with the character of, a pliant tool to any french ministry.

" It is surprising that amidst the great number of foreign ministers at this court, there is not one, except the marquis de Silva, ambassador from Portugal, who is not blindly attached to our enemies' interests. That worthy minister is cordially inclined to England; but M. Wassenaar, the dutch ambassador, and the count de la Tour, who has the same character from the court of Turin, are, though not so avowedly as the ministers from Naples, Vienna, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Venice, and Genoa, yet zealous partisans of France.

" I have now to the best of my capacity

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lerated what I have long made it my study to examine into. You may draw the natural and just inferences from what I have laid down, and by being acquainted with the ground I have to tread upon, you will perceive the difficulties that are to be encountered with. I hope to meet with indulgence for my want of success in the execution of his majesty's commands, as I can safely assert, that my great zeal for the king's service alone enables me to struggle with the variety of impediments I so frequently experience in the discharge of my duty.”\*

Soon after this period, the british minister transmitted to his court an interesting statement of the spanish army, navy, and finances, which, if compared with preceding periods, even long since the accession of Philip, will shew that the efforts of the spanish government had not been employed without effect.

“ After a most diligent perquisition into the spanish forces, I find that, including all their ships of war, the number of them amounts to 58 of the line, with 27 frigates and 16 chébecques. Yet several of them are unfit for service, some are worn out by length of time, others have proved faulty from the badness of their construction, and a few have lately been put upon the

\* The earl of Bristol to Mr. Secretary Pitt, Segovia, August 31, 1761. Most Secret.

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stocks. There are not therefore above 49 ships of war, with 21 frigates, which can be deemed serviceable; and even those could not be sent to sea for want of sailors. The names of all the seamen, who are enrolled in the different marine departments, amount to 50,000. But when the invalids, the aged, and the children are struck off from that list, the greatest number of sailors who can be depended upon, does not exceed 26,000.

" If the land forces, according to the regular establishment, were completed, they would consist of 88 battalions of the spanish and foreign infantry, amounting to near 62,000 men, and thirty three battalions of militia, making 23,000. The invalids and independent companies form a body of eight battalions, or about 7,000 men. The cavalry and dragoons, consisting of 62 squadrons, contain 8,000 men. The catholic king's household troops are composed of two regiments of guards, the spanish and walloon, each regiment having six battalions, with three troops of horse guards, the spanish, italian, and flemish, each troop consisting of three squadrons, amounting together, both foot and horse, to near 9,600 men. The sum total forms a corps of 141 battalions, with 71 squadrons, which, supposing them to be complete, would amount to 109,600 men. Yet their numbers are extremely

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deficient, and the whole does not at present surpass 80,000 men, although orders are expected to be issued to all the regiments to make up their complements.

"I have lately had an opportunity of knowing exactly the balance of the royal accompts, which consisted of £. 2,510,000. But this comprehends all that has been brought to the treasury since the arrival of the flota and the register ships."\*

\* The earl of Bristol to the earl of Egremont, Dec. 6, 1761.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTIETH.

1761.

*Successes of the british arms in every quarter of the globe—Reverses and distresses of France—Situation and disposition of the king and court of Spain—Rise and causes of the alliance between France and Spain—Negotiation with England—Signature of the family compact—Resignation of Mr. Pitt—Continuance of the negotiations between Spain and England—War between the two countries—Declaration of war, by France and Spain, against Portugal.*

CHAP. 60. **C**HARLES ascended the throne of Spain at  
 **1761.** a period peculiarly critical.

Since the change of the british administration, the war had been prosecuted with redoubled ardour, and in England had assumed a new and popular aspect. Repeated reverses abroad had roused the national spirit, while the threats of invasion rallied all parties round the throne. Supplies were lavished by the parliament, and the energies of the country were wielded with a tremendous effect by the powerful hand of Mr. Pitt, who directed the reins of government.

The spirit of the great minister appeared to operate with equal vigour in every quarter of the globe. Reinforcements and supplies were promptly dispatched to America, the West

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1757

Indies and the East. The foreign troops which had been called in on the alarm of invasion were sent back to the continent ; the nation was taught confidence in its own strength and resources by the establishment of a militia ; and an expedition against the isle of Aix and Rochefort, was the first proof that the timid and discouraging system of defensive warfare was changed for a system of aggression, in every quarter where the enemy was assailable. A regard for popularity, and too strong an adherence to the principles of which he had long been the advocate in opposition, at first seem to have restrained him from extending the war on the continent. But when the decisive victory gained at Rosbach frustrated the hostile plans of the french on the side of Saxony, and enabled the king of Prussia to turn with redoubled energy against the host of enemies which menaced every point of his territory, the british minister rose superior to personal considerations and party principles. He engaged with zeal and alacrity in the continental war, directed his attacks where they were most promptly and severely felt by the enemy ; and, to use his own language, conquered America in Germany. A liberal supply raised the sinking fortunes of Prussia, and reinforcements of british troops were dispatched to the continent, to support the hanoverian army, which had

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armed to avenge the shameful depredations and horrid excesses of the french. The command of this force was given to prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the friend and pupil of the king of Prussia.

The effects of these energetic measures were equally sudden and extraordinary. The king of Prussia, unshaken in defeat, and terrible in victory, baffled the efforts of a powerful combination by his firmness and perseverance, his skill and resources ; and rendered his confined territory the theatre of a series of events, seldom paralleled for rapidity, magnitude, and variety. Prince Ferdinand, at the head of the british and german forces, expelled the french from Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick, drove them back towards the Main, shook their power by a series of victories ; and notwithstanding occasional reverses occupied their whole strength in diverting the tide of war from their own frontier. In the midst of this arduous struggle, repeated descents on their northern shores distracted their efforts, and aggravated the evils derived from external war and internal distress.

Baffled and indignant, the french made a desperate attempt to recal the british forces to the defence of their own coasts. Twenty-five thousand men were assembled on the shores of Britanny, and a smaller force at Dunkirk, and

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the Pretender repaired to Vannes, to give countenance to the enterprise. A fleet of twelve ships was equipped at Toulon, and a second, of twenty-one, at Brest, which were to unite and protect the passage of their armament across the channel; while a light squadron from Dunkirk was to direct its course round the northern shore of Scotland, and distract the attention of the British government, by a descent in Ireland.

They could, however, no longer even threaten with impunity. A powerful armament, under Admiral Rodney, appeared before Havre de Grace, and damaged their magazines and vessels of transport, by a vigorous bombardment; while fleets, superior to their own, under Boys, Hawke, and Boscawen, blockaded the ports of Dunkirk, Brest, and Toulon. They took advantage of the moment when the storms of the advanced season drove the blockading fleets from their respective stations. But they were soon taught that British skill is no less distinguished amidst the fury of the elements, than British valour and firmness in the rage of battle. The Toulon fleet, under M. de la Clue, was pursued through the straits, and defeated by Boscawen, off the coast of Portugal. Two were destroyed; three captured; the remainder were dispersed, and escaped with difficulty.\*

Aug. 17,  
1759.

\* Official account in the Gazette.

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Nov. 20.

The grand armament from Brest, under the command of Conflans, experienced a still more terrible reverse. Before they had cleared their own coast, the british fleet was descried bearing down with that resolution which indicated the determination of the admiral to risk a battle. In vain Conflans hoped that the fury of the elements, and the sands and shoals which skirt the coast, would check the ardour of his antagonist. The chase was as rapid and decided as if made under the most favourable circumstances of wind and sea : within two hours after the action commenced, two of the hindmost ships were sunk, and one taken ; and the battle extended to every part of the line. A night dreadfully dark and stormy saved them from impending destruction ; but the dawn of morning disclosed the prospect of utter discomfiture. The admiral's ship and another, driven on shore, were destroyed ; seven throwing their guns overboard escaped into the Villaine ; and the same number, directing their course to sea, with difficulty found an asylum under the isle of Aix.\*

Oct. 15.

Even the petty armament from Dunkirk, commanded by the enterprising Thurot, did not escape the common misfortune. With five frigates, conveying a small body of land troops, he took advantage of a hazy night to evade the

\* Official account in the Gazette extraordinary.

blockade, and directed his course through the german sea to the swedish coast. Having suffered severely from heavy storms, he dismissed one of his frigates ; and after refitting the rest doubled the northern shore of Scotland. He beat about for three months among the western islands, till his men were worn out with hardships and fatigue, and his ships reduced to three. Impelled no less by famine than a spirit of enterprise, he at length effected a landing near Carrickfergus, and forced the neighbouring district to supply his wants. But he had scarcely quitted the bay before he was attacked by three british ships, and after a desperate engagement, in which he fell, the loss of this armament completed the triumph of the british marine and the ruin of that of France.\*

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Feb. 26,  
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The repeated misfortunes which accumulated on the french in Europe, frustrated all their efforts in distant regions. After a long and bloody contest, the british arms gained the ascendancy in the east. The party of the french among the native chiefs was humbled, and the capture of Pondicherry, the seat of their power and the last of their remaining settlements, completed their downfall.

In America, the english rapidly recovered

\* Official accounts.

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July 22,  
1758.Sept. 13,  
1759.Sept. 8,  
1760.

Jan. 1759.

from the disasters which had marked the early operations of the war. At the same time, powerful armaments were directed from the mother country, and the colonies, against the french settlements in the north. Louisburgh was reduced; the british expedition ascended the river St. Lawrence, while a considerable army of colonists and regulars opened the way by land into Canada, where the french had concentrated their principal strength. By a wonderful effort of bravery and enterprise, a considerable part of the french force was defeated at the battle of Quebec, which was rendered memorable by the death of the victorious general Wolfe, and his heroic antagonist Montcalm. The consequence of the defeat was the surrender of the place; and a daring attempt of the enemy in the following winter to surprise Quebec, terminated in a second defeat and the reduction of Montreal, where they had collected the last remnant of their military force.\*

In the West Indies a british expedition, after an ineffectual attempt on Martinico, captured Guadaloupe with its dependent isles. The french were excluded from the coast of Africa by the loss of Goree and Senegal, and the reduction of Belleisle in sight of their own shores intercepted

\* Official accounts both english and french.

the communication between their western ports, and threatened that invasion with which they had menaced the British Isles.

In France the effects of these accumulated disasters were deep and awful. The population was thinned by the continual reinforcements poured into Germany; by the loss of the colonies and the naval superiority of England, their trade and resources were annihilated; every operation of finance disappointed their hopes; scheme after scheme to supply the necessities of government entailed disgrace on the projectors; the Austrian alliance and the war were equally execrated; and a nation which only three years before insolently lorded it over Europe, was reduced to place its hopes of safety in the divisions of the enemy and the acquisition of new allies.

In the midst of a period so auspicious to England, George the second closed his reign, and was succeeded by his grandson George the third, a prince in the bloom of youth, and devoid of those foreign predilections which his two predecessors had derived from birth and habit. The change of sovereigns brought a new set of actors on the political scene; and other circumstances contributed to diminish the power which the great minister had wielded with such effect against the national enemy. The people, always

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extreme in their confidence and their fears, as before the degrading peace of Utrecht, forgot their recent dangers, and almost repined at success. Instead of looking to future safety and future greatness in the depression of France, their attention was rather directed to the burthens and sacrifices, than to the advantages of the contest. Long accustomed also to regard Austria as a natural ally, they did not look towards Prussia with confidence and cordiality. As in France it was the general complaint that the country was exhausted for the advantage of its antient enemy ; so in England discontent displayed itself in clamours against german connections, and murmurs that the welfare of England was sacrificed to promote the interests of a doubtful friend.

These maxims were supported by many of the persons whom the change of sovereigns had raised to power ; and by none more than the earl of Bute, the confidant and sovereign of the new monarch. Though upright in his intentions, his mind was not sufficiently enlarged to embrace the extensive views of the minister ; and he could not regard without jealousy a colleague whose splendid reputation eclipsed his own. Fitted also for the elegant pursuits of literature and science, rather than for the conduct of a system of policy and war stupendous in its extent

and details, he was anxious to flatter the popular bent, and to restore the nation to that tranquillity which was consonant to his own placid character and pacific principles.

In the commencement of the new reign, the change was little felt. The sovereign in his first speech to the parliament announced his resolution to follow the example of his predecessor in prosecuting the war; and expressed a proper sense of the recent successes. But the appointment of lord Bute to the post of secretary of state for the northern department in the room of lord Holderness, was followed by a more effectual display of his influence; and though he was still awed by the energy and abilities of his colleague in office, it was easy to foresee that a revolution in politics was not far distant. Indeed the accession of the new sovereign, and the changes in the government, were joyfully hailed by those who trembled before the British power, and by none more than by the king of Spain, who had long beheld our successes with anxiety and alarm.\*

The change of sovereigns produced no less important effects in Spain than in England. Ferdinand had observed the strictest neutrality

\* Adolphus's History of George III.—Lord Melcombe's Diary.—Life of lord Chatham, and other English historical and periodical publications.

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with equal advantage to the commerce and welfare of his subjects. Solicitous only to maintain his own independence, he had sedulously avoided the embarrassments of war; and was the only monarch, who since the accession of the austrian line, had not added to the debts of the crown.

The general interests of Spain doubtless required an adherence to the same system; but partial and personal motives predominated with the new sovereign. Charles had conceived an early antipathy against the english, for the imperious manner in which they had compelled him to desert the cause of his house during the italian war;\* and this passion continued with undiminished force on his accession to Spain. From his constant correspondence with the french court, and their partisans, he was no less deeply imbued with bourbon principles and prejudices than his father. On his new throne he formed additional motives of dislike to our nation, from the endless bickerings relative to the british settlements, and contraband trade to the spanish West Indies, and the frequent vexations practised by british cruisers on spanish ships in their traffic with France. Another cause of dissension arose from the claims of the spaniards for a share in the Newfoundland fishery; an indulgence which, though granted in equivocal terms by the

\* Chap. 45.

treaty of Utrecht; had never been publicly permitted by the british government.

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For a short period, these feelings of irritation were soothed by the influence of his queen, Amelia, a princess of the House of Saxony, who was personally favourable to England ; but on her death, they revived with additional force, and derived new strength from the circumstances of the war, and state of the contending parties. Charles was alarmed by the ruin of the french marine ; he dreaded lest the successes of the english against the hostile settlements in the East and West Indies, and America, should incite them to extend their hostilities to those of Spain, so long the object of general cupidity. He was not ignorant also, that the partiality and vexations of his officers and ministers had furnished abundant causes of complaint, which were not likely to be overlooked by a great and triumphant nation.

Sept. 27,  
1760.

Of this disposition, and these motives, the french court and agents adroitly availed themselves. They held forth the lure of Minorca, and the prospect of recovering Gibraltar ; they represented the english as the tyrants of the seas, the natural enemies of every maritime and commercial power ; they did not fail to appeal to the national jealousy of the colonies, and the apprehensions entertained by the sovereign of their

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danger. They profited even by their distresses, to appeal more strongly to the feelings of a bourbon prince, and furnish him a plausible pretext for a rupture. Having been compelled to open a negotiation with England, they contrived to interest Charles in their favour, by secretly communicating all their proceedings, and constantly appealing to his judgment. They so far succeeded, that he approved the conditions which were to be submitted to England; and allowed, or rather induced, the french court to unite the pretensions and claims of Spain with their own. Should England refuse to admit their joint proposals, he likewise agreed to cement the interests of the two bourbon crowns, by a family compact, and appears to have only waited the arrival of the american treasures, and the completion of the requisite preparations, to interfere in the contest. This negotiation was conducted by the agency of Grimaldi, the spanish embassador at Paris, with Choiseul, the prime minister of France, without the knowledge of Wall, and perhaps even of the french embassador at Madrid.

On these principles, the court of France conducted the negotiation with England. It was settled that a congress should be opened at Augsburgh, for an arrangement between the different powers of Germany and the north.

Mr. Stanley was dispatched to Paris, and the count de Bussy repaired to London, and preliminaries were mutually proposed. The offers of France comprised the cession of Canada, with certain restrictions, the restoration of Minorca for Gaudaloupe and Marigulante; Dominique and St. Vincent to remain neuter; all the English conquests in the east to be restored; the cession of Gorée or Senegal, at the option of Great Britain; and the restoration of Belleisle. In regard to Germany, they offered to evacuate what they occupied in Hanover, together with Hesse and Hanau, but to retain the conquests made on Prussia till the peace. England was to give no assistance to Prussia; France to withdraw from the theatre of war twice the number of troops withdrawn by England.

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1761.

These preliminaries were accompanied with a private memorial, in which the French proposed to terminate the differences with Spain, as the means of preventing a new war in Europe and America, and to request her guaranty in the proposed treaty of peace. To this were added three demands in behalf of Spain: the restoration of some Spanish ships captured under the plea of contraband, the privilege of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, and the demolition of the British settlements on the bay of Honduras. These were accompanied with the threat,

July 23.

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1761.

that if the differences on these subjects should excite a war, the king of France would consider himself under an obligation to assist Spain.

Mr. Pitt was perfectly conscious of the motives for a proceeding so unusual in diplomatic transactions, as the introduction of disputes between two nations at peace, by a belligerent power, in a negotiation for the termination of its own hostilities. To the conditions offered by France, he tendered counter proposals, comprising the absolute cession of Canada, Senegal, and Gorée; the mutual restoration of all other conquests in America, the West Indies and Europe; the demolition of Dunkirk, according to the peace of Utrecht; the immediate evacuation of Ostend and Nieuport, which the French had occupied, contrary to the neutrality of the Netherlands. The affairs of India were to be left to a negotiation between the two companies, and the respective powers to be at liberty to support their allies in Germany. To these proposals, he added the declaration, that the king of England would never suffer his disputes with Spain to be blended in the negotiation for peace between the two crowns, and that any further mention of this subject would be considered as an insult to his dignity, and as incompatible with the sincerity of the negotiation.

This reply was followed by a direct application

to the spanish court. The british ambassador, lord Bristol, was authorised to declare, that any intimation of an union of councils with France would never facilitate matters to the satisfaction of Spain, though the king's moderation would not cease to dispose him to a just and reasonable accommodation. With regard to the first demand, it was observed, that the courts instituted to take cognizance of such matters, are always open to those who seek redress ; the second was rejected as totally inadmissible ; and the third might be settled whenever his catholic majesty would make any just overtures, *not through the channel of France*. Finally, as reports had been industriously spread of an approaching rupture with Spain, lord Bristol was enjoined to demand a clear and categorical explanation with regard to the naval preparations making in the spanish ports.

The reply to this application perfectly developed the views of the two bourbon courts. Wall declared, that the memorial relating to Spain had been presented with the full consent of his catholic majesty ; and that no consideration should induce his sovereign to recede from the union of his counsels with those of France, nor deter the two bourbon monarchs from giving proofs of their mutual confidence and harmony.

To the demand relative to the warlike pre-

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1761.

payations, M. Wall verbally replied, that they had only twenty ships of war, including frigates; that they used them on occasions which he specified; and that his catholic majesty's disposition and profession had invariably been the same, to cement and cultivate the friendship so happily subsisting with England. With respect to the answer to the three demands, he observed, "Spain cannot imagine to what purpose England says she cannot regard the french ministers as a proper tribunal to which she will consent to carry appeals." To the second and third, he added, "the spaniards consider their right as indisputable," and he concluded with indecorously comparing the conduct of England to what would be considered, in private proceedings, as an outrage and a robbery.\*

Aug 15.

During the period which intervened between the delivery of these two memorials, the arrangements of the bourbon courts had been matured, and an alliance, under the title of a *family compact*, was formally signed at Versailles, immediately after the answer given by Wall to the application of lord Bristol.

In a preamble, conceived in terms of studied obscurity, the motives for concluding this treaty are stated to be the ties of blood and reciprocal esteem. The object, to give stability to those

\* Abstract of the negotiation submitted to parliament.

duties which flow from affinity and friendship, and to establish a lasting memorial of that mutual interest which ought to form the basis of the desires of the two monarchs, and of the prosperity of their royal families.

The two monarchs agreed, *for the future*, to consider *every power as their enemy, who might become the enemy of either*, and to guaranty the respective dominions in all parts of the world, which they might possess at the conclusion of peace. Mutual succours by sea and land are stipulated according to the usual forms. The wars in which France might be involved, in consequence of her engagements at the peace of Westphalia, or of her alliances with the german princes and states, are excepted from the cases in which Spain is to furnish succours, *unless some maritime power should take part in those wars*, or France should be invaded *by land*.

No proposal of peace to their common enemies was to be made, except by common consent. In time of peace, as well as in time of war, each sovereign was to consider the interests of his ally as his own, to compensate for their respective losses and disadvantages, and to act as if the two monarchies formed one and the same power. The subjects of each to enjoy respectively in the european territories of the other, the same privileges as natives. Lastly, a clause was intro-

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duced for the accession of the king of the two Sicilies, and a stipulation, that no other power should be admitted, except a prince of the House of Bourbon.\*

From this moment, the question of peace or war was evidently decided by the two bourbon courts. But as the american treasures were not yet arrived, nor the preparations of Spain matured, the spanish ministers still held the language of peace, though without disavowing the union between the two crowns. The same affection was maintained on the part of France ; and only a week before the actual signature of this celebrated engagement, a new offer was tendered to England, differing in some points from the former, and without any reference to spanish claims. This produced a counter proposal on the part of England.

During this farce of negotiation, and before the french answer reached London, the vigilance of Mr. Pitt discovered traces of the secret treaty between the two courts. Considering

\* It is not extraordinary, that in the struggle of the moment, writers should have been found who represented this treaty as perfectly *innocent* in itself, and as *neither affecting nor designating England*; but it is astonishing that some of our own historians, writing at a later period, and with more enlarged means of information, should have overlooked the pointed and hostile stipulations marked in *italics*, while they lay so great a stress on the article of the guaranty, because it was only to take place at the conclusion of a peace.

this compact as a decisive proof of hostility, he instantly broke off the negotiation, and with that promptitude which marked all his measures, proposed to anticipate the designs of Spain by a declaration of war. He hoped to cut off their immediate supplies, by intercepting the american fleet on its return, and to cripple their future exertions by an attack on their colonies. After the reduction of the french West India islands, the expedition fitted out for that purpose, strengthened by reinforcements from North America, was to proceed against the Havannah, which was ill prepared to resist an immediate aggression, and a second attack was to be made against the isthmus of Panama. The points which connect the eastern and western shores of South America with each other, and the great body of the colonies, with the mother country, being thus occupied, another expedition was to carry hostilities into the Philippine isles, and intercept the communication between the western world and the opulent regions of the east.

The minister, however, could not produce proofs of this union sufficiently strong to vanquish the scruples of his colleagues in office, whose incredulity was fortified by political rivalry. Indignant at this opposition, and at the obstacles which had been already raised to his salutary designs in other quarters, he abandoned

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1761.

Oct. 5.

the helm, disdaining, as he observed, "to become responsible for measures which he was not permitted to guide." He was succeeded in office by the earl of Egremont; but the real power of government was concentrated in the earl of Bute.

The abrupt retreat of Mr. Pitt, and the obligation which the administration had voluntarily incurred, to maintain the principle on which they had rejected his proposal, not only saved Spain from a danger which she was ill prepared to resist, but even enabled her to temporise till she could commence hostilities with more advantage. The court of Madrid, therefore, hastened their preparations, and in continuing the negotiation, gradually assumed a harsher tone of remonstrance and complaint.

Events soon proved the wisdom and foresight of Mr. Pitt. The British ministers, notwithstanding their impolitic credulity with regard to the professions of Spain, were at length alarmed by the triumphant boasting of the court of Versailles, the activity of the Spanish preparations, and the undoubted intelligence which transpired of the conclusion and terms of the new family compact. With the same misplaced delicacy, or rather timidity, which had hitherto been a motive for forbearance, they yet endeavoured, by negotiation to prevent Spain from becoming

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1761.

a party in the war, or to draw from the avowal of the monarch a justification of that hostility to which they had affected such repugnance. The orders sent to lord Bristol were calculated to bring the question to an issue.

After testifying the uneasiness of the british cabinet at the language held by the court of Spain, he requested to know whether any ground existed for the general rumours of her hostile disposition, and of the treaty said to be recently concluded between the two crowns. If such a treaty existed, he demanded a communication of its nature and tendency, views and conditions.

Nov. 2.

M. Wall replied to this demand with a long series of insulting declamations. " My master," he said, " could never obtain an answer to any of his applications. You are intoxicated with your successes, and aim to ruin the french power, that you may afterwards crush that of Spain." With real or affected passion, he added, " Since the dominions of his catholic majesty are to be overwhelmed, I shall be the first to advise him at least to put arms in the hands of his subjects ; and not to fall a passive victim. You have set the spanish power at defiance ; you have attacked and plundered our vessels ; you have insulted our coasts ; you have violated our neutrality ; you have incroached

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1761

upon the spanish dominions in America by cutting logwood, and forming new settlements in the bay of Honduras. You have extorted from the subjects of Spain the right they long enjoyed of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland. I have given my royal master hopes, that some atonement would be made for these repeated grievances; and I am commanded to require, how, when, and where such reparation may be expected."

The repeated demands of the british ambassador were alternately evaded and repelled, till the long-expected treasure arrived from America. Immediately after this supply was placed beyond the reach of british enterprise,\* the spanish minister spoke in less equivocal language of the connection with France. "It is time," he said, "to open our eyes and not to suffer a neighbour, an ally, a relation, and a friend, any longer to incur the risk of receiving such rigid laws as are prescribed by an insulting victor. The king of France," he added, "after communicating to the catholic king the most minute particulars of the late negotiation, has determined to publish the mortifying terms to which he had submitted

\* "Two ships have lately arrived at Cadiz with very extraordinary rich cargoes from the West Indies; so that all the wealth that was expected from spanish America is now safe in old Spain." Lord Bristol's dispatch, November 2, 1761.—Anecdotes of lord Chatham, v. 1, p. 335.

for the sake of peace ; and to make known the arbitrary and unreasonable demands of England, which have frustrated his good intentions for the sake of humanity.”

Lord Bristol, persisting in his demand of a specific answer relative to the family compact, was referred to a dispatch written to the count of Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador, to be communicated to the secretary of state. This paper was composed in a style of unusual acrimony. It treated with contempt the proposal for renewing discussions which had been repeatedly and fruitlessly agitated ; vindicated the terms offered by France, and rejected by England ; represented the views of the British government as hostile to the tranquillity of other maritime powers possessing colonies beyond sea ; justified the interference of France in the disputes between Great Britain and Spain, as proper, kind, and necessary, and calculated to prevent the renewal of hostilities.

In reply to the demand relative to the treaty with France, it was observed : “ We frankly answer, Yes, and justify its conclusion.” After other contemptuous expressions, it concludes, “ Your excellency being informed of every thing I have set forth, may tell it or give it in writing to the ministry, that they may on no account charge us with leaving lord Bristol’s

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1761.

memorial unanswered, and that they may acknowledge how improper it is, that the king should continually satisfy their curiosity, while no satisfaction is given to his just demands.”\*

As this dispatch was not communicated, lord Bristol renewed his instances in a firmer and more peremptory tone, during two interviews with M. Wall on the 6th and 8th of December. On the first of these occasions the spontaneous avowal of the spanish minister manifested his own private feelings, and proved that his former language was the effect of his rigid sense of official duty and strict obedience to the commands of his sovereign.

Dec. 6.

After a short pause, evidently the effect of great emotion, he said, “ I have been using my utmost endeavours for six years in England and seven more in Spain, to prevent a rupture between our courts. I am now growing near my end ; but I have ever wished not to leave so dreadful a legacy to the spaniards as a war with England.” After recapitulating many circumstances attending his situation during the late reign of Ferdinand and that of the present king, he continued, “ Most part of this time I have stood alone, and baffled all the attacks of my enemies, who incessantly sought to render my

\* Translation of a paper received by lord Egremont from the count de Fuentes, Dec. 3, 1761.

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1761.

conduct suspected to each of my royal masters, from my predilection towards the english. I lament that all my earnest labours should end with so melancholy a prospect. You are not ignorant how strong the french party is at this court, and you must know how many of my friends are incessantly urging the necessity of declaring against the english, if I would effectually wipe away aspersions so long and so odiously cast upon me for my partiality to Great Britain. But the consciousness that I am acting for the true interest of my royal master, has encouraged me to pursue that path which I deem the only true and direct one for the welfare and benefit of Spain.”\*

Unwilling to announce the final decision of his court, Wall endeavoured, by every mark of conciliation and regard, to avert an evil which he dreaded and deplored. After listening to the arguments of the british minister with a complacency which inspired the hope that an accommodation might yet be effected, he postponed the conclusion of the conference till the second day. Possibly he flattered himself, that this short delay might produce some effect on the mind of the king; but such expectations were vain, and in the interval he was ordered to assume a firmer

\* The earl of Bristol to the earl of Egremont, Madrid, Dec. 7, 1761, MS. Hardwicke Papers.

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1761.

Dec. 8.

tone. Accordingly when he again met the ambassador, he observed, "I have received my master's commands again to inform you, that with regard to the treaty, and the intentions of Spain, my dispatch to the count of Fuentes is the only answer I am empowered to give." Lord Bristol insisted on a specific reply, and added, "that a refusal to give satisfaction on this point would be considered as a declaration of war." M. Wall exclaimed with an emotion which bespoke his feelings, "What is to follow? Have you then orders to depart?" The question being answered in the affirmative, he rejoined, "The demand is such an attack on the dignity of the catholic king, that I cannot venture to give advice to my sovereign on so delicate a subject." As if anxiously seizing every pretext for excuse or delay, he required that the demand should be given in writing. Accordingly lord Bristol briefly wrote, "Does the court of Madrid intend to join the french, and to act hostilely against Great Britain, or to depart in any manner from its neutrality? The refusal of a categorical answer will be considered as a declaration of war."

Receiving this paper, Wall dismissed lord Bristol with striking marks of friendship and concern. After a lapse of forty-eight hours, he announced, by a letter, the hostile declaration



which he evidently wanted firmness to deliver in person.

" Your excellency having expressed to me the day before yesterday, and even been pleased to put it down in writing, that you had orders to ask a positive and categorical answer to the question, If Spain thought of joining herself with France against England?—declaring at the same time, that you should look upon the refusal as a declaration of war, and that you would in consequence leave this court: the spirit of haughtiness and of discord which dictated this inconsiderate step, and which, for the misfortune of mankind, still reigns so much in the british government, is what made at the same instant the declaration of war, and attacked the king's dignity. Your excellency may think of retiring when and in what manner it is convenient to you, which is the only answer that, without detaining you, his majesty has ordered me to give you."\*

This letter he accompanied with a private note, expressing the last testimony of his regret and esteem.

After some delays, and even insults from the court, lord Bristol retired from Madrid; and on the same day in which he received the answer of M. Wall, an order was issued to the proper December.

\* M. Wall to the earl of Bristol, Buen Retiro, Dec. 10, 1761.

CHAP. 60. officers to detain english ships, and lay an embargo in the different ports.

1761.  
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Dec. 25.

While these transactions were passing at Madrid, London equally became the scene of political altercation, and witnessed the final declaration of war on both sides. On the 25th of December, the count of Fuentes delivered the dispatch which he was charged to communicate to lord Egremont, and followed the delivery with a memorial which may be considered as an appeal to the english nation. In this paper he endeavoured to cast the whole blame of the rupture on the *insufferable pride and unbounded ambition of him* (Mr. Pitt) *who formerly held the reigns of government, and who still appeared to direct them though held by another hand.* He justified his sovereign in refusing to give an answer to the demand concerning the treaty with France, on account of the insulting manner in which Spain had been treated during the negotiation. He declared that the obnoxious treaty was perfectly innocent, and had no relation to the present war. It had, he asserted, been previously demonstrated to lord Bristol, that the proceedings of France, which had offended the haughty minister, did not affect the laws of neutrality, or the sincerity of the kings of France and Spain. His royal master, he said, had offered to waive the family compact if it proved



an impediment to peace; but when the french government continued the negotiation without mention of Spain, and proposed terms highly advantageous and even honourable to England, that minister had still rejected them with disdain, and evinced his ill will against Spain, to the great scandal of the british counsels.

At the same time, an abstract of the family compact was published at Paris, accompanied with remarks calculated to throw the blame of aggression on England.\*

At this juncture, the king of Spain gave a public proof of his satisfaction with the new alliance, by conferring the honours of a grandee on the duke of Choiseul, who had been the principal instrument in its conclusion.

The british cabinet published a masterly reply to the spanish memorial, repelled the charge of aggression, and employed great ingenuity to prove, that they deserved no other blame than that of becoming the dupes of the two bourbon courts, and of suffering Spain to place herself in a respectable state of defence.

The formal declaration of war was first issued by England, and grounded on the approbation, expressed by the spanish monarch, of the memo-

Jan. 2,  
1762.

\* The account of this memorable negoitation is drawn from the official documents published on both sides, and a few unpublished dispatches from lord Bristol; also from the foreign and english historians.

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1761.

Jan. 18.

rial presented by Bussy, in the preceding negotiation ; his avowal of the principles and sentiments it contained ; and his refusal to give a satisfactory explanation relative to his hostile preparations and engagements with France. On the other hand, the king of Spain, still affecting to avoid the appearance of aggression, did not issue his counter-declaration till after that of Great Britain had become public. He passed over the discussions which had led to the rupture, censured the ambition of the british government, in aspiring to aggrandisement by land and dominion by sea, and represented the imperious demand of the embassador as a declaration of war. He concluded with stating, that from a love of peace he had waited till the threat had actually been carried into effect, before he adopted a measure so horrible in itself, and so contrary to humanity, as an appeal to the sword.\*

Although interest, prejudice, and political artifice, were not unsuccessful in glossing over the transactions of Charles with England, his conduct towards his ally and relative, the king of Portugal, admits of neither excuse or palliation, but appears, in all its native deformity, an act of the most unprovoked violence, and unjust aggression.

Notwithstanding the value of the Portugal

\* Official papers, as before.

alliance with England had gradually diminished under the administration of Carvalho, the two bourbon sovereigns were too much influenced by a spirit of vengeance to leave in the opposite scale a country, whose defenceless state appeared to promise an easy conquest. While military preparations were made on the frontier, the bourbon ambassadors presented a joint memorial to the court of Lisbon, which was followed by others, requiring the king to concur in the war against England, as the common enemy of all maritime nations. With an indirect but not unequivocal menace, they offered a powerful army to occupy and defend Portugal against aggression, and peremptorily demanded an answer within four days, declaring that any delay would be considered as a negative. On a firm and repeated refusal of the portuguese monarch to submit to this species of subjugation, under the cloak of protection, the ministers withdrew, and their retreat became the signal of instant invasion.\*

\* Official papers.—Beccatini, p. 27.—Silva Historia de Portugal, t. 3, p. 191.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-FIRST.

1762—1763.

*State of the war in Germany—Reverses of the spanish arms—Capture of the Havannah—Surrender of Manilla—The spanish reduce Sacramento and repel an attack against Buenos Ayres—Unsuccessful campaign in Portugal—Alarm in the spanish nation—Spirited offer of assistance from the nobles of Aragon and its dependencies—Distressed state of France and Spain—Changes in the british administration—Ascendancy of lord Bute—Peace of Paris.*

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1762—1763.

March.

ALTHOUGH the change of administration in England was justly hailed, both at Versailles and Madrid, as a fortunate event, the war in Germany continued unfavourable to the cause and views of France. On one hand, the french, embarrassed by internal distresses, and discouraged by repeated reverses, with difficulty prevented prince Ferdinand from carrying hostilities beyond the Rhine; on the other, the king of Prussia, in the midst of the deepest depression, was delivered from a part of his numerous enemies. The death of the empress Elizabeth, and the accession of Peter, changed Russia from an enemy into an ally; and although the deposition of Peter, and the revolution which raised Catherine the second to the throne, speedily

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1762—1763.

April 7.

deprived him of this temporary advantage ; yet this powerful enemy was never again thrown into the scale against him. Thus relieved, he resumed offensive operations against the austrians, and again prepared to carry the war into Bohemia, the frontier of which was exposed by the defeat of Freyberg. Soon afterwards, Sweden, by accepting an armistice, relieved the prussian dominions from the danger of invasion on the north ; and an irruption of the prussians into Franconia deprived the sinking cause of Austria of the support derived from the germanic body. At the same time disease, and the want of succours and supplies, reduced the austrian army to the most deplorable state.

Spain also entered into the war only to share the misfortunes of France, and to encounter disasters equal to any which she had yet experienced under a bourbon king. Aware that Cuba was likely to be the first object of british enterprise, the spanish government had not neglected the security of this important island, and its capital the Havannah. A squadron of twelve men of war and four frigates, under the command of the marquis of Real Transporte, was collected at this station, the works defending the entrance of the harbour were strengthened, and the garrison, which was commanded by Don Juan de Prado, amounted to 4,600 regular

CHAP. 61. troops. Confiding in the strength of the place,  
1762—1763. and still more in the baneful nature of the climate, they defied an attack, and rendered it the depository of their treasure, and the principal magazine of their naval and military establishments in the new world:

But a great change had been wrought in the situation, strength, and even in the character of the ~~british~~ nation. Mr. Pitt had introduced into every branch of the political system, an order, concert, and regularity, before unknown, and the wheels of government still felt the impulse which had been given by his vigorous hand. The conquests in North America and the West Indies opened the way, and afforded the resources, for new victories; while a rapid and brilliant career of success inspired the army and navy with irresistible enthusiasm.

As the plans of aggression against Spain had been already matured, the rupture of the negotiation was the signal for immediate hostilities. Within six weeks after the intelligence had reached the West Indies, a ~~british~~ fleet of 29 sail, under admiral Pocock, convoying a body of 14,000 men, commanded by lord Albemarle, was already traversing the old Bahama channel, before the governor was apprised of the threatened attack, or even suspected the approach of an enemy.

June 2.

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1762—1763.

June 7.

The militia, to the number of 13,000, were raised, to co-operate with the regular troops, and measures adopted to secure the harbour. But these precautions were inadequate to prevent a landing. While the British fleet amused the Spaniards by a feint to the west of the harbour, the disembarkation was effected on the east, between the rivers Nao and Coximar; a Spanish force of 6,000 men repulsed at Guanamacoa; and proper positions occupied to cover a siege against the Moro, a strong fort, situated on a projecting rock, and commanding the entrance of the port. During these operations, another division was landed, to straiten the Havannah itself on the west.

The outposts were rapidly driven in, and attacks commenced. Notwithstanding the embarrassments derived from a rocky soil, and difficult communications, a general cannonade was opened in a few days against the Moro, as well from the batteries by land, as from three of the largest ships of the fleet.

The governor, Don Louis Velasco, a naval officer belonging to one of the ships of war, withstood these attacks with equal spirit and skill. The British ships were driven off with great loss, and the besieging batteries answered with a superior fire. For some days, the efforts of the assailants were balanced by the vigour and steadi-

July 1.

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CHAP. 61.  
1762—1763.

ness of the defence. An accidental conflagration destroyed one of their principal works ; sickness, thirst, and hardships, made the most dreadful ravages among troops unaccustomed to a sultry climate ; and the besieged already anticipated relief from the same causes which had frustrated the ill-fated enterprise against Cartagena, in the preceding war.

But the spirit of the British troops, and the exertions of the commanders, triumphed over every difficulty. Assisted by a reinforcement of 4,000 men from America, their attacks were renewed with redoubled vigour. New batteries arose in the place of those destroyed ; the cannon of the fort were silenced, its defences reduced to ruins, the covert-way was carried, and a sally from the town repulsed with considerable loss.

July 22.

A breach being effected, by the assistance of the miner, the last and decisive contest was worthy of the preceding defence. Of the garrison, no less than 400 fell in the conflict, or were driven into the sea ; a part obtained quarter ; the Marquis of Gonzales, second in command, fell in the breach ; and the gallant Velasco, after maintaining the unequal struggle as long as he could rally a single soldier in defence of the Spanish flag, received his mortal wound in the midst of his conquerors.

Masters of this advantageous position, the

besiegers concentrated all their efforts against the Havannah, and the fort of Puntales, opposite the Moro. New batteries and works were raised on the eastern and western sides of the harbour, and the place assailed by a tremendous cannonade and bombardment.

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1762—1763.

Aug. 11.

A rich, populous, and commercial town is seldom proof against the terrors of such an impressive attack. After withstanding this tempest till most of the artillery was silenced, and the troops driven from their posts, flags of truce appeared on different points of the works, and the ships in the harbour; and a negotiation was commenced for a surrender. Trusting in the distresses of the besiegers, and the approach of the hurricane season, the governor struggled, though in vain, to save the fleet, and obtain a declaration of neutrality for the port. He was admitted to an honourable capitulation, by which 900 men, the remnant of the garrison, were to be sent to Spain; the established government and religion to be maintained; the officers and governors belonging to other parts of the colonies to be conveyed home in a manner suitable to their quality. Thus, after a contest of two months and eight days, the English were put in possession of the Havannah, and a district of 180 miles westward, with a booty amounting to £. 3,000,000 sterling, public property, an

Aug. 14.

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1762—1763.

Sept. 24.

immense quantity of naval and military stores, and the remainder of the fleet, which had not been sunk or destroyed during the siege, consisting of nine sail of the line, and three frigates.\*

The intelligence of this disaster had scarcely reached Madrid, before news arrived of the loss of Manilla, capital of the isle of Luconia; a place no less important in the east, than the Havannah in the west. A force of 2,300 men, under colonel Draper, was detached from Madras, reached Luconia before the spaniards were even apprised of the war, effected a landing under the protection of the fleet, and occupied the suburbs of the capital preparatory to the attack.

The archbishop, who acted as governor, displayed a greater degree of spirit and military talents than might have been expected from his profession. After in vain attempting to prevent the disembarkation, he roused the native indians to arms, to harrass the assailants, while the garrison, of 800 regulars, endeavoured to check their approaches in front. But neither the storms of the hurricane season, nor the efforts of the spaniards and their indian allies, were sufficient to check the ardour of the british troops. The indians were repulsed with a dreadful car-

\* Official letters from admiral Pocock and lord Albemarle, in the gazette, and the accounts in the periodical papers.—Entick's History of the War.—Beaton's Naval and Military Memoirs. Beccatini, p. 220.

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1762—1763.

Oct. 6.

nage, the usual approaches made, and twelve days after the landing, the works were carried by storm. After several hours of plunder and disorder, which could not be restrained, the archbishop and commandant, who had retired into the citadel, were admitted to a capitulation, and the town was saved from ruin by the leniency of the conqueror, who accepted as a ransom two millions of dollars, and an assignment for the same sum on the Spanish treasury. The booty consisted of several ships, and a considerable quantity of military stores; and this success was followed by the capture of the Manilla ship, the Santissima Trinidad, valued at three millions of dollars.\*

The only compensation for these heavy disasters was the reduction of the colony of Sacramento, so long the object of contention with Portugal. By this enterprise, the Spaniards obtained twenty-six English ships, richly laden, besides merchandize, and military stores, amounting in value, to above £. 4,000,000 sterling. It also enabled them to frustrate an attack planned against Buenos Ayres, by individuals in England and Portugal, who were stimulated with the hope of plunder. This expedition arrived in the Rio de la Plata soon after the reduction of Sacra-

\* Official letter from Sir William Draper, &c.—Beccatini, p. 221.

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mento. Disappointed of the succours and stores which were to have been furnished from that quarter, their efforts were confined to a desultory attempt for its recovery, which ended in the loss of the commodore, and a considerable part of the armament. The remnant, with difficulty reached Rio Janeiro.\*

The efforts of Spain were not sufficiently fortunate in Europe to compensate for her disasters in more distant quarters, although she was opposed to an enemy, whose situation appeared to promise an easy conquest.

Portugal had not yet recovered from the effects of that terrible earthquake which had buried a third part of the capital in ruins; nor had the popular discontents, occasioned by the dreadful exertion of justice upon the noble conspirators against the king, and by the expulsion of the jesuits, yet subsided. All attached, either by blood or interest, to the families who suffered, or by religious prejudices to the jesuits, all who were hostile to the administration of Pombal, were ill inclined to exert themselves in favour of a government which was stigmatized as a sanguinary despotism. By the eagerness of the minister in pursuing his favourite system of policy, the army had been neglected. The

\* Adolphus's History of England, ch. 4.—Entick, v. 5.—Official accounts in the periodical papers.

whole military force did not exceed twenty thousand men, many unarmed, and all undisciplined, and the subaltern officers degraded to the condition of menial servants ; and no fortress was in a condition to support a siege. Finally, England, the steady and natural ally of the House of Braganza, had been alienated by a series of vexations and restrictions on her commerce with Portugal.

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The king appealed to the principal powers with which he was connected by alliance or interest ; but from England alone he experienced a generous and disinterested sympathy in his distress. Before, however, he could obtain effectual support, his dominions were invaded by a Spanish army. A force of 22,000 men, commanded by the marquis of Saria, entered the provinces north of the Douro, reduced Braganza, Miranda, Torre de Moncorvo, and spread such alarm to Oporto, that preparations were made to remove the British factory. Their progress was arrested by the militia and peasantry of these mountainous districts, a brave, active, and hardy race, who flew to arms, and, under the direction of British officers, waged an incessant and destructive war of posts against the invaders. But this spirited resistance did not prevent a body of 8,000 men from penetrating south of the Douro into Beira, and taking post near Almeida, where

April 5.

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June 15.

they remained during the summer heats. At this period, the bourbon courts thought proper to justify their aggressions by a declaration of hostilities. In August, count d'Aranda, assuming the command, attacked Almeida, and after a siege of nine days compelled the garrison of 1,500 men to surrender prisoners of war.

During these operations, succours and supplies were landed from England ; and the count de la Lippe, a german officer of distinguished talents, was appointed to the command. He collected the principal part of the forces at Ponte de Marcella, to prevent the advance of the enemy on the north ; and while they were occupied in the siege of Almeida, he detached brigadier-general Burgoyne across the mountains by Castel da Vida, against a dépôt which was collecting at Valencia de Alcantara, preparatory to an invasion along the Tagus. This expedition was effected with equal skill and spirit. Burgoyne made a forced march of five days through a broken and rugged country, surprised and captured a spanish detachment, destroyed considerable quantities of arms and stores, and by this success greatly contributed to divide the attention, if not to baffle the plans, of the spaniards.

After the reduction of Almeida, d'Aranda did not attempt to push his progress in that quarter,

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but leaving garrisons at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, directed his march by Alfayates to Castel Branco, with the evident intention of crossing the Tagus into the Alemtejo. Here, however, he was again opposed by his vigilant antagonist, who drew his principal force to Abrantes, the key of Portugal on the Tagus, and posted strong detachments at Alvite and Niza, to obstruct the passage of that river at Villavelha. The spanish general attacked and forced the pass of Alvite; but while he was following the portuguese across the mountains towards Codigos, Burgoyne, who commanded the troops at Niza, sent a party beyond the Tagus, and surprised a spanish detachment and magazine left at Villavelha. The spaniards were thus entangled in a war of posts, in a sterile and difficult country, till the autumnal rains obstructed their further progress. They then retired within their own frontier to wait the arrival of french reinforcements, which were on their march. The anglo-portuguese, encouraged by their success, and strengthened by new succours, took up their quarters in a line stretching from Guarda to Abrantes; while the corps of Burgoyne continued at Niza to cover the country south of the Tagus.\*

Oct. 1.

Oct. 5.

\* Official accounts, spanish, portuguese, and english.—Entick.—Periodical works.

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After this unsuccessful result of the campaign, Spain was too well acquainted with the enterprise and spirit of her enemies not to dread a severe retaliation on her own coasts and frontiers. In this crisis, the people rallied round their sovereign, and displayed all the firmness of their national character. The Aragonese, with the dependent countries of Murcia, Grenada, Valencia, and Catalonia, presented a common address, testifying that chivalrous spirit which they had always displayed when imminent perils threatened their country.

"The nobility of your kingdoms, attached to the crown of Aragon, supplicate your majesty to intrust to their zeal the defence of their coasts. It cannot be considered as too great a presumption to challenge the english power, which by public, injurious, and offensive writings, has outraged the courageous inhabitants of Spain. If a long peace, or some short and feeble war, has prevented the spanish nobles from displaying that valour, which is sufficiently known in the old and new world, and sufficiently fatal to the english, who now insult us, the present contest has shewn, that their martial fire is not extinct; that they are still animated by the same sentiments. He is not a gentleman, who has not acquired his title by illustrious deeds in defence of his country.

" All burn with unfeigned ardour to seek this defence in martial glory. We therefore pray your majesty to accept the half of our forces to carry the war into hostile countries, instead of waiting for the enemy in our own ; the other half will suffice to keep them far distant from our shores, should they have the temerity to approach us. We have little concern in regard to the quality of the posts which your majesty may assign us, less for the climate whither we may be sent, and none for pay. Those who seek only to establish an incontestable title to the rank of gentleman, need no reward but an open field to display their valour and affection to their country. Your enemies, Sire, shall know that Spain is a vessel sustained by two anchors in the tempest ; that is, by its religion, and by its customs. In imitation of the romans, who once received peace from our ancestors, we exhort your majesty never to grant it but with victory in your hands. Now, Sire, is the time to exalt, under your glorious auspices, the fame of the nation, by humbling England, who madly aspires only to the ruin of all Europe. As she has nothing in view but commerce, that is, a sordid gain, she reluctantly wages war against a war-like nation, that knows no baseness, and feels only affection for its king and country. Money may be wanting at London as at Carthage ; but

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virtue, constancy, and strength, will never fail among us more than in antient Rome. Your enemies, Sire, will destroy themselves by the violent efforts which they must make to defend themselves against us.”\*

But although misfortune had not subdued the spirit of a magnanimous nation, the preceding disasters had exhausted the resources of the bourbon crowns. Spain was stripped of her boasted stores of wealth, and deprived of communication with her colonies; her navy was ruined; her army reduced and discouraged by the fruitless result of an arduous campaign, commenced in the full confidence of success. France, menaced by a foreign enemy, harassed by repeated descents, ruined in trade, and sinking in credit, presented the same scene of distress and despondency as when the mighty power of Louis the fourteenth had sunk under the vigorous hostilities of the grand alliance. The pressure of public misfortune was aggravated by the voluptuous profligacy of the monarch, the rapacity of his mistresses and their adherents, and the unpopularity of the great but restless minister. Finally, the alliance of Austria was execrated as a public misfortune, and even the union with Spain, though strengthened by the ties of blood and consonant to the national feeling, was

\* Beccatini, p. 222.

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regarded as a burthen rather than an advantage. In this disastrous situation, peace was sought by the bourbon sovereigns with a sincerity and solicitude equal to their distress. Fortunately, in the british government they had no longer to encounter a lofty and keen-sighted statesman, who knew and profited by his advantages ; but with a minister who was attached to peace from principle and temper, and who felt himself unable to wield the vast machine entrusted to his guidance. Indeed, soon after the resignation of Mr. Pitt, lord Bute himself made overtures to Austria and Prussia, with the avowed design of accommodating their disputes, but with an evident coolness towards Prussia. To prevent also the prolongation of the contest in Germany, he with-held the prussian subsidy, and in the management of the war, as well as in his domestic policy, he exhibited unequivocal symptoms of anxiety for peace. His conduct towards Prussia occasioned the resignation of the duke of Newcastle, who had connived at the fall of his great colleague, and weakly remained in the ministry with the hope of regaining his former consequence. Lord Bute succeeding to the treasury, united in himself the ostensible as well as the real power of the state ; and the subsequent resignations of the whig party at length left him without a rival, however inconsiderable, in the

May 26.

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September.

Feb. 10,  
1763.

cabinet. These advantages enabled him to pursue his plans with additional effect and rapidity.

In these circumstances, a direct communication took place between France and England, and the pacific inclinations of both were evinced by the mission of the most distinguished nobleman in each country to the respective courts; the duke of Bedford to Paris, and the duke of Nivernois to London. The original matters in dispute were settled with little difficulty; but the affairs of Germany produced a short though intricate discussion; because Austria and Prussia were equally dissatisfied with their respective allies, and equally eager for the continuance of the war. They were therefore left to arrange their jarring interests, while the two bourbon courts and England concurred in hastening a common accommodation by mutual complaisance.

By the definitive treaty signed at Paris, France ceded to England, Nova Scotia and Canada, with the country east of the Mississippi as far as the Ibbeville, which hitherto formed a part of Louisiana; also the isle of cape Breton, with the islets and coasts of the river St. Lawrence, retaining only the privilege of the Newfoundland fishery, under certain restrictions. In the West Indies they yielded Dominica, St.

Vincent, and Tobago; on the coast of Africa, the river Senegal; in the east, they were to relinquish their acquisitions on the coast of Coromandel and Orixa, since 1749, and to keep no troops in Bengal. Dunkirk was to be restored to the same state as fixed by the peace of Aix la Chapelle and succeeding treaties. All other conquests were mutually restored,

Spain also purchased the restoration of the British conquests by the cession of Florida, and the countries east and south-east of the Mississippi. She acknowledged the right of British subjects to cut logwood in the bay of Honduras, and other parts of the Spanish territory; but had the address to render this concession precarious, by the stipulation that all the fortifications erected in those districts should be demolished. The right so long claimed of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland was also formally renounced. The French and Spanish troops were to be withdrawn from the territories of Portugal, and the colony of Sacramento to be again restored.

By a private agreement, Spain obtained from France the remainder of Louisiana as a recompence for the loss of Florida.

The dispute between Austria and Prussia, after a short but arduous struggle, was arranged by the peace of Hubertsburgh, which

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left the two contending parties in nearly the same situation as before the war; and the german powers individually and collectively were comprised in the treaty.\*

\* For the negotiation and conclusion of peace have been consulted,—Beccatini, p. 225.—Adolphus, ch. 5.—Life of lord Chatham, v. 1, *passim*.—Entick, v. 5, *passim*.—Annual Register, and other periodical works for 1762 and 1763.—Peace of Paris in Chalmers's and other collections.—Koch Histoire des Traités. *Paix de Paris*, t. 2.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-SECOND.

1764.

*Resignation of Wall—Nomination of the marquis Grimaldi to the foreign department—Account of the spanish court and ministry by the earl of Rockford—Measures of Charles to cement his alliance with France—Matrimonial connections between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria—Application of the empress queen, for admission into the family compact, rejected.*

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SOON after the conclusion of the peace, M. Wall retired from office. Compelled to sacrifice his principles to the partial policy of his court, exposed to national jealousy, and to the incessant cabals of the french and neapolitan partisans, he had been long disgusted with his situation, and was anxious to quit a post, where he was charged with the labours and responsibility, though without the power, of a minister. He had repeatedly tendered his resignation, but in vain, to a sovereign, whose aversion to change was fortified by a consciousness of his integrity, merit, and services. At length he was reduced to a petty, but pardonable artifice to obtain his liberation. He affected to complain of giddiness and weakness of sight; to give colour to this

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pretended infirmity, before he appeared in the royal presence, he rubbed his eyes with an ointment which produced a temporary inflammation ; and in public he never appeared without a shade. After some time, this feint produced the expected effect. The king reluctantly accepted his resignation, and he joyfully retired from his irksome office, loaded with honours, and the rewards of long and faithful service.

Superior to the allurements of ambition, and satisfied with escaping with peculiar good fortune from the storms of political life, he renounced all desire of influence in resigning his office ; he restricted his intercourse with the court to those testimonies of respect and gratitude which were due to his sovereign, and by his reserved and independent conduct acquired the esteem even of those who had caballed against him when he was in authority. After his resignation, he resided alternately at the Soto de Roma, a royal palace in the Vega of Grenada, and at Mirador, a beautiful villa in the vicinity of the city itself ; and illustrated his retreat by his native urbanity, elegant taste, and liberal charities. He died in 1778\*

At the instigation of Choiseul, his office was

\* Luer's Reisen in Spanien, 1764 and 1765.—Busching's Geograph. Magazin, v. 2, p. 68, and from private information.

transferred to another foreigner of different principles, Grimaldi, spanish embassador at Paris. Jeronimo, marquis Grimaldi, was the younger son of an illustrious genoese family. Being destined for the church, he passed through the ordinary course of instruction, and repaired to Rome, as well to complete his education, as to introduce himself on the great theatre of ecclesiastical and diplomatic business. He accordingly entered into the inferior order of the clerical profession, but does not appear to have obtained any preferment.

Towards the close of Philip's reign, he was dispatched by his native republic on a political mission to Spain. From the elegance of his person, he was designated as, 'the handsome abbot,' while his lively conversation and insinuating manners strengthened the impression produced by a prepossessing figure. With these qualities, he acquired the patronage of some persons who possessed considerable influence at Madrid, and found means to display his talents with advantage, in a court where every foreigner, with the mere appearance of ability, found a ready welcome. Hence, he quitted the ecclesiastical habit, and the service of a petty republic, to occupy a respectable situation in one of the civil departments of the spanish administration.

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From his political principles and devotion to France, he appears to have acquired the patronage of Ensenada, and was employed, during the reign of Ferdinand, in missions to Vienna, Hanover, the Hague, and Stockholm. To this cause, we may attribute the endeavours made to procure for him the embassy to England, in the place of Wall,\* and his subsequent nomination to that of Paris, soon after Charles ascended the throne. In this situation, he acquired the confidence of the french minister Choiseul, and was the great agent of that change of policy which was established by the family compact. He remained in this important post during the war; and on the resignation of Wall, was recalled to fill an office, in which he was peculiarly adapted to forward the views of the two bourbon sovereigns.

As a counterpart to the description of the spanish court at the accession of Charles, already presented to the reader,† we here give a no less lively picture of the principal characters, drawn at the moment of this change of administration, by our new ambassador, the earl of Rochford.

*Lord Rochford to the earl of Halifax.*

Madrid, Jan. 13, 1764.

" My lord;

" As this court had been a great while, until my arrival, without an english minister, it is very

\* See page 90 of this volume.

† Chapter 59.

natural to conclude, that his majesty must be impatient to hear something of its present state. I have, indeed, ever since I have been here, not only endeavoured to get the best information in my power, but have been also very assiduous in paying my court to his catholic majesty, as well as in frequenting those who are directly consulted, and others who, by indirect methods, have opportunities of throwing in their advice.

" And first, with regard to his catholic majesty, who has been often, I know, represented as a weak prince. He is, in my opinion, very far from it, and if he would deprive himself a little more of his darling passion of shooting, and give himself time to look into the national affairs, he would, I am persuaded, manage them more wisely and better than any of his present ministers. But the great misfortune is, that this favourite diversion does not allow the necessary time; and of course, in order to get rid of his ministers, that he may pursue his shooting, schemes laid before him do not undergo that strict examination it is to be wished they did. His general knowledge of the state of Europe, and the political interest of Spain, is good and just, and it would be impossible to put any gross imposition upon him; for his steadiness, I may even venture to say, obstinacy, to the principles he has once laid down, will deter his ministers

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from making any attempt contrary to those which their master has adopted. He was most certainly much inclined not to break with us. Those who know him best, have assured me, that it was a great astonishment to them when he did, and the first time they had ever found him change his mind.

"I am informed, from the same authority, and it may be depended upon, that the french ambassador here was several times heard to say amongst his confidants, 'that the revealing of the family compact, was a *finesse* of the duke of Choiseul, to drive this court into the war; a plain proof, that he, the ambassador, had very little share in it, and a much stronger that Grimaldi was the chief instrument.' This his catholic majesty was so sensible of, that at the very time he recalled Grimaldi, he wrote a letter in his own hand to his most christian majesty, and named Grimaldi's successor, that there might be no pretence for detaining him there; so conscious was he of Grimaldi's being influenced by french counsels, although I must add, that his catholic majesty has a great opinion of his abilities in foreign affairs.

"The king of Spain's present views are, to remain quiet. If he is not entirely persuaded of his having been duped by the french court, his suspicions have been strong enough to awaken

his attention, and some reflections upon them often escape from him. I cannot help taking notice to your lordship on this occasion, of what fell from his catholic majesty the other day, which, although trifling, may serve to shew his way of thinking. As he was examining a new palace he is building here, Grimaldi, who is far from being discreet, found fault with part of the architecture, upon which the king turned, and said to the duke of Lozada ; “*On voudroit me faire faire tout à-la-mode françoise, mais moi, je veux faire à la mienne.*”

“ By many other observations of this sort, too trifling to trouble your lordship with, it is clear to me that his catholic majesty is not personally inclined to the french, and whoever is disposed to lead him that way, must be very cautious. For his catholic majesty is extremely discerning, will seem even to acquiesce with his ministers, till he has learned their way of thinking, and then has been known to tell them at once, to their great surprise, that they do not know what they are about, and that he will conduct the affair himself.

“ He knows his country is greatly exhausted, and he will soon find out that they have no resources. His private expences for the chace, buildings, making roads, &c. drive Squilaci, the minister of the finances, to the greatest diffi-

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ties to find supplies. Great encouragement, therefore, is given to the introduction of foreign manufactures, as the duties upon them raise an immediate fund, whilst the greatest discouragement is given to the manufactures established here, which are daily going to decay, because there is no fund to employ or support them.

" The king, his ministers, and the whole nation, are sensible and conscious of their weakness, from the experience of the last war, as well as from their present situation. It is, therefore, very obvious that, besides their professions to me, which are very strong, they will be obliged to abide by the terms and conditions of the last definitive treaty.

" Monsieur de Grimaldi's character is well known to your lordship. He is plausible, but entirely unacquainted with commercial affairs, or the real interests of Spain, with regard to commerce. In the conversations I have had with him on that subject, he boasted of his having duped the french, by gaining considerable advantages for the spanish trade by the family compact; but declared strongly, at the same time, with regard to us, that he desired nothing more, than that the treaties between us should be religiously adhered to, in which I have always readily concurred.

" His conduct, at his first arrival here, was

high, and insolent beyond measure, particularly to the foreign ministers, the french ambassador not excepted, who in general paid very servile court to him, but have since wisely changed that method, and reduced him to a proper size. He, at the very first, begun quite differently with me, making the greatest professions of personal friendship, and there has been no sort of attention he has not shewn me; but I should not act agreeably to my duty, if I did not acquaint your lordship that this predilection for France grows stronger and stronger. It must be very strong indeed to give jealousy even to the french ambassador, who, conscious that Grimaldi has a private correspondence with the duke of Choiseul, is now rather shy in his behaviour to this frenchified spanish minister. Yet I have heard, from very good authority, that the ambassador has orders from his court to assist Grimaldi in ruining Squilaci, which makes his situation rather an unpleasant one. Indeed the duke d'Ossun, french ambassador, cares very little by whom the affairs of his court are managed, provided he stays here three or four years longer, which is his only view. The last thing general Wall did, was to put all his friends about Grimaldi, and that is the only party he (Grimaldi) has here; the principal of which are Fuentes, who was at our court, prince Masseran, and the count d'Aranda, who

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was once thought of for Grimaldi's place, and who is now endeavouring to get the department of war from Squilaci. There must be added to these, don Agostino de Llano, first secretary to Grimaldi's office ; and though he was in the same office in general Wall's time, he has always been a most determined frenchman.

"There was never, until lately, any council held here ; but Grimaldi has very artfully procured a meeting of himself, Squilaci, and Ariaga, the minister of marine, once a week, and procured an order from his catholic majesty for that purpose, much against the will of the other two ministers. He would otherwise only have been informed of what relates to foreign affairs, but will now be *au fait* of what is internally carrying on, as well as what relates to commerce, and enabled thereby to talk to the king about it.

"Monsieur de Squilaci, who is minister of war and finance, is a man of low birth, indefatigable in business, and rather loves it ; and although the clamours of the nation are strong against him, he thinks himself quite secure in his place. But his friends are under apprehensions for him, to one of whom he said the other day, "the king knows me, and I know him, you have therefore nothing to fear." His professions to me are as strong as possible, and he will be more and more confirmed in his attachment to Eng-

land, was it only from the motive of acting directly contrary to Grimaldi. He of late pays great court to Ensenada, who has entirely the duke de Lozada at his disposal; and although the duke's genius is but moderate, he is a thorough honest man, is more esteemed by the king of Spain than any person here, and has had his master's confidence for a number of years past, without the least variation. Squilaci therefore pays his court to Lozada through Ensenada, and has by this means, in my opinion, a stronger hold upon the king than Grimaldi is likely to have, especially as Squilaci's system of cultivating my royal master's friendship, is more agreeable to his catholic majesty than the doctrines Grimaldi would instil into him.

" Don Julian Ariaga, the minister for the marine and the Indies, is a well-meaning man, but led entirely by the jesuits, and although he meets the other two ministers, is never consulted but in what concerns his own departments. I cannot help thinking that Grimaldi, by what I have observed, is trying to make him more active; but both his indolence and bigotry will prevent him from entering into Grimaldi's views.

" The next person I have to speak of, is the queen mother, who is now contented with the catholic king's filial affection; as her majesty plainly sees, although to her great regret, that

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her son never asks her advice. As Grimaldi is a new minister, she will be dabbling with him, and if he should by chance enter into her views, I should believe he will find it fatal to him, for he must have more skill than I think he has if he can deceive his catholic majesty.

" Of the king's confessor I cannot as yet speak so pertinently as I could wish, for he is very shy to every body, and particularly so to foreign ministers. He has certainly a great deal of credit with the king : your lordship may judge a little of his character by the following *trait*. He observed to his catholic majesty, that the very day twelvemonth the inquisitor-general was banished, the Havannah was taken ; in consequence of which observation, the inquisitor was recalled.

" Your lordship sees by this little sketch (which, from the short time I have been here, is as perfect as my abilities and observations would allow it to be) the ground I have to tread upon, Grimaldi is the minister I must do business with ; and he shews by his behaviour to me, that he believes I have a confidence in him. But I frequently see Squilaci, and lest Grimaldi should not always report faithfully what I say, I acquaint the former with the points of business I talk to the latter upon, and in commercial affairs it is absolutely necessary so to do, as they all pass

through his hands. He is very frank and open with me, has assured me that, whenever I apply for the extraction of silver, if my demands are but moderate, though they are frequent, I shall not meet with a refusal, and has lately granted me a licence for Messieurs Walpole, for 200,000 hard dollars.

"I cannot help lamenting the advantage which the french ambassador has here over every other minister. For being considered as *embassadeur de famille*, he is called in first at the levée, and has by that means, whenever the prince de la Catholica, the neapolitan ambassador is not there, an opportunity of being alone with his catholic majesty, and he has been known sometimes to make good use of it."

Although Charles had suffered so severely for his adherence to the bourbon system of policy ; yet he was of too tenacious a character to relinquish his principles and attachment to his family. Not only during the war, but immediately after the conclusion of the peace, the principal operations of his policy were directed to augment and strengthen those connections which bound him to the elder branch of his house, and even to extend them to that of Austria, which was closely united with France by blood and alliance.

Measures were now taken to solemnise those marriages which had already been arranged with

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the austrian family. But a temporary obstacle arose from the selfish claims of the archduke Joseph, who opposed the transfer of Tuscany as an establishment for his brother Leopold, on the plea that though an emperor, he should himself, on the death of his father, remain without a single foot of land. He therefore endeavoured to retain the reversion of this duchy until he should become sovereign of the austrian monarchy.

As the king of Spain peremptorily refused to bestow his daughter on Leopold, unless the reversion of Tuscany was secured to him for an establishment, the dispute was compromised by the empress queen, who promised to nominate Joseph co-regent of the austrian dominions, should she survive her husband. Joseph was satisfied with this arrangement ; Porto Longone, with the Presidii, were annexed to Tuscany ; and Leopold, in 1765, espoused the infanta.

Soon afterwards, the death of the emperor Francis gave effect to this whole arrangement. Joseph assumed the imperial title, and was declared co-regent of the austrian territories, and Leopold took possession of Tuscany.\* About the same period, a new marriage was concluded between the prince of Asturias and the second

Aug 18,  
1765.

\* Lord Rochford's dispatch to the earl of Halifax, October 8, 1764.—Beccatini.

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princess of Parma, at the instigation of the queen mother, and the french court, to which she was entirely devoted. Other matches also were arranged between the king of Naples and Ferdinand, the new duke of Parma, with two archduchesses. To increase the power of Austria in Italy, a match was also promoted between the archduke Ferdinand, and the heiress of Modena.

These matrimonial connections were afterwards extended to the House of Savoy, by the marriage of two french princes, Monsieur, and the court of Artois, with two daughters of the king of Sardinia. Such arrangements sufficiently develope the principle of the bourbon courts, to secure the establishment of the spanish princes in Italy, and to form a compact body of sufficient strength and consistency to awe the maritime powers and the rest of Europe.

At this period an effort was made by the court of Vienna to identify itself completely with the House of Bourbon, by obtaining admission into the family compact. But this wish was contrary to the secret policy of the french cabinet, which, notwithstanding its public connections, had never ceased to regard Austria as a power likely to become its rival,\* and therefore the application

\* Politique de tous les cabinets de l'Europe, passim.—House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 41.

CHAP. 62. was evaded. The same principle, joined to a  
1764. fear of creating alarm, actuated the court of Madrid; and Grimaldi gave a public and authentic expression of his sovereign's sentiments, by voluntarily declaring to lord Rochford, " Nothing could embarrass us so much as the court of Vienna's desire to accede to the family compact. For on one hand, we wish, on many accounts, to be well with that court, who alone can support his majesty's son and brother in Italy. But the family compact is an *affaire de cœur*, and not an *affaire politique*. The moment any other power, that is not of the family, accedes to it, it becomes a political affair, and may alarm Europe, which is the furthest from our thoughts, for I would have the peace last if possible these twenty years. You may depend upon it, neither the court of France, nor his catholic majesty will admit of the court of Vienna's accession to that compact." \*

\* Lord Rochford to the earl of Halifax, Madrid, June 25, 1764.

In noticing the retreat of Wall, in the preceding part of this chapter, we omitted to refer the reader to a very interesting account of the amiable ex-minister, given by Swinburne, who visited him at Grenado, during his travels in Spain. Letter 26.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-THIRD.

1764—1765.

*Schemes of Choiseul and Grimaldi to renew hostilities with England—Disputes relative to the british settlements in the Bay of Mexico, and with Portugal on the colony of Sacramento and the limits of the Brasils—Causes which prevented an open rupture—Accommodation of the disputes—Negotiation relative to the Manilla Ransom—Introduction of a new system of taxation in Spanish America—Tumults in Mexico, Peru, and Cuba.*

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IT might have been expected, that after obtaining so advantageous a peace, in the actual circumstances, the king of Spain would have profited by the opportunity to give that tranquillity to his subjects which they so much needed, and have endeavoured to remedy the evils derived from the unnecessary wars and ambitious projects of his father. But though Charles himself professed, and doubtless felt a wish to maintain the independence of his crown, and promote the happiness of his people, he was too deeply entangled in the system of bourbon policy to consult his personal inclinations, or his interest as a sovereign. From the very moment of peace, though the exterior forms of amicable negotiation were observed towards England, the same causes of irritation were revived as had

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given rise to former wars ; and the spanish nation for a long period was tottering on the verge of a rupture, without the means or resources for maintaining a contest. Such was the effect of french counsels in a cabinet where Choiseul boasted with reason, that his influence was more powerful than in that of Versailles.\*

Foiled and humbled in his hostile designs against England, the restless and vindictive minister of France only meditated a more effectual and deeper vengeance. Even in signing the treaty, he looked forward to future retaliation, when England, divided by domestic feuds, or occupied in the pursuits of peace, should be unprepared for the renewal of the contest. Too impatient, however, to temporise even for a short interval, his feverish spirit wasted itself in petty enterprises and needless provocations, which served only to keep alive distrust and resentment. He projected, in conjunction with Grimaldi, a new offensive alliance between all the branches of the House of Bourbon, and the adopted houses of Austria and Sardinia ; † he excited the indians to exercise their customary ravages on the british settlements in America ; in every quarter of the world he evinced a disposition to overstep the arrangements of the recent treaty, and by the

\* Memoires de Besenval, t. 2, p. 15.

† Lord Rochford to the earl of Halifax, June 9, 1765.

activity of his preparations, both military and naval, he shewed an unequivocal resolution to resume hostilities.

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As an ambitious minister never wants causes of trouble, he employed his influence with Grimaldi to provoke or urge the court of Madrid to similar measures. At one and the same moment, contentions arose in the public intercourse between France and Spain on one side, with England and Portugal on the other; so that within a year after the conclusion of peace, the principal powers engaged in the recent war resumed a hostile aspect.

The interminable disputes between England and Spain relative to the settlements and trade in the bay of Honduras, were aggravated by the very article of the treaty intended to obviate them. The impolitic consent of England to demolish all fortifications on that shore, left the settlers at the mercy of the spaniards; while the want of defined limits led to frequent violations of the spanish territory on one hand, and frequent vexations on the other. The evil was aggravated by the incessant attempts of the settlers to carry their contraband trade into the interior, even as far as Mexico, and the protection given by the spaniards to the fugitive negroes, by whom the arduous labour of cutting logwood was principally borne.

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Dec. 1763.

In virtue of orders from the minister, Ariaga, to confine the settlers to the strict letter of the treaty, the governor of Yucatan and the commandant of Baccalar, interrupted their trade in general, by requiring them to produce a regular licence, either from their own sovereign, or from the king of Spain. This interruption was followed by the expulsion of the settlers from those points of the coast which were considered as beyond the limits assigned in the recent treaty.

They were commanded to retire from Rio Hondo within the space of two months; they were confined to the south bank of Rio Nuevo; and both at Rio Nuevo, and Rio Wallis, they were restricted from ascending to the distance of more than twenty leagues from the sea. By these aggressions, more than five hundred settlers were driven from their habitations, with the loss of their property, amounting to above £.27,000 sterling.\*

At the same time, the secret hostility fostered against Portugal was manifested by the reluctance of Spain to restore the colony of Sacramento, by complaints relative to the contraband trade with Buenos Ayres, and the interior of Paraguay, and by the renewal of

\* MS. remarks on the article of the treaty of 1783, relating to the settlements in the bay of Mexico, by a british settler. Lord Auckland's Collections.

the dispute on the ill-defined limits of the two colonies.

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July 1764.

Immediate remonstrances were made; and, while the Spanish minister endeavoured to entangle the British court in a negotiation, troops were assembled in Galicia and Estremadura, and active preparations made to resume hostilities. At the same moment, a diabolical scheme\* was

\* We should have scrupled in advancing a fact of this horrible nature, had not the account of Lord Rochford been accompanied with circumstances which furnish as cogent evidence on the subject as such matters will admit. These circumstances induced the British government to credit the intelligence, and to take proper precautions to prevent the attempt.

The discovery is first announced in a 'most secret' dispatch, dated 17th Sept. 1764, from Lord Rochford to Lord Halifax: "I have learnt that about three weeks since, Grimaldi received a letter from Choiseul, telling him that every thing was ready; and in his answer, which was sent by the last Spanish messenger who went to London, Grimaldi, after approving the scheme, added, the sooner it is put in execution the better.

"The scheme is this: two French engineers were sent to England in June last; they went to Portsmouth and Plymouth; staid some time; and returned to France. They are since returned to England; and are now there. They reported to M. de Choiseul, that they had gained, by bribery, the necessary people to assist them, some of whom are English. In short, that in the dark nights, between the 1st and 15th November, the shipping and dock-yards both at Portsmouth and Plymouth would infallibly be destroyed, and that they had invented a new kind of fire for that purpose. I would not willingly give credit to so diabolical a design, but I can see no reason to doubt my friend's intelligence. He heard Grimaldi relate the whole to his intimate and bosom friend Masones, who was formerly ambassador at Paris; and has further told me, that it has since been confirmed to him."

In a dispatch 'secret and private,' Feb. 23, 1765, he adds other particulars. "An Englishman, whose name is Milton, was the first projector of this scheme, and upon its miscarrying he is returned to France, and was three days at Prince Masserano's, who, I am

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formed or approved by Choiseul, to burn the docks and naval arsenals at Plymouth and Portsmouth, and french engineers were already on the spot to superintend or execute the design. Grimaldi was intrusted with the secret, and the two ministers (for we do not implicate the sovereigns of France and Spain), waited with impatience the signal of a conflagration, which was expected to wither the naval strength of England, that they might renew hostilities, and restore the humbled glories of the House of Bourbon. Fortunately, the vigilance of lord Rochford discovered the plot, and the precautions of our government deterred the incendiaries from making the attempt.

### The negotiations between England and Spain

also informed, is sending; or has sent away, by sea from Portsmouth, some of the others who were engaged in it. But what gives most light into this business is, the names of two persons, one at Portsmouth, and the other at Plymouth, who have houses and live constantly there, and where I am assured may be found enough to convince any one of what had been carrying on. Their names, as far as I can trust to french spelling, are Worley and Leynit. But my friend had not time or opportunity to learn which lived at Portsmouth and which at Plymouth, and wrote down their names only from hearing them pronounced." Rochford Papers, MS.

The periodical publications in the beginning of 1795, allude to the alarm which existed on this subject at Portsmouth and Plymouth, and the precautions taken to prevent the attempt. It is scarcely necessary to apprise the reader, that this diabolical scheme was revived, with a fatal effect, in the american war, and partly executed by the notorious incendiary, John the Painter, who was proved to have been an emissary of France.

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were evidently influenced by the progress and failure of this nefarious project. While it was yet in agitation, Grimaldi endeavoured to gain time, by affecting to wait for reports from the officers who were accused of unprovoked aggression. He afterwards evaded the instances of lord Rochford, by referring the discussion to prince Masserano, spanish ambassador at London. His design was, however, disconcerted by the positive refusal of the british government to listen even to the proposal of a negotiation on incontestible rights, and their peremptory demand for the re-establishment of the settlers, the punishment of the governors, and the reparation of damages. The dispatches of our ambassador will best shew the impression produced by these decisive measures.

“ From my knowledge of this court, and from a thorough persuasion that there is nothing they would not do to avoid a rupture at this moment, I knew the more I frightened them the more I should carry my point. I began first with accusing Grimaldi of having drawn me into a scrape, by making me give your lordship assurances that prince Masserano would facilitate every thing.

Sep. 17.

“ I then proceeded to acquaint him with the purport of the last orders I had received from your lordship, and, to shew him my confidence, I

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read the essential parts of your letter. When he came to hear that your lordship would not enter into any discussion with prince Masserano, he clasped his hands together, and the tears came into his eyes ; ‘ Good God,’ says he, ‘ if your ministers will not treat with the king’s ambassador, how can any affair ever be adjusted ? ’

“ Finding this operate very strongly, I took a softer tone ; I desired he would put himself in our situation, and then judge whether it was possible for us to treat about an affair which was already adjusted. ‘ But,’ says he, interrupting me, ‘ all you could have asked would, and will be granted ; you shall have full liberty to cut at Rio Hondo, Rio Nuevo, and every where along that coast, in the bay of Honduras ; and instead of modifying the treaty, we are willing to amplify it. But as you have not a right, nor do you pretend to have any, to go to Mexico, why do you object to declare it ; for, if you mean to pretend a right to go there, as averse as I am to a war, I would be the first to advise the king, my master, to sacrifice every thing, rather than not have that point cleared up.’

“ This, my lord, gave me an opening to tell him, that the previous step towards negotiating that or any other point, would be to begin with giving a full and satisfactory answer to my memo-

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rial of the 27th of July, and to that I saw no difficulty, as the most essential point was agreed upon ; namely, by allowing the king's subjects not to be molested in their occupation of cutting logwood in the *bay of Honduras, and other places of the spanish territory in that part of the world.*

" In the afternoon, he took me into his closet. He immediately resumed the conversation, which had been interrupted in the morning, by saying, that although he was willing to grant us what we required, there was a great difference, and an essential one to them, between granting it to us now, and acknowledging it as a prior right. For if we abided by the spirit of the treaty and not by the letter, we might as well claim a right to go to Mexico, since that was the territory of Spain in that part of the world. He further added, that allowing our interpretation to be the genuine and natural sense of the treaty, it certainly was not the literal one ; and how unjust the catholic king would appear in the eyes of the world, if he punished a governor for adhering strictly to the terms of a treaty ; or gave reparation for a supposed injury which was not one when it was done, but which they were willing to allow, for the future, should be considered as one if it should be repeated. He concluded by

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saying our ships might return thither in the greatest security.

“At this part of the conversation, I rose, and told him I was sorry to find he stopped at such a trifle ; but that unless satisfaction was given, the king would be obliged to take measures for reinstating his injured subjects, and he must see that this would be the same thing as *sonner le tocsin de la guerre*. “*Vous avez raison*, dit-il, *et j'atteste Dieu que je ferai tout ce qui dependra de moi pour l'éviter.*” As I then proposed passing him a memorial the next day to have his answer to transmit to your lordship, he desired I would first give him an exact *precis* of the orders I had received, which he promised me he would make a good use of. In an affair of this consequence, he added, “I will take nothing upon myself; to-morrow, the 14th, I will give the king, my master, an exact state of the affair; on the 15th, I will have a council, and on the 16th, which will be the soonest, you may come to me, and in order to save time prepare a memorial and bring it along with you, to deliver in case we cannot agree. You shall then have my final answer.”

“15th. His catholic majesty dined this morning at ten o'clock in order to go out a shooting. I did not therefore get to St. Ildephonso time

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enough to pay my court to him ; but I went to Squilaci's office, and found him *tête à tête* with Ensenada, who left him upon my coming. After talking upon indifferent subjects for some time, and finding he would not begin upon the matter in question, I told him I now should have an opportunity of seeing whether his pacific intentions were as sincere as he had always professed ; and then proceeded to inform him exactly of what had passed. Upon this, he took me by the hand, and said, " Now you shall see whether I understand your intentions or no. I must tell you the king has been much alarmed at your demands, but I have set that right, and as I know I can depend upon you, Is it not all you require to have the governors disavowed, and the king your master's subjects reinstated in their right ? This previous step being taken, do you mean to object to the discussion of this affair afterwards, and fix where you are to go, that you may not have an unlimited right to run over all America ?" I replied, that supposing we would not fix any thing with them afterwards, they ran no risk by settling this first ; for if they were hereafter dissatisfied with our proceedings, they might, whenever they pleased, act in the same manner they had now done, and drive us away again from Rio Hondo, since they would always have it in their power. But I

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could assure him it was not, nor ever would be, our intention to act in such a manner as to justify our repeating the same thing, and as they had now done it unprovoked, it did not become them to have any suspicions of our conduct. "Go," said he, "to-morrow to Grimaldi, and it shall not be my fault if this affair is not adjusted." He then made me the most solemn and strong assurances that there was nothing they would not do to keep well with us.

"16th. This morning I was early at court, and after having been at his catholic majesty's levée, I attended Grimaldi. After a great deal of very warm debate, during the course of which he told me, that in council the day before he had received his instructions, he mentioned two points only of my memorial, viz. the disavowing of the governor's proceedings, and re-establishing our logwood cutters. Upon my producing the memorial I had brought with me, which was indeed drawn up in very strong terms, he begged I would not deliver it, as both our intentions were to accommodate matters, and not *aigrir les esprits*; and as I had no new demand to make after what I had already made, there was no need of a new memorial. As I had given him the *precis* of it the day before, I readily acquiesced in not delivering it. He then took up the pen, and drew up the form of the letter he would

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write immediately to the governor of Yucatan, and of which he would give me a duplicate; assuring me at the same time it should be directly sent away. After altering some parts of the letter, and adding the three last lines myself, we were so far agreed.

"When I came to mention the reparation again, which was the third part of my memorial, he said, what they did was to quiet us, and shew their sincere disposition to peace. But repairing what we called an injury, and which they did not believe one, was a little, if I would allow him the expression, too imperious, and that he had not yet, because he dared not, proposed it to the king his master. I then told him my orders to insist upon it were positive, and that I much apprehended our court would not be satisfied without it.

"I had the other day a long conference with Grimaldi on the subject of your letter of the 23rd, when I informed him that as soon as your lordship knew what damages had been sustained by our ships being obliged to retire from the bay of Honduras, the king expected and hoped from the equity of his catholic majesty, that he would order proper reparation to be made. It is impossible for language to admit of stronger terms than Grimaldi used, to assure me of the steady and determined resolution of his catholic majesty

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to remain in perfect amity with the king; but he added these remarkable words, " You do not know what a master I have to deal with. When he has taken a resolution, there is nothing can make him alter, especially as he is persuaded your demand is unjust and unreasonable, and that his complying with it would give room for a further extension of the 17th article of the definitive treaty."\* Finding all reasoning vain, I said no more then, especially as I had a sufficient claim for renewing the demand when I should be particularly instructed so to do, which I told him must inevitably happen."†

Lord Rochford knew no less than Grimaldi himself the inflexible character of the king, the impossibility of obtaining the punishment of officers who had merely fulfilled their orders; and the difficulty of drawing money from an impoverished treasury. He therefore left the demands of punishment and reparation, to swell the list of grievances which continually accumulated between the two courts, and accepted the order of the minister to restore the settlers, accompanied by a private letter, censuring the spanish officers for their precipitate conduct, and forbidding future violence, even should the settlers act illegally, without a previous application

\* Relative to the right of cutting logwood.

† Lord Rochford's dispatches, Sept. to Dec. 1764.

to the court. This transaction was terminated by a gracious audience, in which Charles expressed his satisfaction and friendly sentiments towards England ; and lord Rochford, without referring to the points so grating to the feelings of a punctilious monarch, testified the resolution of his sovereign to prevent contraband trade, and the abuse of the privileges enjoyed by british subjects.\*

Although this unpleasant altercation appeared to be amicably terminated by the concession of Spain on one side, and the temperate forbearance of England on the other ; yet the irritation still subsisted. The spanish government did not remit its military preparations, and Grimaldi again assumed a tone not consonant to his professions of amity. “ The english,” he peevishly said, in a conference with our ambassador, “ are an enterprising nation, and have views of commerce which cannot be borne.”†

Meanwhile the collateral dispute with Portugal had been agitated with greater warmth than that with England. The equivocal answers and menacing aspect of Spain, and the evident design of Grimaldi to protract the negotiation, exasperated the court of Portugal : the high-spirited minister, Pombal, scorning to temporise,

\* Dispatch from lord Rochford to lord Halifax, Oct. 27, 1764.

† Lord Rochford to lord Halifax, Oct. 27, 1764.

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considered a rupture as inevitable, and demanded the assistance to which Portugal was intitled by her alliance with England.

Blending temperance with firmness, the british government soothed the resentment of Portugal; but at the same time testified to Spain a resolution, not to suffer the slightest attack on the dominions of an ally, by declaring that the first gun fired should be considered as a declaration of war. For a time, indeed, the instigations of Choiseul maintained the animosity of the spanish cabinet. But as all applications for the assistance of France were evaded by vague and equivocal promises, as the dark design against the navy of England was frustrated by the vigilance and precautions of the government, the spanish minister shrunk from the dangerous situation in which he was placed; at a time when the treasury was exhausted, the army and navy still suffering from the effects of an unsuccessful war, and when he himself was branded by the popular odium as a foreigner.

His consequent change of sentiment and conduct did not escape the penetration of lord Rochford. "I have great reason," he wrote, "to believe, from the present conduct, as well as the sudden change in the behaviour of the ministers here, that the french suspect their grand scheme is discovered, and have communicated their sus-

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pitions to this court; for the Spanish troops, who were preparing for their march, are stopped, and the colonels of many regiments, who had a leave of absence till February, have obtained a further leave till May. Within these ten days, three messengers have arrived from Paris, one of whom was Choiseul's valet de chambre, who, while he was here, was shut up in Grimaldi's house, and not suffered to converse with any of his servants."\*

The most flattering attentions were accordingly lavished on the court of Portugal, and the dispute finally suspended by an accommodation similar to that with England. The contested points were partly arranged, and partly left to become the germ of future negotiations and future hostilities.†

Another cause of irritation was the Manilla ransom. It has been already mentioned, that, when the town surrendered, the governor purchased an exemption from plunder by the promise of four millions of dollars, for half of which he gave an assignment on the treasury of Spain. When this demand was formally made, it was haughtily rejected by Grimaldi, under the frivolous pretence, that it had been extorted by force

\* Lord Rochford to lord Halifax, Escurial, Nov. 12, 1764.

† Lord Rochford's dispatches in 1764 and 1765, *passim*.

CHAP. 63. and that the plunder, previous to the capitulation, was a breach of the agreement.  
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Though the captors had acted with more humanity than policy, in accepting such an imperfect satisfaction, the popular outcry in England compelled the ministers to make repeated and even menacing demands for its discharge. But the Spanish court, well aware that no prudent government would incur the risks and expences of a war for the sake of a consideration comparatively so trifling, treated the demand with indifference or levity. "The archbishop," said Grimaldi, in answer to one of the applications of lord Rochford, "might as well have drawn on the king for the province of Grenada, or agreed to deliver up the city of Madrid. My master will wage eternal war, rather than submit to pay a single pistole of so degrading a demand; and I myself will rather be cut to pieces, than make so dishonourable a proposal." Squilaci was no less untractable. Assuming a tone of irony, he said, "Give us the two millions of dollars which you have already received, and in return, we will yield you Manilla and all its dependencies."\* Subsequent remonstrances produced a more softened language; but no instances could extort from Spain the slightest symptom of com-

\* Lord Rochford's dispatch to lord Halifax, Sept. 6 and 17, 1765.

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pliance; and during almost the whole reign of Charles, this petty and irritating demand was repeatedly brought forward, and as repeatedly evaded or rejected. The english government had no other resource than to gratify sir William Draper with a pension, and pacify the other claimants by promises of reparation, which were never fulfilled. At length, even the soldiers themselves treated the subject with military levity, and soothed their disappointed hopes, by expressing their wishes, that, on a future occasion, they might not be led by a *learned* general, whose *latin* had robbed them of their booty.\*

The jealous and irritable spirit which these transactions displayed towards England, joined to the pressing instances of the french minister to raise funds for the execution of the common designs formed by the two bourbon courts, led to measures which aggravated the distresses of the country, and increased the embarrassments of government.

Conscious that the sources of revenue in Old Spain were exhausted, and that vast supplies might yet be drawn from the rich and extensive territories in the new world, Choiseul and his partisans urgently recommended the adoption

\* Sir William Draper, who prided himself on his classical acquirements, had concluded the capitulation, with the archbishop of Manilla, in the *latin tongue*.

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of a more efficient system of government and finance in the colonies. The plan was formed by Carrasco, fiscal of Castile, who was doubtless assisted by french financiers, and by the ex-minister Ensenada. The design was approved even by Squilaci himself, who was irritated by the frauds and malversations of american corregidores.

The plan was submitted to the king soon after the peace of 1763. The author clearly proved that the whole revenue of Peru, Chili, Mexico, and Terra Firma, amounted to no more than £. 800,000 annually, of which the net return to the treasury did not exceed £. 160,000. Hence, he inferred the extent of the abuses, and contended that the king was no where more shamefully defrauded, than in the kingdom of Mexico. That kingdom he represented in the most flourishing condition, containing above ten millions of souls, and sixteen towns, as populous as Madrid ; the capital alone comprising above 250,000 inhabitants, its neighbourhood well cultivated, and the people in general in easy circumstances.

He proposed therefore to make the first trial of the scheme in this rich and flourishing kingdom, and confidently predicted that the advantages would be proved by an annual increase in the revenue of £. 200,000. He stated that the

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whole trade of the country was engrossed by four great bodies, the magistracy, the military, the monks, and the secular clergy. He suggested the necessity of profiting by their mutual contentions and opposition, to gain two of these great bodies by intrigue, and employ their influence in crushing the rest. The people, it was hoped, less burthened than under the existing administration, would speedily open their eyes to their true interests; and the plan being extended into the other colonies, the king of Spain would become the richest sovereign in Europe.

A scheme which promised so great an increase of revenue, with so little expences, was warmly approved. As Carrasco declined the appointment, Don Andres de Galvez, an alcalde de corte, a person who was considered as possessing all the requisite qualities, was nominated to carry it into execution. To give energy to his measures, a reinforcement of 2,000 men was embarked for Vera Cruz, and, instead of veteran spaniards, walloons and strangers were selected for the service, as less likely to be influenced by local or national connections. The command was given to Don Juan de Vilhaba, late captain general of Andalusia, an officer of great firmness and activity, who was intrusted with far more

CHAP. 63. extensive powers than had been usually confided  
1764—1765. to the military chiefs of the colonies.

The intelligence of the intended innovations spread universal alarm and discontent through all orders in the new world. Scarcely had the commander reached his destination, before he was involved in a dispute with the viceroy; the marquis de Cruilles, in consequence of which the payment of the troops was suspended, and the allowance itself reduced one third. Commotions immediately arose among the soldiery, who, after committing some disorders, deserted into the country, where they found a welcome refuge among the discontented inhabitants.

In this crisis, Galvez arrived at Mexico. With difficulty he succeeded in reconciling the viceroy and Vilhaba, consented to suspend the execution of his orders, at the instigation of the principal persons in the colony, and prevailed on the capital to offer a free gift of 200,000 crowns. He transmitted an account of these proceedings to the court, and demanded new instructions.

The impression of distant danger was too faint to overcome the instances of the french party, and the alluring hope of a plentiful revenue. A new viceroy was appointed, Galvez was ordered to proceed, two assistants were dispatched to assist and stimulate his efforts, and custom-

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houses were established in conformity to the new plan.

In consequence of these measures, the general discontent broke out into open insurrection. Galvez, and one of his assistants, were driven from Mexico, and the other, who was less fortunate in his attempt to escape, was roughly handled by the populace. The commotion spread rapidly into the neighbouring districts.

At los Angeles, on the high road from Mexico to Vera Cruz, the people, a hardy race descended from the antient Tlascalans, flew to arms; the troops were attacked and driven into the mountains, and the obnoxious custom-houses demolished. The ferment was checked with difficulty by the principal inhabitants, who supported the royal authority, and clothed and maintained the militia at their own expence.

Similar measures produced similar effects in other parts of the colonies. But the insurrection of Quito was of a still more dangerous nature. After expelling the royal officers, the insurgents offered the sovereignty to one of their own body. They rejected all intreaties to return to their allegiance, and refused an offer of pardon, declaring, " We, who have committed no offence, have no need of pardon; we will continue to pay the same sum to the revenue, on condition that we have no more spanish governors. We will

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appoint our own magistrates." The old spaniards and those best acquainted with the temper of the americans, joined in reprobating the new system of revenue ; they laboured to shew that it would prove less productive than the old ; and they dwelt with great force on the danger of irritating a people who were every where ripe for revolt. These remonstrances produced a temporary hesitation in the government, which gave the rising commotion time to subside.\*

The ferment, however, extended to Cuba. A new impost on tobacco became the cause of insurrection ; and the populace assembling from different districts of the island, destroyed considerable quantities of this valuable plant, from which the king derives a considerable portion of his revenue.†

\* This account of the troubles in America is drawn from lord Rochford's dispatches to Mr. Secretary Conway in March, 1766.

† Lord Rochford to Mr. Secretary Conway, Madrid, March 12, 1766.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-FOURTH.

1766.

*Predominant principles and foreign partialities of Charles—Characters and political rivalry of Grimaldi and Squilaci—Regulations and reforms of Squilaci—Alarming tumult at Madrid—Retreat of the court to Aranjuez—Dismissal of Squilaci—Changes in the government, and vigorous administration of d'Aranda—Restoration of tranquillity—Return of the king to Madrid.*

THE alarm derived from distant insurrections was lost in the more dangerous tumults which agitated the capital itself, the result of the same restless spirit of intrigue, and the same rage for innovation.

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Although born and educated in Spain, Charles had quitted the country at too early an age to retain a partiality to its customs, laws, manners, and language; while, from his residence abroad, and his intercourse with France, he had formed a natural predilection for the French character and institutions. On this was ingrafted another predilection to manners and habits equally differing from those of Spain, in consequence of a long residence in Italy, and an affectionate attachment to his Neapolitan subjects. When he

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acceded to his new throne, he was accompanied by a number of Italian favourites, each of whom was surrounded by a crowd of inferior dependents. One of these favourites, the Marquis Squilaci, was raised to the post of minister of finance and war; and foreign partialities and connections equally influenced Charles in the choice of Grimaldi, another Italian, to fill the office vacated by the retreat of Wall.

The elevation of Grimaldi led to a political rivalry between the two Italian ministers, less public, but not less active and incessant, than that between Carvajal and Ensenada, in the preceding reign.

A common principle, which equally actuated the two ministers, was a great awe of their royal master, and a dread of exciting displeasure by direct contradiction. In every other particular, they totally differed. Grimaldi, of illustrious extraction, and accustomed to the polished society of courts, was elegant in his manners, magnificent, generous, and hospitable in his mode of life. He was averse to application; yet sedulous when application was necessary; he transacted business with an ease, dispatch, and accuracy, highly agreeable to his sovereign; fond of amusement, yet never suffering amusement to interrupt the course of serious occupations.\* In

\* Swinburne, who frequently visited Grimaldi at Aranjuez, says,

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political principle he was devoted to France, proud of that devotion, and guided in his operations by the counsels of Choiseul; but dreading the effect of the national prejudice against France and french alliances, and adroitly flattering his sovereign by an affectation of zeal for the independence and honour of his crown. Though naturally timid, he had not acquired the reserve of a veteran statesman, but was frequently loquacious and communicative, even to a degree of indiscretion. He was, however, cautious in confining himself to the business of his peculiar department, and repressed his own love of rule, to leave the management as well as the odium of the internal administration to Squilaci.

Squilaci, of humble origin, and accustomed to low society at that period of life when habits are formed, was coarse in his manners, unpolished in his conversation, and without the slightest tincture of learning. Compensating by diligence and attention for the natural slowness of his parts, he carried his fondness for business to the mechanical drudgery of a clerk. He was reserved in his temper, niggardly in his disposition, and mean in his establishment. From the habits of early parsimony, joined to an apprehension of

“The prime minister, the marquis Grimaldi, is superlatively free from ceremony and restraint. He keeps an open house, where we are always sure of meeting with a numerous company, cards, and conversation.” Travels in Spain, Letter 38.

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the uncertainty of court favour, he was rapacious in amassing money; and to place his fortune beyond the effects of national prejudice, or political revolutions, he was now in treaty for the vast estate of the Alva family in Sicily. As a minister of finance, he was averse to war, from a dread both of lessening his own sources of profit, and of increasing the embarrassments of the state. For this reason, he was antigallican; and partial towards England, though seldom venturing to avow his sentiments, lest he should incur the displeasure of his sovereign. He was rigid and unaccommodating, careless of public opinion, and zealously attached to the customs and institutions of the country which gave him birth.

From situation and character, Squilaci became the instrument of measures which most deeply affected the nation, and consequently was most exposed to popular odium. Accustomed to the details of neapolitan finance, he found in Spain a system totally different in its principles and operation; and by want of address rendered still more galling the measures to which he was obliged to recur to fill the coffers of the sovereign, particularly the imposition of new taxes, and the grant of monopolies. He introduced indeed many excellent regulations for the improvement of manufactures, and executed various plans for the ornament, security, and comfort, of the me-

tropolis. The streets, which were inexpressibly filthy, were cleansed by his order; the city was lighted by above 5,000 lamps; concealed weapons were prohibited, and other measures adopted for the establishment of a regular and efficient police. But in pursuing these plans, his eagerness for reformation, and contempt of public opinion, led him to an experiment of the most dangerous kind; the change of the national dress, which favoured crimes and assassination. Flapped hats and long cloaks were prohibited; and, if we may credit the reports of travellers, he employed the same expedients in curtailing these excrescencies of dress, as Peter the Great in retrenching the long beards and flowing robes of the muscovites.

Besides the odium attached to such innovations, however beneficial, the almost exclusive possession of the royal confidence exposed Squilaci to the jealousy of the other ministers, and the envy of the courtiers. The clergy were offended with various regulations calculated to diminish their power, and apprehensive of still further incroachments, on the privileges of their order. The people also were discontented with the result of the late war, begun in opposition to the public opinion, terminated without glory, accompanied and followed with additional burthens. Finally, the french court, dissatisfied

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with Squilaci, and eager to throw the whole power into the hands of Grimaldi, found an able instrument of their machinations in Ensenada, who considered himself as supplanted by the obnoxious minister. The operation of these different causes appeared in popular murmurs, in frequent and inflammatory placards.

In the midst of these discontents and intrigues, Squilaci imprudently established a monopoly for supplying Madrid with oil, bread, and other articles of consumption, which formed the principal food of the lower classes. The consequence was an immediate rise in the price of these necessaries, which gave to his political rivals an opportunity to excite a tumult. The primary or ostensible cause of insurrection, was the decree against flapped hats and long cloaks.

March 23,  
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On the evening of Palm Sunday, the populace of Madrid rose, as if by general concert, rushed towards the house of Squilaci with imprecations and cries of vengeance, broke the windows, and attempted to force the gates. Being repulsed by the walloon guards, they spread themselves over the city, exclaiming, "Spain for ever," "Long live the king, and die Squilaci!" They compelled all who appeared in the streets to let down the brims of their hats, broke the lamps, but injured none except the walloons, many of whom were massacred in attempting to suppress the

riot. During the whole night the tumult continued to increase, and in the morning had risen to the most alarming height. Still, however, they neither ill-treated nor insulted those who passed with their hats flapped, permitted the foreign ministers to repair to court, and among others greeted the British ambassador with acclamations of "England for ever, and perish France!" mingled with the popular cry, "Peace with England, war with all the world!"

Many messages passed between the king and the insurgents. The dukes of Medina Celi and Arcos were deputed to address the multitude, though without effect, for nothing would satisfy them but the head of Squilaci. This dreadful suspense continued till three in the afternoon. The court were panic-struck by an explosion equally sudden and violent; the royal officers hurried to and fro, in uncertainty and consternation. At length, the sovereign was reduced to follow the example of former kings in similar commotions, and a species of compromise was effected.

Charles himself appeared in the balcony of the palace, promised to dismiss Squilaci, to appoint a Spaniard his successor, to repeal the edict against round hats and long cloaks, to reduce the price of bread, oil, soap, and bacon; to suppress the monopoly for supplying the city with provisions; and to pardon the insurgents. This

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species of capitulation between the king and people, was ratified in the most solemn manner. A friar, with an uplifted crucifix, read the articles distinctly, and at the conclusion of each the king gave signs of approbation. In the evening, a general amnesty was proclaimed; the insurgents retired from the palace with acclamations of loyalty; and before night, the city was as tranquil, and the streets as little crowded, as if no trouble had happened.

The calm was of short duration. With an unaccountable degree of timidity and imprudence, the king and royal family quitted the palace at midnight. Escorted only by a few body guards, and accompanied by Squilaci and the principal officers of the household, they walked to the nearest gate, entered some carriages which were hastily procured, and drove rapidly towards Aranjuez.

The report of their departure being spread abroad, the populace rose with redoubled fury. Considering the capitulation as violated, they assembled in vast multitudes, seized the arms and drums of the guards stationed in the different quarters, collected offensive weapons of all descriptions, and shutting the gates, permitted no one to quit the city.

As the Spanish troops were unwilling to act, and the Walloons had marched to Aranjuez,

Madrid for forty-eight hours was at the mercy of a licentious populace. Yet this seemingly ungovernable mob entered no dwellings but taverns and public houses; terrified all, but injured none. They discharged continual volleys of muskets without ball; and venting their fury on the bodies of the walloons who had been killed in the recent tumult, dragged them through the streets, tore out their eyes and tongues, and burnt their mangled limbs. During the whole day and the succeeding night, they paraded the city, crying, "Long live the king, and die Squilaci!" accompanied by women and children bearing lighted torches; and the palm branches which had been distributed at the churches on the preceding Sunday. They scornfully rejected the offer of money, exclaiming with savage disinterestedness, "We want only the blood of Squilaci!"

One of the ring-leaders, a coach-maker, was deputed to Aranjuez to insist on the king's return. He carried a letter open, and brought back an answer, which was addressed to the council of Castile. It declared, that the king had been twice bled, and was too much indisposed to return to Madrid; it announced the dismissal of Squilaci, and the appointment of Don Michael Musquiz to the department of finance; renewed the former promises, provided the people would immediately deliver up their

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arms, and return to their occupations; and added, that their future obedience could alone induce the king to resume his residence in the capital. This message, which was instantly proclaimed in every part of the city, was received with tumultuous approbation. The populace dispersed, delivered up the arms and drums at the respective guard-houses, shook hands with the soldiers, and in a few hours Madrid resumed its former tranquillity. No one was insulted on account of dress; all the damages committed by the people in the taverns and public-houses were repaired, their expences liberally defrayed by the chiefs of the tumult, and no one, except an eye-witness, would have believed that an insurrection had taken place.

The king immediately fulfilled his promise by dismissing Squilaci, who had narrowly escaped the popular fury. On the morning of the insurrection, he was absent from Madrid on business, and when entering the city at the gate of Alcala, was apprised that the people had risen, and threatened his life. He instantly made a circuit round the walls, and arriving safely at the palace, accompanied the royal family in their retreat. His wife also, who was equally the object of popular fury, in returning from Las Delicias, a neighbouring villa, in company with her daughter, was fortunately met by the dutch

embassador. He received them into his carriage, and conveyed them to his hotel, from whence they escaped to Aranjuez.

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In the morning of the 25th, the fallen minister and his family departed under the escort of a troop of light horse; and the officers, if molested on the road, were ordered to declare that they were conducting him as a state prisoner, and were responsible for his person. They arrived without accident at Carthagena. The marquis and his family embarked for Italy, never more to return to Spain, though he afterwards filled the Spanish embassy at Venice.

No incident ever more deeply affected Charles, or more ruffled his equable temper, than this tumult. Besides being compelled, by the dictates of a seditious mob, to dismiss a minister of whom he publicly said, ‘that if he was reduced to a morsel of bread he would divide it with Squilaci,’ many circumstances gave cause to suspect, that the tumult did not originate with the people. The regularity with which it was conducted; the general contempt displayed by the insurgents for money; the deep and unanimous animosity against Squilaci, and the calmness of the principal nobles at the moment when a general massacre was dreaded, were strong proofs that this convulsion was the effect of a political intrigue, which might eventually be turned to

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more dangerous purposes than the removal of an obnoxious minister. Similar insurrections also arose in different parts of the kingdom, particularly at Saragossa and Barcelona, which were not quelled without bloodshed.

The king, brooding over these circumstances, became pensive, reserved and peevish. For some time, he suspected the French of having fomented the insurrection; but on further investigation, his suspicions were transferred to the Jesuits, and to some of the principal courtiers. Ensenada, in particular, was exiled from the capital.\* Count d'Aranda, a nobleman highly popular, and distinguished for vigour and decision of character, was summoned from his government of Valencia, and intrusted with extensive powers both civil and military, to restore tranquillity; and a body of 10,000 men was drawn towards Madrid.

Still, however, an alarming ferment continued to subsist after so great and general a commotion, and the popular discontent was evinced by numerous placards, affixed even to the very walls of the palace. Among other expressions indicative of a resolution to resist the authority of government, and denunciations of vengeance against the troops who had distinguished them-

\* This was his last appearance at the court. He resided at Medina del Campo, where he died at an advanced age.

selves in suppressing the revolt, the phrase which most frequently recurred, was

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“ Si entraran los Valones,  
No reyneran los Borbones.”\*

From displeasure or apprehension, the king for some time continued at Aranjuez, and even expressed his resolution to transfer the royal residence to Seville. But he was at length soothed by Grimaldi, who represented that the numerous palaces in Castile, on which such immense sums had been expended, would become useless, and the treasury was too much impoverished to build others in Andalusia. He did not, however, resume his residence in the capital till an interval of eight months, employed in vigorous measures, had given time for the restoration of tranquillity.

The dismissal of Squilaci led to a partial change in the administration. Grimaldi, trembling at his fate, shunned responsibility, avoided even giving his opinion in the deliberations of the cabinet, and left all internal arrangements to d'Aranda, the confessor, and the Spanish ministers. He thus escaped the suspicion of the sovereign and the hatred of the people; and continued to rise in favour; but no other foreigner was placed in office. The department of finance was conferred on Don Michael Mus-

\* If the walloons enter, the bourbons shall cease to reign.

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quiz, who had been first secretary to Squilaci ; that of war on another spaniard ; the office of president of Castile was revived in favour of d'Aranda, and joined with that of captain-general. By his firmness and vigour, tranquillity and subordination were gradually restored ; vagabonds and idlers were driven from the capital ;\* many of the retainers of the great were arrested and punished ; ecclesiastics, who were not exercising their function, were remanded to their respective residences. Even the obnoxious decree itself was partially carried into effect, within the vicinity of the court, and a sense of pride was called in to assist the operation of the law, by an order enjoining the public executioner to wear the round hat and national cloak.†

\* "Every blackguard," says Swinburne, "now loiters about with his hat pinned up; but the moment he gets out of town, and beyond the bounds of the proclamation, he indulges himself in flapping it on all sides." Travels in Spain, p. 361. 4to.

† Lord Rochford's dispatches from March to June 1766.—Beccatini, p. 233, 236.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-FIFTH.

1767—1769.

*Motives which induced the king of Spain to expel the jesuits—Extraordinary secrecy and precautions of the measure—Correspondence between the king and pope Clement the thirteenth—Expulsion of the jesuits from Naples and Parma—Papal bull against the duke of Parma—Dispute of the bourbon princes with the holy see—Death of the pope and election of Clement the fourteenth—The king of Spain obtains the abolition of the order of jesuits—Arrangement of the ecclesiastical disputes.*

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THE year succeeding the tumult at Madrid was distinguished by the expulsion of the jesuits from the dominions of Spain, an incident as remarkable in itself as it was unexpected. It is unnecessary to trace the rise and progress of this celebrated order. It will be sufficient to observe, that their spirit of intrigue, dangerous maxims, bond of union, and persevering ambition, had long rendered them an object of fear and jealousy to many of the European governments; and there was scarcely a political intrigue, or public commotion, in which they were not actually implicated, or supposed to be engaged. Such, however, was their extensive influence, from the number and talents of their members; and the authority which they exercised over the

CHAP. 65. public mind, by monopolising, in a great degree,  
1767—1769. the duties of education ; such also was their influence in the cabinets of catholic princes, as directors of their consciences, and such the wealth and power they had appropriated, that till the middle of the last century no statesmen had been found bold enough to smite this spiritual colossus. The first blow was struck in the petty kingdom of Portugal, by the marquis of Pombal, the minister of a weak and superstitious monarch, whose court and household were filled by their members and adherents.

One of the first causes which contributed to their disgrace, was their conduct in exciting commotions in the missionary settlements of Paraguay, to which we have already alluded. In consequence of this imputation, the royal confessors were arrested, and the other jesuits forbidden to appear at court. This was the prelude to their total expulsion in the ensuing year. From a suspicion, well or ill-founded, that they were implicated in the memorable attempt to assassinate the king, they were in a single day involved in one common disgrace, their property confiscated, their members transported as prisoners to the coast of Italy, and set ashore in the states of the church.

Jan. 19,  
1759.

Their expulsion from Portugal dissipated the terror inspired by their name and power, and the

principles and conduct of the order were vigorously attacked by the literati of France, who had long waged a paper war with the most distinguished of its individuals. The general contempt and aversion in which they were thus involved, favoured the designs of the duke de Choiseul,\* their inveterate enemy, and prepared the way for their expulsion from France, which took place in 1764, with circumstances of more humanity and moderation than in Portugal.

It now became the leading principle of the french minister to complete their downfall in other countries, and particularly to obtain their expulsion from Spain. For this purpose, Choiseul employed all the resources of intrigue to excite alarm at their character and principles, and implicate them in every offence which was likely to throw disgrace on their body. He did

\* Choiseul, when a young man, and in company with some officers of his regiment, abused the jesuits; and, as was customary, these sallies were noticed in the records of the order. Afterwards, when he was appointed french minister at Rome, he received a deputation from the college with great marks of respect and expressions of regard, and admitted many of the members to his table and society. In one of these familiar visits, a jesuit, father de Gallique, imprudently said, "We are glad to see that you no longer entertain the same opinion of our body as formerly," and alluded to his conversation with his brother officers. This incident, which proved the extent and exactness of their information, made a deep impression on his mind, and is said to have been one cause which induced him to promote their abolition. This singular anecdote, which I had previously heard from good authority, I find confirmed in the Memoirs of Besenval, t. 1, p. 364  
—367.

CHAP. 65. ~~1767—1769.~~ not even scruple to circulate forged letters, in the name of their general and chiefs, and to propagate reports of the most odious and criminal nature against the members themselves individually.

These artifices and this anxiety will not appear superfluous, when it is considered, that Spain was the country which gave rise to the institution, and fostered it with peculiar affection ; that the king, a devout prince, had shewn himself its friend and protector, and had strenuously resisted the private insinuations of the french and portuguese courts, to follow their example. It cannot be supposed, that general arguments on the principles, duplicity, ambition, or power of the order, would have sufficiently influenced the mind of Charles, had they not been attended with more specific circumstances, which affected either his own personal feelings, or the interests of his kingdom. Such circumstances were not wanting. Undoubted documents had already been adduced to prove that father Ravago, the confessor of Ferdinand, had encouraged the fathers in the West Indies to oppose the execution of the treaty of limits with Portugal, in 1750, and resist the cession of the missions in Paraguay, in exchange for the colony of Sacramento.\* The jesuits were likewise justly charged with monopo-

\* Sir Benjamin Keene's dispatches.—See also ch. 50.

hising the commerce of South America, to the CHAP. 65.  
prejudice of the revenue, and the detriment of  
~~1767—1769.~~  
individuals. A report from Don Emanuel Da-  
mas, viceroy of Peru, asserted that they possessed  
warehouses in the city of Lima, and other towns  
of South America, carried on an extensive com-  
merce with the natives, and, being exempt from  
contributions, undersold the regular merchants.

In Europe they were accused of disturbing the public tranquillity with seditious publications, and in the house of father Payons, rector of the college at Saragossa, were discovered several thousand copies of a work privately printed, on the expulsion of their order from France, stigmatising the magistrates, and even attacking the person of the king himself. Rumours were spread of their supposed plots and conspiracies against the Spanish government; and to give colour to the charge, a letter was forged in the name of the general at Rome to the provincial general in Spain, instructing him to excite insurrections, and sent in a manner to be intercepted. Even the riches and property of the order were greatly exaggerated, as an additional temptation for its abolition. The jesuits themselves imprudently weakened their own influence over the mind of Charles, by opposing the canonization of Don Juan Palafox, bishop of Angelopat, which he had much at heart. The final cause

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which led to their expulsion, was the success of the means employed to persuade the king, that their intrigues had caused the recent tumult at Madrid, and that they were still forming new machinations against his own person and the royal family. Influenced by this opinion, Charles, from their zealous protector, became at once their implacable enemy, and hastened to follow the example of the french government, in expelling so obnoxious a body from all his dominions.

He confided the execution to count d'Aranda, who had so ably suppressed the commotions at Madrid. Impenetrable secrecy, uncommon vigilance, great popularity, and particularly personal influence over the inhabitants of the capital, rendered him an appropriate instrument for the execution of so delicate a design. He laid the whole plan with the king alone, in his capacity of president of Castile. As it was known that the king usually signed only the ordinary dispatches, in order to elude the watchful eyes of the jesuits, and avoid the suspicion that might arise from using the ink-stand in the royal cabinet, the count did not omit the trifling, though important, precaution, of carrying the materials for writing in his pocket. The king himself wrote, and directed with his own hand, circular letters to the governors of each province, which they were to open at a particular hour, and in a particular place.

When the period arrived, the six colleges of the jesuits at Madrid were surrounded at midnight with troops, headed by officers of the police, and admission being obtained, the bells were secured, and a centinel placed at the door of each cell. The rector was commanded to assemble the community ; and the different members being collected in the refectory, the royal decree of expulsion was formally read. Each member was then permitted to take his breviary, linen, chocolate, snuff, a few other conveniences and his money, on specifying the amount in writing. The doors were then closed, and they were led in companies of ten to the place where the carriages were collected for their conveyance. They were distributed in different vehicles, each carriage under the escort of two dragoons, to prevent any communication, and were thus conveyed to the coast. The servants and others attached to the order, were guarded for some time, and then liberated. So complete were the precautions, and so prompt and regular the execution, that the inhabitants of the capital were ignorant of the event till the following morning, when the cavalcade was already on its journey.\*

\* Beccatini, p. 238—9.—The orders for the seizure of the jesuits were privately given by the king, and carried into execution on the 31st of March, before the regular decree for their expulsion was signed, which was not till the second of April. On that day, the decree was promulgated by the public crier before

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March 31.

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In the same manner each college, in the different parts of Spain, was invested; the fathers conducted to the coast, and embarked with similar precautions and rapidity. The transports, under the convoy of several frigates, steered for the ecclesiastical state, and appeared off Civita Vecchia, where the different officers had orders to land their unfortunate charge. These measures were facilitated by a committee composed of the principal ministers, and five prelates, which was formed at the moment when the decree of expulsion was promulgated.

As the governor of Civita Vecchia had received no instructions, he dispatched a messenger to Rome for orders. But the pope forbade their admission, under the pretext, that if the catholic sovereigns of Europe should abolish the religious societies, and transmit the members into the ecclesiastical state, the papal dominions would be too small, and the treasure too poor to maintain them. During these delays, the jesuits were crowded like convicts on board the trans-

the gates of the royal palace, facing the principal balcony, and at the gate of Guadalaxara, where the business of merchants and tradesmen is carried on, in the presence of the mayors of the household and court, and with the sound of trumpets and kettle drums.

This form of promulgation seems to have been derived, through the channel of the moors, from the east, where the public acts are proclaimed before the royal palace, and at the exchange, or place where merchants and tradesmen assemble.

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ports, in the most sultry season of a sultry climate; and of the old and infirm, or those who had suffered from their sedentary life, numbers perished within sight of land. At length, after beating about the Mediterranean, exposed to storms and tempests for three months, they were received on the isle of Corsica; those who had the misfortune to survive preceding hardships, were deposited in warehouses like bales of goods, without beds, and almost without the common necessities of life. They remained in this deplorable situation, till their destiny was fixed, by a compromise with the pope, when they were permitted to repair to Italy, and receive the scanty pittance allotted for their maintenance, by the king of Spain.\*

In the distant and extensive colonies of South America, similar precautions were adopted. Don Pedro Cevallos, governor of Buenos Ayres, was recalled, and replaced by the marquis of Bucarelli, who was personally apprised of the design, and reached Buenos Ayres in the beginning of 1767. Receiving in June the formal order, he dispatched messengers to Peru and Chili, with the letters from Madrid. In his own province, he forwarded the royal decree to the subordinate commanders, with orders to open it on a certain day, and in the presence of the

\* Two paoli, or about 1*s.* per day each.

CHAP. 65. highest ecclesiastical and civil authorities. Thus every measure was conducted with the same secrecy and dispatch, as in the mother country, and at the same day and hour, the houses of the jesuits were surrounded, their persons seized, and their papers secured.

The execution of the order in the missions of Paraguay, was considered as a work of extreme difficulty, because it was apprehended that the jesuits, who had opposed in arms the cessions to Portugal, who had been long accustomed to govern with independent authority, and were adored by their numerous converts, would not tamely submit. But in no one instance was the slightest opposition made. The jesuits displayed the greatest resignation, humbled themselves before the hand that smote them, soothed their irritated flocks, and suffering themselves to be conducted to the coast, were embarked and conveyed to Europe.

Pages, who witnessed their expulsion from the Philippine isles, thus describes their conduct: "I cannot conclude the just encomium of these men (the jesuits in the isle of Samar) without observing that, in a situation where the extreme attachment of the natives to their pastors might, with little encouragement, have given occasion to all the evils of violence and insurrection, I saw them meet the edict for the abolition of their

order, with the deference due to civil authority ; but at the same time, with a strength and firmness of mind truly manly and heroic."\*

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On considering this transaction with impartiality, it is impossible to deny that, however necessary the expulsion of the jesuits might be deemed, yet the execution itself was the most arbitrary and cruel measure ever held out to the indignation of mankind. The members of a great religious order were suddenly arrested, as if guilty of enormous crimes, banished from their native land without trial, exposed to the most dreadful hardships, and finally, compelled to remain in the papal dominions, under the pain of losing the scanty pittance allotted for their subsistence.†

No other reason ‡ was alleged for these rigor-

\* Pages' Voyage, t. 1. p. 190.

† This account of the expulsion of the jesuits, is composed from private information, obtained both abroad and at home, from the most respectable authorities, as well as from the different publications on this subject.

‡ Although no public reasons were alledged by the court of Spain for the expulsion of the jesuits, yet many criminations of them were circulated in the private correspondence of the ministers at the court of Madrid, as the following extract from one of lord Rochford's dispatches will sufficiently shew. " The marquis of Ossun, the french ambassador at Madrid, has written a letter to the most christian king, to inform him, that, by the examination of the jesuit's papers, it has been discovered that they were the promoters of the insurrection last year, and formed a design on the Thursday of the holy week to exterminate his catholic majesty and all his family; and that the same scheme was to have been effected this year, if count d'Aranda had not, by his precautions,

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ous measures, than the absolute good pleasure of the king. In this state of proscription, they were not only prohibited from justifying their conduct, but it was ordained, that if one single jesuit should send forth the slightest apology in their favour, the pensions of all should instantly cease, and that all subjects of Spain, who should presume to publish any writing, either for or against them, should be punished as if guilty of high treason: circumstances which can scarcely be credited in a free nation, if the truth was not still attested by the edict for their expulsion.\* The only apology which can be advanced in favour of such a cruel measure, is, that the whole body being closely linked together in absolute obedience to their general, no one member could presume to publish any thing without the approbation of his superior; and such was their mighty

prevented it." Lord Rochford to lord Shelburne, Paris, May 6, 1767.

It is the duty of every historian, as it becomes the feelings of every man, to lean to the side of humanity, and not to attach implicit credit to vague accusations and reports of enormous crimes, circulated in secret against the members of that society, by its enemies, who were interested to defame it, and when the members themselves were precluded from all justification. Therefore, we cannot, without further proof, assent to any such charge, subsequent to their expulsion. But in whatever light this accusation may be considered, the passage is too curious to be omitted, because it serves to shew, that the king of Spain himself was fully persuaded of their criminality, and was therefore induced to insist upon the final abolition of their order.

\* See the Edict in all the periodical publications.

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influence over the consciences of persons of all ranks and descriptions, that if any had been permitted to continue in Spain, or to return thither while the ferment subsisted, they might have excited dangerous tumults among the people.

Charles notified this important measure to the head of the church in firm but respectful terms. He said, “The principal obligation of a king is to watch over the maintenance and tranquillity of his states, the honour of his crown, and the domestic peace of his subjects. To fulfil this duty, I am under the urgent necessity of expelling the jesuits from my kingdoms, and transporting them to the ecclesiastical territories, that they may remain under the wise and immediate dissection of his holiness, the common father of the faithful. Not intending, however, to charge the apostolic chamber with their maintenance, I have taken proper measures for paying to each during life, a pension more than sufficient for his support. I request your holiness not to regard this resolution otherwise than as an indispensable civil precaution, which I have not adopted till after mature examination, and profound reflection. I hope, therefore, that your holiness and the court of Rome will render me the justice which such a resolution deserves, and from which will result the greatest glory to

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March 31,  
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May 16,  
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God. I intreat your holy and apostolic benediction."

It was not to be expected that the pope would acquiesce in so sudden and unqualified an expulsion of the most zealous partisans of the holy see, and still less, that so bold and irritable a pontiff as Clement the thirteenth, already vexed by contests with the catholic princes, would submit to this invasion of his authority. He accordingly announced his concern and displeasure in the same tone of remonstrance which was employed so successfully by his predecessors in the darker ages, however ill calculated for modern times. After a warm eulogy on the merits and services of the order, and after expatiating on the injury which would accrue to the catholic faith from the abolition; he concluded with an earnest and singular appeal to the devotion and feelings of the monarch. "We present not," he said, "the prayers of your royal spouse, who from the height of heaven perhaps recalls to memory your affection for the company of Jesus; but the prayers of the spouse of Christ, the holy church, which cannot without tears behold the total ruin of so useful an institution. We add our own particular requests, to those of the roman church. She rejoices in the attachment of your majesty, and of your glorious predecessors, to the see of St. Peter; she boasts of hav-

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ing given to the person of your majesty and the spanish monarchy, the greatest proofs of peculiar love. We adjure your majesty, then, by the sweet name of Jesus, which is the glorious device of the sons of St. Ignatius; by the name of the blessed Virgin, whose immaculate conception they have always defended; we adjure you by our old age, to yield, and condescend to revoke or suspend the execution of your order. Let the motives be reasonably discussed; give room to justice and truth to dissipate the cloud of prejudices and suspicions; listen to the counsels of the first-born of Israel, the prelates and religious, in an affair, which affects the state, the love of the church, the salvation of souls, and your own conscience. We are convinced, that your majesty will perceive the ruin of the whole body to be unjust, and not proportioned to the guilt, if there be any, of a few individuals. Convinced of your majesty's rare piety and known equity, we are full of confidence that you will hear our tender exhortation, embrace our pastoral and paternal advice, and comply with our prayers, no less reasonable than just. With hopes so well founded, we give your majesty and your royal family our apostolic benediction."\*

The reply of the king announced respect and affection for the head of the church, but un-

June 2.

\* Beccatini.

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shaken firmness in his resolution. " My heart is filled with grief and anguish at receiving the letter of your holiness, in answer to the information announcing the expulsion of the jesuits from my dominions. What son would not be melted when he saw a respected and beloved father overwhelmed with affliction, and bathed in tears? I love the person of your holiness, in whom I observe the most exemplary virtues ever united in the vicar of Jesus Christ. Your holiness may judge what share I take in your concern. The reasons and convictions which have led to this resolution, most holy father, are too strong and indubitable to induce me to expel only a small number of the jesuits from my dominions, instead of the whole body. This I again assure your holiness, because the truth of my explanation may redound to your consolation. I pray God that your holiness may be perfectly convinced of it. Moreover, the divine goodness has permitted that in this affair, I should keep in view the account which I am one day strictly to render of the government of my people, of whom I am not only obliged to defend the temporal property, but the spiritual welfare.

" Directed therefore by such a principle, and to such an end, I have taken exact precautions that no aid due to men devoted to the church, should be wanting for the expelled jesuits, even

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in the most distant regions. Your holiness may be tranquil on this subject, since it appears to be that which gives you the greatest cause of complaint; and deign to encourage me with your paternal affection and apostolic benediction."\*

The example of Spain was speedily followed by the king of Naples. The jesuits were expelled with the same precautions as in Spain, and conveyed without ceremony across the frontier into the ecclesiastical state.

From a dread of offending the powerful monarchs of France and Spain, the pope had hitherto confined his opposition to mere remonstrances, and complaints against the violation of his territory. But when a petty sovereign like the duke of Parma ventured to expel the jesuits from his states, and establish various regulations to restrain the papal authority, Clement deemed it a proper opportunity to exercise his spiritual power, without the danger of a repulse. He therefore issued a brief against the duke, threatening his territories with interdict, and his person with excommunication, unless he revoked his ordinances against the privileges and rights of the church.

The princes of the House of Bourbon, watchful for an opportunity to abridge the pretensions of the roman see, did not acquiesce in this insult

\* Beccatini, p. 245, 253.

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against a weaker member of their family. They accordingly opposed this exertion of papal authority with the most vigorous measures. France occupied Avignon and the Venaissin, and Naples seized Benevento; and all the catholic powers united in a common censure of the papal brief as illegal and vindictive. The king of Spain, in particular, issued a declaration, proving that such briefs of excommunication had been prohibited by the most devout of his predecessors, and therefore enjoined his prelates to prevent the promulgation in their respective dioceses. At the same time the council of Castile revived the statute against publishers and distributers of bulls or briefs derogatory to the royal prerogative, and denounced death and confiscation of property against all who should assist in circulating the brief against the duke of Parma, and the bull *in Cœna Domini*, on which it was founded.

The great catholic powers, particularly the king of Spain, had hourly proofs of the exertions and intrigues of the jesuits to regain their lost establishments, and felt the necessity of completing the dissolution of so dangerous a society, now rendered doubly formidable by resentment for past mortification and recent disgrace. A remarkable and alarming proof of their influence was given at Madrid, the year after their expulsion. At the festival of St. Charles, when the

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monarch shewed himself to the people from the balcony of the palace, and was accustomed to grant their general request ; to the surprise and confusion of the whole court, the voice of the immense multitude, with one accord, demanded the return of the jesuits, and the permission for them to wear the habit of the secular clergy. This unexpected incident alarmed and mortified the king ; and after a vigilant inquiry, he thought proper to banish the cardinal archbishop of Toledo, and his grand vicar, as the secret instigators of this tumultuary petition.

He therefore redoubled his efforts to extort from the pope the abolition of the order ; and demanded this concession as a preliminary to an accommodation of the dispute with Parma. The demand occupied the serious deliberations of the sacred college, but the partisans of the jesuits were still sufficiently numerous to negative the proposal ; and the pope was induced, by the decision of the college, to address briefs to the catholic princes, interceding for the persecuted order, and intreating compassion on their sufferings. But while the dispute was yet in suspense, chagrin, anxiety, and disappointment hastened the decease of the aged pontiff, and opened a field for the struggle of the civil against the ecclesiastical power.

When the conclave for the choice of a new

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pope assembled, no intrigue was spared by the catholic powers to baffle the influence of the jesuits, and obtain the election of a person who would enter into their views, and relinquish those privileges of the church which they were determined to abolish. A vigorous struggle took place in the conclave, in which the members of the sacred college, devoted to the two contending powers, were each sufficiently numerous to exclude, but not to elect. At length the joint efforts of France and Spain prevailed, and procured the choice of Ganganelli, a monk of the order of Minor Conventuals; a prelate of great learning, moderation, and disinterestedness, whose sentiments in favour of an accommodation with the catholic powers had drawn on him the marked displeasure of his predecessor.

This victory gained, the catholic powers produced their demands to the new pontiff, and required the immediate abolition of the order, the renunciation of the ecclesiastical rights, which they considered as derogatory to the civil authority, and even the cession of Avignon and Benevente. Clement the fourteenth, whatever were his engagements, would not lower the dignity of his character by too ready an assent to their instances. He firmly refused to cede the smallest part of the ecclesiastical patrimony. He required time to examine the question concern-

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ing the jesuits ; he declared that, as the common father of the faithful and head of all religious communities, he could not destroy so celebrated an order, without reasons which would justify him in the eyes of God, and in the opinion of posterity. On the other points, he evinced an inclination to gratify the catholic powers. He received an ambassador from Portugal, which the late pope had refused ; revoked the brief against the duke of Parma ; and made several concessions in regard to ecclesiastical discipline, and the rights of the church, in points which had been found detrimental to the welfare of society.

To the king of Spain in particular, to whom he chiefly owed his elevation, he displayed strong marks of attention and gratitude ; and, among the first instances of acquiescence in his wishes, gratified him by the canonization of bishop Palafox. He ultimately yielded to the incessant and pressing solicitations of all the catholic powers ; and on the 21st of July, 1773, abolished the order of Jesus, by a bull, in which he ascribes his consent to respect for the representations of the king of Spain, who insisted on this measure as necessary for the tranquillity of christendom, and the peace of his own dominions.

Charles, satisfied with having annihilated the power of the jesuits, secured the tranquillity of his dominions, and eradicated their influence as

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a body, reverted to his natural mildness, and by a royal rescript permitted the members who yet survived to return to Spain, and obtain possession of lands which had fallen to them by inheritance.\*

\* Historisches ü Politisches Journal for 1783, vol. 1, p. 87,—for 1784, vol. 1, p. 173.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-SIXTH.

1764—1771.

*Improvements in the spanish army, navy, and finances—State of France—Situation of Europe—Changes in the administration, and popular feuds, in England—Intimate union between France and Spain—Transfer of Louisiana—Hostile designs of Grimaldi and Choiseul against England—Occupation of Corsica by the french—Dispute and accommodation relative to Falkland's Islands.*

TRANQUILLITY being restored, the spanish government resumed the operations of foreign and domestic policy, with a new ardour derived from the recent changes. Grimaldi confined himself to the business of his peculiar department, and to the prosecution of the schemes which he had concerted with Choiseul. On the other hand, the creative genius of d'Aranda, assisted by the energy of an absolute government, was employed in reforming the internal administration, and restoring the army and navy. By the zeal and co-operation of the two ministers, a considerable amelioration was soon visible in the finances. The system of tactics, which the successes of Frederic the second had rendered the envy and admiration of other nations, was introduced into the army: our embas-

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sador commemorates, with astonishment and concern, the striking improvement of the Spanish discipline, and the augmentation of the military force. He notices also a similar increase in the navy, and the sudden activity which animated every dock and arsenal belonging to Spain in the old and new world.\*

At the same time, France, which was now identified with Spain, exhibited a singular mixture of restlessness and debility; of trouble and misery within, of aggression and provocation without. The monarch was devoted to sensual pleasures and personal gratifications, careless of national honour, and solicitous only for the continuance of tranquillity, that he might not be roused from his dream of voluptuousness. A new mistress, drawn from the haunts of vice, was already caballing to exhibit her power with the same state and publicity as her titled predecessors. She was connected with a crew of relations and dependents, who agitated the palace with their petty machinations, and guided by a superior, but scarcely more honourable class of intriguers, who hoped to employ her rising influence in supplanting the minister.

The nation was exhausted, overwhelmed with debts, desponding from recent misfortunes, and actual debasement. The antient nobility, who

\* Lord Rochford's dispatches.

prided themselves as the support of the throne, were alienated from the sovereign, and under a voluntary banishment from his court and counsels. The parliaments in open opposition to the royal authority, and equally thwarting every measure which emanated from the crown, whether beneficial or obnoxious. In Britanny, in particular, a province which had always asserted its privileges with characteristic pertinacity, the contentions between the sovereign and the magistracy had arisen to an alarming height, and proved the germ of those troubles which have contributed to accelerate a stupendous revolution.

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In the midst of these rising commotions, Choiseul, whose restless spirit, as the royal historian justly observes, found gratification in spreading trouble in every court, pursued his designs with an obstinacy amounting to desperation.\* Regardless of future consequences, and looking forward to wars and commotions as the only means to maintain his tottering power against a host of assailants, he was actively employed in impelling the nation to exertions far beyond their strength. In concert with the spanish minister, he was silently, but industriously, preparing the means for renewing the contest with England. The army was subjected to a new

\* Oeuvres Posthumes du Roi de Prusse, t. 5, p. 51.

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system of discipline; and though he was too artful to excite alarm by a premature augmentation, yet such an organization was introduced into the military department, as would enable the power of a despotic government to call into immediate action a numerous and efficient force. Nor was the navy neglected. Vast quantities of materials for construction, and naval stores, were already accumulated; and such a number of ships, either in readiness for service, or actually built, as were deemed sufficient to render the bourbon fleets not inferior to that of England, neglected as it was known to be in the intervals of peace.

Although the revenue was inadequate even to the current expenditure, every expedient of finance which promised to afford a ready supply, was called into action. The interest of the public debts was reduced one half; the survivorship of tontines was abolished; the payment of pensions suspended; titles of nobility conferred for money; and every preparatory measure adopted, at once to accumulate a considerable fund in the royal treasury,\* and to extend the division of public and private property, in order to render less distressing the dreadful expedient of declaring a national bankruptcy.

The state of Europe in general flattered the

\* The suspension of pensions alone raised above 130,000,000 livres. Lord Rochford to Lord Shelburne, Paris, May 7, 1767.

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hopes and favoured the views of the bourbon ministers. The powers of Germany and the north were watching with anxious suspense the progress of the war between Russia and the turks, while the troubles of Poland presented a theatre for their intrigue and ambition. Prussia was making vast preparations, which announced some new and great operation of policy. Austria was employed in counter preparations, and importuning France for the stipulated aid of 25,000 men. At the same time, both powers, however divided by political rivalry, were meditating that union of intrigue and force, which terminated in the partition of Poland. The arms of Russia were engaged on the distant frontier of Asia; Sweden agitated with those cabals which led to the revolution of 1772; Denmark of little consequence alone; Holland overwhelmed with debts, and attentive only to commercial interest, was without ability or inclination to resume a share in public affairs.

The policy which had dictated the arrangements and alliances of the two bourbon crowns, now became evident in Italy. That country, which had once acted a distinguished part in the slightest contentions of Europe, and had been so frequently the theatre of misfortune to the House of Bourbon, was rendered completely subservient to its interests. The two Sicilies, the Milanese,

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Tuscany, and the smaller states, were occupied by bourbon sovereigns, or devoted to their cause ; and Venice and Genoa influenced by similar principles. The king of Sardinia, once the arbiter of Italy, was surrounded by bourbon states, fettered with alliances, without direct communication with England, and reduced to insignificance if not to dependence.

In the midst of this general confusion, England alone appeared inclined, or interested, to watch the projects of the bourbon courts ; but in England an important change had taken place since the brilliant era which preceded the peace of Paris. The government had been weakened by frequent changes of administration ; the nation, agitated by party feuds, had pushed liberty to the bounds of licentiousness. The reins of government, after being rapidly shifted from lord Bute to the Grenvilles, and from the Grenvilles to the Rockinghams, had at length again fallen into the hands of Mr. Pitt, from whose energy and popularity a stable and consistent administration was expected. But that great minister, declining in health and years, unable to rule as formerly a divided house of commons, accepted the peerage, with the office of privy seal, and by his promotion lost much of that influence which might otherwise have supplied the want of vigour and health. After a year of

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political imbecility, spent in vain struggles to manage his motley administration, he resigned in disgust, and left the arduous task of directing the jarring counsels of his country to the duke of Grafton. But on quitting the government and re-entering the lists of opposition, he resumed his native energy and lost popularity, and though when in office unable to guide or influence his colleagues, he had now sufficient power to shake their authority.

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The divisions and revolutions of the cabinet were however trifling, in comparison with the popular convulsions. Each of the successive administrations had been marked by some obnoxious act, which excited a dangerous ferment or direct opposition to the government. The cyder tax under lord Bute, the stamp act under the Grenvilles, the indemnity bill under lord Chatham; and recently the expulsion and re-election of Wilkes, and the contest relative to general warrants, produced a commotion the most extensive and alarming which this country had witnessed since the revolution. This gloomy period was marked also by the rise of those intestine troubles which led to the separation of the american colonies from the british crown.

As in all times of trouble, the governing powers were more attentive to their own cabals and civil broils, than to the internal benefit or

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external interests of the country ; each administration appeared chiefly solicitous to change and abrogate the acts of their predecessors ; and while no consistent system of policy was pursued either at home or abroad, the army and navy fell into a neglect and disorder unusual even in times of the profoundest peace.

In this situation of affairs, the restless ministers of France and Spain were eager to engage in new troubles ; and from this motive, they accelerated an arrangement, calculated to prevent a future misunderstanding between their two courts. After delaying the cession of Louisiana under various pretences, the transfer was at length completed with the concurrence of France.

Feb. 28,  
1766.

On the 21st of April, 1764, a formal notification of the cession of Louisiana to Spain, was made to the inhabitants. The intelligence excited general consternation ; but as the Spanish court delayed the act of taking possession, the colonists flattered themselves that the transfer might yet be eluded. After a long interval of suspense, however, Don Benardo de Ulloa arrived at New Orleans to assume the government ; but the colonists refusing to acknowledge his authority, the administration, both civil and military, still continued in the name of the king of France.

This contumacy irritated the court of Madrid ;

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and accordingly a royal decree was promulgated, prohibiting the people of Louisiana from all communication with the fairs and marts of the neighbouring colonies, hitherto the principal markets for their produce. This act of arbitrary authority increased their discontent and apprehension. In the paroxysm of resentment, they at first meditated the design of emigrating into the British territory on the other side of the Mississippi; but unwilling to quit a soil endeared to them by habit, they induced the grand council of New Orleans to withhold the act of transfer. They demanded the recall of Ulloa, and sent deputies to Versailles, expressing their deep regret at being separated from France, and at the same time drawing an advantageous picture of the colony and its improving state.

Their appeal, however, was fruitless. The French king was not inclined to revoke or defer the cession, and merely tendered his good offices. On the other hand, the court of Spain, to prevent further delays or troubles, adopted the necessary precautions to enforce the submission of the colony. General O'Reilly was dispatched from the Havannah with a force of 5,000 men, and appeared at the mouth of the Mississippi in June, 1769. The sight of the Spanish pavilion occasioned a general insurrection. Some of the colonists proposed to resist the disembarkation of

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the troops, and destroy the vessels which conveyed them, others resumed their determination to seek an asylum in the british territory. At length the interference of the french commander, and the pathetic appeal of the magistrates, soothed their indignation. The spanish troops were permitted to land, and took possession of the colony ; but the new government did not adopt measures likely to conciliate the affections of the new subjects. The colonists were treated as rebels, six of their chiefs were decapitated ; others were transferred to the dungeons of the Havannah. These severities awed the refractory into sullen acquiescence ; but the rich proprietors abandoned their plantations ; the neighbouring people gradually withdrew from a market which was become precarious, and it was observed with reason, that by this transfer, Spain had only added another desert to her empire.\*

While this affair continued in suspense, Choiseul and Grimaldi were actively maturing their joint plans of hostility. But as they were both restrained by the pacific principles of their respective sovereigns, their ingenuity was exerted in raising subjects of contention, which might provoke an attack, and call into action the stipulations of the family compact.

\* Odouards Fantin. Hist. France, t. 6, p. 377, 388.—Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, t. 3, p. 113.

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One of the subjects was the appropriation of Corsica by France. After seeking a pretext for interference in the contest between the islanders and their sovereigns the genoese, the french minister fomented a struggle which exhausted both parties ; and at length profited by the weakness of both to occupy the island as a purchase from the republic of Genoa. The native government, which he had affected to patronise, was abolished ; Paoli, the patriot chief who had long and manfully sustained the liberties of his country, was compelled to seek a refuge in England ; and this island, so important from its position in the Mediterranean, was formally annexed to the french dominions.

This glaring incroachment in the time of peace roused a general sentiment of indignation in England. The impression was strengthened by the sympathy which the nation felt for a free people struggling to preserve their independence ; and the interest inspired by the person, character, and sufferings of the patriot chief, whose arrival in the british capital awakened the public enthusiasm. Had the ministers themselves been sufficiently remiss to connive at this attempt of France, the public spirit would not have permitted them to be silent. Lord Rochford, who had recently quitted his embassy at Madrid, was

CHAP. 66. dispatched to Paris, to insist on the immediate  
1764—1771. evacuation of Corsica.

But amidst cajoling professions of anxiety for peace, the conduct and language of Choiseul exhibited a series of studied insults to provoke a rupture, at the same time that he avoided the appearance of aggression. He refused to recall the troops, under the stale pretence, usually employed to justify French aggression, the dishonour of receding from an enterprise once commenced. He repeatedly declared, that although not desirous of war, he would not shrink from hostilities; and concluded one of his conversations with the contemptuous remark: "We will strictly fulfil the conditions of the last treaty, but you are much mistaken if you imagine that threats will deter us from pursuing any design not contrary to our engagements. I will not cross my room to soften your alarms."\*

By a minister as vigorous and decisive as Mr. Pitt, this mixture of prevarication and insult would have been repelled with becoming indignation. But the existing administration, embroiled with political feuds and discontents in every quarter of the empire, and hopeless of co-operation abroad, were only anxious to avert hostilities. They employed their ingenuity to

\* Lord Rochford to Lord Shelburne, June 9, Sept. 14, 1768.

prove the insignificance of Corsica, temporised till the national enthusiasm had subsided, and then announced to the french government their acquiescence in the usurpation.\*

This concession did not prevent the recurrence of petty, though irritating, acts of provocation. The jealousy which Spain had invariably manifested with regard to her colonies, was next called into action, on the attempt of the english to establish themselves on the Malouine or Falkland's islands, situated opposite the eastern mouth of the straits of Magellan, which had been successively claimed or visited by the english, dutch, french, and spaniards. The editor of Anson, in the narrative of his memorable voyage round the world, had highly extolled their fertility and situation, as advantageous either for trading or warlike enterprises, in the pacific ocean. Accordingly, in 1748, an expedition was fitted out to explore them; but abandoned in consequence of remonstrances from Carvajal.†

To recal the attention of the maritime powers, particularly of England, to this object, Choiseul sent out the celebrated navigator Bougainville, to take possession of the most easterly of these islands, where, in 1764, he formed a settlement which he denominated Port Louis, in honour of the king of France.

\* Lord Rochford's dispatches. † See this vol. p. 39.

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This expedient produced the desired effect. The british government, jealous of the enterprises of France, as well as claiming the rights of prior discovery in these distant regions, almost at the same period sent out captain Byron, to explore and occupy the most westerly island. In consequence of his report, a settlement was formed in 1766, at a harbour named Port Egmont, in honour of the first lord of the admiralty. Both the english and french navigators published narratives of their respective voyages, with exaggerated descriptions of the new settlements.

Meanwhile the spanish court made a formal complaint to that of Versailles, against the occupation of an island, considered as a part of their territory. The claim was readily allowed. Bougainville himself, after repairing to Madrid, to make a formal renunciation, returned to the south seas, and surrendered the settlement to a governor sent from Buenos Ayres, who changed the name of Port Louis into the spanish appellation of Port Soledad.

These islands, which had been so highly vaunted, were soon found to be a sterile and unprofitable possession. It is not improbable that the british settlement would have been abandoned, had the activity of the bourbon ministers allowed time for reflection. But instead of a formal complaint to the british court, an atten-

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1764—1771.June 7,  
1769.

tion which had been shewn towards France, the commandant of Port Soledad sent the new settlers orders to retire. On their refusal, a spanish schooner was dispatched to reconnoitre the port, but driven away by the menaces of captain Hunt of the Tamar, the principal officer on the station. Soon afterwards an expedition of 1,600 men, with artillery, fitted out by Don Francisco Bucarelli, governor of Buenos Ayres, appeared before Port Egmont. Having obtained admission, under the pretence of procuring a supply of water, they found that captain Hunt had returned to England, and that the only force of the settlement consisted of a few soldiers with four pieces of artillery, and two sloops of war, under the command of captain Maltby. After an ineffectual parley, the troops were landed, and a few shot fired on both sides for the sake of form. The english then surrendered the island by a capitulation ; but to prevent them from conveying the earliest intelligence to Europe, their ships were detained for twenty days. The first regular communication of this proceeding was a notification by Prince Masserano, the spanish ambassador, to the secretary of state, signifying that the governor of Buenos Ayres had taken on himself to dispossess the english from an island which belonged to Spain.

The two ministers naturally expected that this

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insulting aggression would provoke England to declare war; but the prudence, or weakness, of the cabinet disappointed their hopes. In spite of the national clamour, a negotiation was opened for an amicable accommodation. Warlike preparations were indeed made, both by sea and land; parliament was assembled; and the speech of the king declared, that by the seizure of Port Egmont, the honour of the crown, and the rights of the nation had been deeply affected. He added, that an immediate application had been made for satisfaction, and announced his resolution to employ the force intrusted to his direction to procure justice, should amicable instances prove ineffectual. The addresses of parliament conveyed the strongest assurances of support.

Nov. 1770.

A demand was accordingly made, that the Spanish government should disavow the conduct of Bucarelli, and restore things to the same state as before the seizure. Instructions to this effect were transmitted to Mr. Harris,\* secretary to the embassy at Madrid, who, on the departure of Sir James Gray, was left as chargé d'affaires, and at the early age of twenty-four commenced his diplomatic career with this delicate transaction.

Grimaldi profited by the terms in which the demand was conceived, to provoke the resentment of his master; and induced him to appeal

\* Now Earl of Malmesbury.

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to the court of Versailles for the assistance stipulated by the family compact. He likewise evaded a discussion with Mr. Harris, under the pretence that proper instructions were transmitted to the Spanish ambassador in London, and in the midst of continual professions of his pacific inclinations, neglected no means to provoke a rupture. For this purpose, the instructions sent to Prince Masserano to offer the disavowal of Buccarelli were clogged with the declaration, that he had not exceeded his orders; and the proposal to cede the island without prejudice to the rights of Spain, with the frivolous demand, that the king of England should disavow the menaces of Captain Hunt. These conditions being deemed unsatisfactory, Mr. Harris was ordered to reiterate his application for an unconditional disavowal and restitution. At the same time warlike preparations were continued on both sides with equal vigour.

The Spanish minister, however, temporised till he could receive an answer from France, by renewing his general assurances, and again referring the negotiation to Masserano. Meanwhile he employed all the advantages of his situation and office to inflame the mind of the king, by exaggerating the encroachments and ambitious projects of England. He was supported by the advocates for war, at the head of

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whom were d'Aranda, and O'Reilly, an officer of Irish extraction, recently summoned from the Havannah to superintend the military arrangements. Troops were drawn into Gallicia, Murcia, and Andalusia; the regular army was completed by drafts from the militia; and increased activity employed to equip the navy, and prepare armaments at Cadiz and Ferrol. Transports were collected to convey reinforcements to America, the departure of the register ships was deferred, the payment of pensions suspended, and other expedients employed for raising supplies, as in time of actual war.

The hopes of Grimaldi were encouraged by the most confident assurances of support from Choiseul, and every measure on both sides indicated the speedy burst of the storm. As Masserano had only been commissioned to repeat his former offers, all negotiation was suspended; the British minister was ordered to quit Madrid, and the officers absent from the garrison at Gibraltar were summoned to their posts.

Grimaldi beheld the departure of the British minister with affected regret, and real satisfaction. But his triumph was of short duration. At the same moment, discouraging intelligence arrived from Paris. The machinations of Choiseul being discovered, he was suddenly dismissed and exiled; the advocates of war enveloped in

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his disgrace; and the helm of government intrusted to the duke d'Aiguillon, his most inveterate enemy, whose continuance in office depended on the preservation of peace with England. Louis the fifteenth announced the change in a letter written with his own hand to Charles, in which he briefly, but peremptorily observed, "My minister would have war, but I will not."\* This letter made a deep impression on the king, and rendered both him and his minister desirous of peace, from a conviction that Spain was unable alone to maintain a war against England.

Charles shewed no symptom of dissatisfaction, but it was with equal disappointment and chagrin that Grimaldi beheld the fall of his friend and patron, and the failure of their common designs. His mortification was increased by the taunts of d'Aranda and his partisans, who clamoured at his overweening confidence in the support of France. He reluctantly obeyed the order of the king, by transmitting instructions to prince Masserano, to accept, without delay, the propositions of England. The long-pending negotiation was instantly terminated, and the news arrived in Spain a few hours after Mr. Harris had quitted the capital.

Mr. Harris was met at Alorga, a village twenty leagues from Madrid, by a messenger

\* Lord Rochford to lord Grantham.

CHAP. 66. who conveyed the intelligence of the accommodation, with orders to return. He instantly hastened back, and appeared at court on the following morning, hoping, by this diligence, to prevent any embarrassment or suspense in the current affairs. But Grimaldi refused to acknowledge him in an official capacity, or even to present him to the king, alleging, that as he had been recalled, he could not resume a public character without a new credential. He broke forth into bitter invectives against this unavoidable informality ; he complained, that while Spain had deputed an ambassador of the highest rank to London, England sent only subordinate ministers to Madrid ; he declared that, in consequence of the abrupt recal of Mr. Harris, the court would enforce the rigid rules of etiquette, and " weigh," as he said, " the difference of characters in the balance of Astrea."

Adverting to the conduct of England towards France, where an english ambassador, or minister plenipotentiary, constantly resided, he peevishly asked, " Is the king of France a greater monarch than the king of Spain ? Have we not a right to similar marks of respect at the moment when a disagreeable broil has been happily terminated, and when the eyes of all Europe are fixed upon us ?"

The moderation of Mr. Harris, and the at-

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tentions of England, prevented the mischief which might have resulted from the mortified pride of the minister. On the representations of prince Masserano, lord Grantham was nominated ambassador, and the credentials of minister plenipotentiary were transmitted to Mr. Harris. The king was conciliated by this attention, and the spleen of Grimaldi being overawed, the plenipotentiary experienced the most flattering and cordial reception from the court. On his presentation, Charles observed, with that benignant smile which marked his satisfaction, "I have always seen you with pleasure, but never with so much as at the present moment."

Meanwhile, the armaments had been suspended, and after mutual explanations, the troops were disbanded, and the navy reduced to the peace establishment. The agreement concluded between prince Masserano and lord Rochford, who had been recently nominated secretary of state, was received by all ranks in Spain with marks of satisfaction, and by none more than by the king himself. Equal displeasure was testified against the family compact, and the conduct of France in deserting her engagements the first time she was called on to fulfil them.\* The

\* This account is drawn from lord Malmesbury's dispatches, and authentic documents.

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arrival of lord Grantham announced the re-establishment of harmony ; and Mr. Harris, whose temper and conduct had been so laudably displayed on this delicate occasion, quitted Madrid with every mark of consideration and regard, to distinguish his diplomatic talents at Berlin, Petersburgh, and the Hague.

In consequence of the preceding arrangement settled between lord Rochford and prince Masserano, Port Egmont was formally restored to England; but was soon afterwards abandoned as an expensive and useless cause of irritation to Spain.

Notwithstanding this arrangement, it was accepted with too much reluctance to remove the irritation and jealousy which subsisted. Accordingly, for several years, we observe Spain at different periods relapsing into a hostile disposition towards England, and only restrained from engaging in a new contest, by what Grimaldi alternately called the pusillanimity and incapacity of France.

The struggles and contending interests in the north of Europe, and particularly the ambitious projects of Russia, awakened this political rivalry. The designs of Catherine the second, to extend her dominion southwards, by the dismemberment of the turkish empire, gave rise to a war with the

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**Porte.** In the course of the contest, her arms were successful by land, and the independence, or rather dismemberment of the Crimea, extended her power towards the antient seat of the greek empire ; while her fleets, for the first time, appeared in the Mediterranean, and after annihilating that of the turks at Tchesme, rode triumphant in the Archipelago.

France could not, without alarm, behold the humiliation of an ally from whom she had long drawn important advantages, both commercial and political. This sentiment was still more deeply felt by the king of Spain, who, in the success of the russian navy, foresaw an obstacle to his darling scheme of acquiring a naval superiority in the Mediterranean.

In the midst of these events, new causes of jealousy arose in the north. As the means of abridging that extensive influence which Russia had recently acquired in Sweden, Spain had co-operated with France in encouraging the king, Gustavus, to change the constitution of his country, and at once to emancipate himself from the shackles of the aristocracy and the domination of a rival power. His attempt proving successful, and Russia menacing an invasion to restore the former government, the two bourbon courts assumed a hostile attitude : they an-

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nounced an intention to send a naval force into the Baltic, and to attack the Russian fleet, which was parading in the Archipelago. These movements provoked similar armaments on the part of England, who evinced her resolution to repress the naval enterprises of the Bourbon courts, either in the Baltic or the Mediterranean. A species of compromise took place. Russia abandoned the design of recovering her influence in Sweden, to pursue her views in other quarters; and the Bourbon courts shrunk from a contest with the naval power of England.

But, although a rupture was prevented, the language of Grimaldi shewed the inveterate jealousy which was still fostered against England. When d'Aiguillon represented their naval armament as a mere fleet of evolution, Grimaldi boldly avowed the real object, and condemned the French minister for pusillanimity in affecting to veil his designs. At the same time also that he testified unwillingness to engage in war as a principal, he announced the resolution of his sovereign to follow the example of England in arming, and to assist France if attacked.

At the moment when this revolution in Sweden threatened a crisis, the disclosure of the long-meditated plan for the dismemberment of Poland became a new source of alarm. The king of

Spain expressed his dissatisfaction at this injurious act of encroachment, with more energy than appeared to accord with his sedate and reserved temper. "Ambition and usurpation," he said, "do not surprise me in the king of Prussia, and the tzarina; but from the empress queen I did not expect such reserve and perfidy."

Had other powers participated in these sentiments, Spain would doubtless have warmly espoused the cause of the poles. But in this instance, she experienced the same equivocation from France as on other occasions. Anxious to interfere, though without the means or inclination to support a war, the duke d'Aiguillon testified unusual cordiality towards Grimaldi, fomented the displeasure of the king of Spain, and proposed to England to send a combined squadron into the Baltic, as the most prompt and effectual means of awing the partitioning powers. In this application he was warmly supported by Grimaldi, who, however dissatisfied with the french minister, and however jealous of England, was anxious to take an important share in the affairs of the north. He at the same time again brought forward the darling object of his own court, to sweep the russian intruders from the Mediterranean.

England, however, not only declining to enter

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into a combination which was calculated to promote the naval influence of the bourbon powers, but even evincing the same resolution as before to oppose their designs, France deprecated a contest, and Spain was necessitated to follow the example. The king affected great indifference on this occasion, declared that he was the least interested of any power in the changes of the north, and accepted the apology of the empress queen. But amidst this parade of moderation, his chagrin and disappointment at the desertion of France broke forth in every shape, and produced a greater degree of irritation between the two courts, than had taken place since the dismission of the infanta by the duke of Bourbon. D'Aiguillon did not scruple to censure the restless and hostile disposition of Spain; and imprudently disclosed to the english embassador the proposals, representations, and reproaches of the spanish cabinet. He frequently repeated, in a mixed tone of irony and vexation, "The family compact is an honourable, and might be an advantageous engagement to France; it shall be my concern that it does not prove ruinous. Should Spain be wantonly insulted by the english, France is ready to avenge her in a becoming manner, but will not engage in every nonsensical quarrel she may chuse to provoke." In

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the time of Choiseul, Spanish opinions were laws in France; but I have been obliged to tell them that France is the ally, and not the subject of the Catholic King. Spain is so troublesome, that I scarcely know which way to turn, or what to think." On the other hand, Grimaldi was not sparing of complaints or invectives. He lamented that the Bourbon courts had lost a critical juncture to humble England, when its navy was neglected, and might have fallen an easy prey. On other occasions, he broke out into expressions of indignation and contempt; and asked, "How can Spain enter into any serious engagement with a power which has neither ministers nor money?"

These mutual bickerings and accusations created a degree of alienation between the two Bourbon powers, and, fortunately for Europe, prevented that union of counsels and force which had already provoked a general war, and afterwards again disturbed the public tranquillity. But though too much debilitated to preserve that commanding tone which she had hitherto assumed, the policy of France was never more ably developed than on this critical occasion. After in vain opposing the aggrandisement of Russia, she succeeded in excluding England from the negotiation by which it was to be

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consolidated, and opened the way for an amicable intercourse with the tzarina, by mediating the peace of Kagnardji, which set the seal to her grand designs for the extension of her territorial and naval power.\*

\* Lord Malmesbury's correspondence.—Official documents and private information from Madrid.—Lord Grantham's and lord Rochford's dispatches.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTY-SEVENTH.

1769—1773.

*Administration, reforms, and regulations of d'Aranda—Causes of his resignation—Appointment to the embassy at Paris.*

PEACE being established abroad, and tranquillity restored at home, Charles introduced numerous regulations in the church and state, and directed his attention to the improvement of the arts, sciences, manufactures, and agriculture. The principal agent of these operations was d'Aranda, who, in the post of president of Castile, at once guided the interior administration, and appropriated many of the functions which had been hitherto exercised by the secretaries of state.

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From character and situation, d'Aranda was admirably fitted for this delicate and arduous task. He was descended from one of the most illustrious families in Aragon, and joined extensive possessions with the splendour of high rank. He inherited the lofty spirit which marked the national character in the freest times of the monarchy; his mind was improved and enlarged by foreign travel; his courage and firm-

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ness were united with a perseverance which neither difficulties nor obstacles could daunt. Devoting himself to the military profession, he had visited Prussia to examine the system of military tactics which was the envy and model of Europe. In France he had acquired the graces of polished society, and imbibed that freedom of sentiment which then began to be fashionable, and has since been carried to such a dangerous excess. Déploring the apathy and intolérance of his nation, and conscious of the vast resources which lay dormant within reach, he returned to his native country fraught with plans of reform; and ambitious to rouse the slumbering genius of Spain.

At an early period of the reign of Charles, d'Aranda obtained those marks of consideration which were due to his high rank and distinguished character; and, in the short contest with Portugal, was intrusted with the military command. But his talents, popularity, and lofty spirit, alarmed the jealousy of Squilaci; and, to remove him from the presence of the sovereign, he was sent to fill the office of captain general of Valencia.

His merits, however, could not long be enveloped in obscurity, and the troubles which occasioned the fall of Squilaci recalled him to a theatre more worthy of his talents and character.



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His influence and decision operated like a charm in soothing and awing the minds of a turbulent and irritated populace. He summoned the chief of the malcontents, and required his assistance in restoring tranquillity. The demagogue was gained or awed, and, collecting his turbulent comrades, concluded an harangue, which he employed to persuade them to quit the signal of insurrection, with the declaration, "the king wishes, d'Aranda desires, and I command it."

The pretext for tumult being happily removed, d'Aranda found little difficulty in re-establishing order. He not only freed the capital from the idle and vicious, but formed a new division of the municipal government into sixty-four barrios or wards, for the maintenance of an efficient police. Lastly, he secured the introduction of a permanent garrison, and thus emancipated the court from the caprice and insolence of a licentious populace, who, on numerous occasions, had awed and insulted even the sovereigns themselves.

His services secured the esteem and favour of a monarch, in whose character gratitude was a prominent feature; while his dignified deportment and determined spirit extorted respect from the inhabitants of the capital, and the nation in general. In assuming the presidency of Castile, which had been long left vacant, he gave to that

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office all the dignity and consideration which was due to one of the highest posts in the monarchy. His administration is marked by a series of salutary regulations, which form a memorable æra in the history and government of his country; as well from the diffusion of new and more liberal principles, as from the attempts to confine the overgrown power of the church, and to naturalize a spirit of toleration hitherto unknown in Spain.

In tracing the outline of the new system, our attention is first attracted by the ecclesiastical department. The papal nuntios had repeatedly abused the devout submission of the Spanish people, to enlarge their powers, and consequently to extend the influence of the holy see, to the detriment of the nation and the crown. They were permitted to form a tribunal, where, by means of their auditor, they received appeals from the archbishops and bishops, and decided both civil and criminal causes, in which the regular clergy were concerned. It is needless to expatiate on the shameful exactions, peculations, and injustice which flowed from this establishment of a foreign jurisdiction. In 1771, the court of Madrid circumscribed this self-constituted authority, by obtaining from Clement the fourteenth a brief, reforming the tribunal, and substituting, instead of the auditor, who was the

mere creature of the nuntio, a rota or council resident at Madrid like that of Rome, consisting of six native ecclesiastics, proposed by the king and nominated by the pope.

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A regulation equally important in regard to morals and policy, was the order for reforming the scandalous lives of the monastic bodies, who, under the guise of sanctity and their peculiar privileges, committed almost every excess with impunity. Connected with this plan was the restriction of the privilege of sanctuary, which had encouraged murders and other enormities, by confining the number of asylums to two churches in the capital of each province, and one in each town. The daily processions, called Rosarias, were likewise suppressed, from the encouragement which they afforded to idleness and vice.

But it was in attacking the authority of the inquisition that the courage and liberal principles of d'Aranda were most conspicuous. In this design he was strongly supported by the sovereign, who, having long resided in a country where this dreadful tribunal had never been permitted to rear its head, had shewn an invariable jealousy of its despotism. Soon after his accession, Charles had resisted the power usurped by the popes over the press, who employed the inquisition to censure or prohibit particular

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works. Such a censure being issued against a book entitled, *Verités Chretiennes*, he not only testified his displeasure against the nuntio and the inquisitor general, but promulgated a decree, that no papal brief should have effect in Spain, unless ratified with the royal sanction. The nuntio was enjoined to present such briefs for the examination of the council of Castile, and the grand inquisitor was equally ordered to submit his censures of works to be promulgated in the name of the king. This petty triumph over ecclesiastical encroachment was of short duration. The devout mind of Charles was swayed by the representations of the confessor, and the decree was rescinded in the ensuing year.

D'Aranda, however, confiding in the support of the sovereign, and the confidence of the nation, obtained the revival of this decree. Adopting the same plan, as in the new modification of the nuntiature, he submitted the proposal to a council composed of magistrates and bishops. With their approbation, he again enforced a judicious regulation, which, without infringing the real rights of the national church, or the rules of ecclesiastical discipline, circumscribed that controul over the press, which more than any other cause had checked the diffusion of knowledge in Spain.

The eagerness of the inquisition to recover its

power and extend its jurisdiction to every cause, in the slightest degree connected with ecclesiastical discipline, drew on it a new mortification. The inquisitors having taken from the auditor of the army a process instituted against a veteran who was accused of bigamy, the jealousy which the king entertained against the tribunal revived; and d'Aranda profited by this circumstance to obtain a royal decree, ordering the process again to be restored to the civil tribunal. This was accompanied with an injunction to the inquisition, to abstain from interfering in the proceedings of the civil courts; to confine itself to its proper functions, the prosecution of heresy and apostacy, and to imprison no subject without solid proofs of guilt, under the pain of being called to a strict account. This law put a stop to that shameful tyranny which had too often been exercised in the gratification of private envy, vengeance, and avarice.

Another abuse which attracted the attention of d'Aranda, was the right enjoyed by the holy office, of appropriating the property of condemned criminals, which had too frequently influenced the judges in delivering their sentences. As these confiscations formed the maintenance of the different officers, consisting of three judges, a nuntio extraordinary, and twenty-two secretaries, he proposed to substitute regular salaries,

CHAP. 67. which would have amounted to the annual sum  
1769—1773. of £. 25,000 sterling. Indeed, this and similar regulations were evidently designed to forward the total abolition of this once formidable tribunal, or at least to reduce it to insignificance. But the secret being prematurely disclosed by the literary loquacity of the french encyclopedists, to whom d'Aranda had communicated his views, the inquisition and its partisans caught the alarm. Although the proposed salary was comparatively inconsiderable, they wrought on the œconomical temper of the monarch, and the minister was compelled to abandon a regulation which would have removed a fertile source of injustice, and at the same time have rendered the holy tribunal wholly dependent on the crown.\*

Among the civil regulations, Spain owes to d'Aranda the establishment of a census, and the first authentic statement of her population, which, like that of other countries, had been

\* When at Paris, in 1786, I received the following anecdote from a person connected with the encyclopedists. During his residence in that capital, d'Aranda had frequently testified to the literati, with whom he associated, his resolution to obtain the abolition of the inquisition, should he ever be called to power. His appointment was therefore exultingly hailed by the party, particularly by d'Alembert; and he had scarcely begun his reforms before an article was inserted in the Encyclopedia, then printing, in which this event was confidently anticipated, from the liberal principles of the minister. D'Aranda was struck on reading this article, and said, "This imprudent disclosure will raise such a ferment against me, that my plans will be foiled." He was not mistaken in his conjecture.

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hitherto the subject of calculation and conjecture. Superior to that idle affectation of mystery, which vainly seeks to conceal the national weakness by flattery or imposition, he caused the examination to be made with all possible exactness and publicity. He manfully exposed the result, though it proved the rapid decline which had taken place in the population, since the brilliant periods of the Spanish monarchy. He thus left to his successors a valuable guide for their future measures, and a stimulus to their exertions for improvement.

Among the measures which distinguished the administration of d'Aranda, was the foundation of schools to supply the void in public education, occasioned by the banishment of the jesuits. A system was arranged, by which the instruction of youth was intrusted to a body of secular priests; and seminaries were instituted either by the patronage or protection of the monarch, on a new and enlarged plan. Of these, the principal was the academy of St. Isidore, in the house formerly occupied by the jesuits at Madrid.

1770.

A design calculated to effect a change in the moral habits of the Spaniards, was the establishment of foreign colonies in the Sierra Morena, hitherto the terror of travellers, the haunt of wild beasts, or of banditti scarcely less savage. The intent was at once to secure the safety of a

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district situated on one of the most frequented communications of the kingdom, and to exhibit to the eyes and emulation of the people, the advantages and improvements of foreign industry.

The projector of this establishment was Don Pablo Olavide, whose subsequent misfortunes awakened the sympathy of Europe. He was a native of Peru, and raised himself by merit to the office of judge at Lima. His opposition to existing customs having rendered him obnoxious to the jesuits, then so powerful in the Spanish colonies, a process was instituted against him, and he was summoned to Madrid. Losing his cause, he was imprisoned for debt. He was, however, liberated by a rich widow whom he espoused; and travelling through Italy and France, fixed his residence at Paris. In consequence of a dispute relative to his wife's fortune, he returned to Madrid. He distinguished himself by his literary acquirements, introduced translations of French pieces on the stage, and assisted in establishing a periodical paper which excited considerable interest.

Having attracted the notice of d'Aranda, he drew up, at his request, a plan for the education of youth. He rapidly rose in the esteem of the minister, was employed in the expulsion of the jesuits, and obtained the office of syndic at Madrid. He was afterwards appointed to the

Ilucreative post of assistente at Seville, and, remov-  
ing his residence to that city, greatly contributed  
to its ornament and improvement.

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Here he formed a plan for colonizing the Sierra Morena, and his proposal was approved by government through the influence of his patron. He accordingly drew colonists from Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, principally protestants, and founded the new settlement named la Carolina; in honour of the sovereign. His zeal and activity being aided by the assistance of government, the colony made a satisfactory progress, though placed in an unfavourable situation; and within a short period exhibited an industrious and thriving population of 6,000 souls.

Among the military regulations of d'Aranda, was a new plan for recruiting the army. In 1770, when the dispute relative to Falkland's islands appeared likely to terminate in a rupture with England, the deficiency in the military establishment was found to exceed 18,000 men. For the prompt supply of this vacancy, as well as a permanent resource for future occasions, a regulation was established to recruit the army from the militia, by a reduction of the term of service, and other indulgences; and, to further the operation of this plan, a change was effected in the constitution of the militia.

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In 1772, a reformation was made in the coin of Spain, which was shamefully debased. The old currency of all kinds was called in, and replaced by new money of good quality, and superior execution, at the royal expence.

It is greatly to be lamented that the beneficial labours of this enlightened statesman should have been terminated by his removal from office, and still more to be regretted that this event was accelerated by his own imprudence. It cannot be denied that his virtues and merits were counterbalanced by equal defects. The warmth of his temper too frequently rendered him presumptuous and overbearing, impatient and irritable; and on the slightest opposition to his designs, he became fretful and violent, or sunk into fits of spleen and sullenness. Too vehement in his pursuits, he respected neither the dictates of prudence, the customs of his country, or the feelings of his sovereign; and in his zeal for reform, appeared resolved to sweep away all institutions which did not accord with his own ideas of perfection. He was involved in incessant bickerings with Grimaldi, whose timid character he derided and despised, and he once so far forgot the respect due to royalty as to call him, in the presence of the monarch, the most weak, indolent, sycophantic, and time-serving minister with whom Spain was ever cursed.

Proud of his acquaintance with prussian tactics, and animated with a chivalrous rage for war, he was anxious to obliterate the disgrace of his unfortunate campaign in Portugal. Hence he inflamed the bourbon prejudices and commercial jealousy of the sovereign, and spurned at the idea that Spain was unable to cope with England, without the aid of France.

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But, above all, he was deeply imbued with principles the most ungrateful to the feelings of a spanish monarch. Devoted to his native province, and an enthusiast for its darling constitution, he manifested too strong an inclination to revive many of those laws and institutions which had divided Spain into different nations, and had reduced the sovereigns of Aragon to a condition scarcely less degrading and inefficient than the pageant kings of Poland.

It was not likely that such an ardent and aspiring spirit should pursue his career of innovation without encountering endless obstacles and mortifications. His projects naturally drew on him the odium of all who were averse to change, of all who were attached to the established religion. He offended the king by attempts to circumscribe the prerogative; Grimaldi, by insults and invectives; the confessor, by the profession of principles not calculated for the

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meridian of Spain, nor even consistent with the sentiments of a zealous catholic.

For a considerable period, in his fits of ill humour, he had frequently demanded his dismission, and solicited the embassy of Paris, which was likely to be vacant by the retreat of the count of Fuentes. In other moments, he reflected on the satisfaction which his removal would give to Grimaldi and the confessor; and, with his characteristic obstinacy, declared that he would persist in retaining his office, because he would not gratify his enemies by his retreat. These expressions of alternate pride and disgust at length reached the ears of the monarch, and contributed to increase that dissatisfaction which was inspired by a daring spirit of reform, and an unbending, if not disrespectful conduct.

For some time, his dismission was retarded by the opposition of Grimaldi himself, who was unable to procure his complete disgrace, and unwilling to permit his establishment at Paris, where he was solicitous to maintain his own influence. At length, however, the provocations of d'Aranda overcame his repugnance, and, on the retreat of Fuentes, he profited by the opportunity to free himself from the persecutions of so bitter an enemy. Accordingly, to the astonishment perhaps of the discontented statesman him-

self, and the regret of his partisans, he was informed, that the king reluctantly acquiesced in his wishes to retire, and gratified him with the long-solicited embassy of Paris.

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In the altercations of the cabinet, which marked the latter period of his career, an anecdote has been preserved, which displays the independent and intemperate spirit of the minister, and still more the good nature and forbearance of the monarch. As he was urging some of his reforms with his characteristic perseverance, the king, after in vain attempting to check him, exclaimed, "Count d'Aranda, you are more obstinate than an aragonese mule!"\* "Please your majesty," rejoined the count, "I knew one more obstinate." To the question, "Who?" he added, "His sacred majesty, Don Carlos the third, king of Spain and the Indies." The king smiled at the sally, dismissed him with his usual complacency, and was accustomed to relate the anecdote with apparent satisfaction.†

Even after his removal was announced, no attention was omitted to shew the degree of consideration in which he was held, and he continued to exercise his high offices till the moment

\* Alluding to the proverbial obstinacy of this animal in Aragon, the native province of d'Aranda.

† From a person to whom it was told by d'Aranda himself.

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of his departure. Grimaldi endeavoured to induce the count of Fuentes to accept the presidency of Castile; but failing in his attempt, he persuaded the king to leave it vacant, and the function of governor was exercised by the abbot Figueroa, an aged, prudent, and conciliating ecclesiastic, who had distinguished himself by negotiating the concordate of Ferdinand the sixth with the holy see. On his death, it was transferred to the celebrated Campomanes, one of the fiscals, who had enjoyed the confidence of d'Aranda, and whose literary labours form an era in the civil and political history of Spain. D'Aranda, was succeeded in the post of governor of Madrid, by O'Reilly, who was patronised by Grimaldi, and much esteemed by the king.

Although we cannot approve the temerity and imprudence of d'Aranda, yet we observe, with regret and sorrow, the effects of intolerance which followed his removal, and the temporary revival of the inquisitorial power.

The victim which marks this period, was the celebrated Olavide, whose arrest suspended the progress of colonization in the Sierra Morena. This incident was derived from the same causes which had contributed to the removal of his protector. With a similar spirit of free thinking, which he had imbibed from the fashionable phi-

losophers of the day, he was equally offended by the obstacles which he experienced in his beneficial designs, from the prejudices and institutions of Spain. As most of the colonists were protestants, he resisted all endeavours for their conversion, and opposed the attempts to enforce their attendance on the rites of the catholic worship. Having established a law to permit no monks in the vicinity of the settlement, he obtained an order for the removal of a convent, and built his own house on the site. He frequently indulged himself in expressions of ridicule against the idleness and licentiousness of the monks, and spoke with too great freedom of the depopulation and other mischiefs occasioned by the celibacy of the clergy.

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His imprudence awakened the jealousy of the spanish church. His conduct was closely scrutinised ; his words and actions were noted, and exaggerated ; and a formal accusation was preferred against him for heresy, before that tribunal which is considered as the bulwark of religion. The removal of his protector gave scope to the machinations of his enemies. He was summoned to Madrid, under the pretence of rendering an account of the establishment under his care. Apprised of his danger, he made some ineffectual attempts to obtain the royal pro-

1775

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Nov. 14,  
1776.

tection, and to soothe the guardians of the faith ; but, after a residence of a twelve-month in the capital, he was suddenly arrested, and conveyed to the prisons of the inquisition ; his papers were seized, and his effects sequestrated.

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1778.

After two years of impenetrable seclusion, his process was closed, and his sentence publicly announced. We give an account of this ceremony in the words of an eye witness.

" The *autillos de fé* are still celebrated at the tribunal of the inquisition, with more or less publicity, according to the impressions intended to be made. A great number of persons, of all ranks, civil, military, and ecclesiastical, were invited, I should rather say, summoned, to attend at the holy office, at eight o'clock in the morning, on the 24th of last month. They were all totally ignorant of the reason of their being called on. After waiting some time, in an apartment destined for their reception, they were admitted to the tribunal ; a long darkish room, with the windows near the cieling, and furnished with a crucifix, under a black canopy ; a table, with two chairs, for the inquisitors ; a stool for the prisoner ; two chairs for his guards ; and benches for the spectators. The familiars of the inquisition, Abrantes, Mora, and others, grandees of

Spain, attended as servants, without hats or swords.

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"Olavide soon appeared, attended by brothers in black, his looks quite cast down, his hands closed together, and holding a green taper. His dress was an olive-coloured coat and waist-coat, white canvas breeches, and thread stockings, and his hair was combed back into a bag. He was seated on the stool prepared for him. The secretaries then read, during three hours, the accustomed accusations and proceedings against him. They consisted of above a hundred articles, such as his possession of free books, loose pictures, letters of recommendation from Voltaire, his having neglected some external duties of devotion, uttering hasty expressions, his inattention to images, together with every particular of his life, birth, and education, were all noted. It concluded with declaring him guilty of heresy. At that moment he fainted away, but was brought to the recovery of his senses, that he might hear the sentence pronounced against him. It was no less than this: deprivation of all his offices, incapacity of holding any hereafter, or of receiving any royal favour, confiscation of his property, banishment to thirty leagues from Madrid, from all places of royal residence, from Seville, the new colony, and

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Lima, the place of his birth; prohibition from riding on horseback, or wearing gold, silver, or silk; and eight years confinement and monastic discipline in a convent. From respect to St. Jago, his wearing the cross of that order was not mentioned, and he was excused from putting on the san benito.

"The sentence being read, he was led to the table, where, on his knees, he recanted his errors, and acknowledged his implicit belief in the articles of the roman catholic faith. Four priests in surplices, and with wands in their hands, then came in. They repeatedly laid their wands across his shoulders, while a *miserere* was sung. He then withdrew, the inquisitors bowed, and the strangers silently departed, with terror in their hearts, but discretion on their lips."

However rigorous this punishment may appear, yet it is mild when compared with the severity with which the inquisition formerly visited similar offences. Nothing less than the personal interference of the monarch himself, and the clemency of the grand inquisitor, could probably have prevented a repetition of those dreadful scenes which have rendered this formidable tribunal an object of universal horror; for the confessor, and many of the subordinate

members, insisted on the necessity of an *auto de fé*, in which Olivade would have been infallibly committed to the flames.\*

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\* The contents of this chapter are drawn from various documents not hitherto published, consisting of lord Grantham's dispatches, and other official papers from Madrid.—Also Beccatini, *passim*,—and the *Mercurio Historico*, published at Madrid, 1771—1773.—Burgoing, Laborde, and Townshend, *passim*.

END OF VOL. IV.



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